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Health Reform Reconstruction
Lindsay F. Wiley,†* Elizabeth Y. McCuskey,** Matthew B. Lawrence*** &
Erin C. Fuse Brown****
This Article connects the failed, inequitable U.S. coronavirus pandemic
response to conceptual and structural constraints that have held back U.S
health reform for decades and calls for reconstruction. For more than a halfcentury, a cramped “iron triangle” ethos has constrained health reform
conceptually. Reforms aimed to balance individual interests in cost, quality,
and access to health care, while marginalizing equity, solidarity, and public
health. In the iron triangle era, reforms unquestioningly accommodated
four legally and logistically entrenched fixtures — individualism, fiscal
fragmentation, privatization, and federalism — that distort and diffuse any
reach toward social justice. The profound racial disparities and public
health failures of the U.S. pandemic response have agonizingly manifested
the limitations of pre-2020 health reform and demand a reconstruction.
Health reform reconstruction begins with a new conceptual framework
that aims to realize health justice. Health justice requires commitments to
anti-racism, equitable distribution of the burdens and benefits of public
investments in health care and public health (for which health care access,
quality, and cost are useful, but not exhaustive, metrics), and community
empowerment. These commitments put health justice on a collision course
† Copyright © 2021 Lindsay F. Wiley, Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Matthew B.
Lawrence & Erin C. Fuse Brown. The authors are grateful to Nicholas Bagley, Dayna
Bowen Matthew, Isaac Buck, Rob Field, Allison Hoffman, Jill Horwitz, Peter Jacobson,
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session, and the Georgia State University College of Law faculty retreat for their input
and to Joseph Allen and Chelsea Campbell for their research assistance.
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with the fixtures of individualism, fiscal fragmentation, privatization, and
federalism. Thus, incremental reforms must be measured by the extent to
which they confront these fixtures. This Article describes how health reform
reconstruction can chart the path for legal change and proposes
“confrontational incrementalism” as a method for recognizing the necessity
of reconstructive reform, along with its near impossibility.
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INTRODUCTION
Post-2020, it is no longer tenable for health care reform to
accommodate the individualistic, fragmented, privatized mess that
passes for a health system in the United States.1 The conscienceshocking scale of death and devastation wrought by the COVID
pandemic in the wealthiest country in the world is a fiasco — a
consequence of human failures compounding a natural disaster.2
Governments at every level failed to discharge their core obligations to
protect the people’s health and welfare.3 Worse, communities of color
bore the brunt of death and suffering, due to the existential failure of
past reforms to rectify the racism, economic injustice, and other forms
of subordination (the systematic oppression of one social group to the
benefit of another) baked into the American legal and health systems.4
1 See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Matthew B. Lawrence, Elizabeth Y. McCuskey & Lindsay
F. Wiley, Social Solidarity in Health Care, American-Style, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 411,
411 (2020) (describing four fixtures of the US legal and health care systems that have
prevented the achievement of social solidarity: federalism, fiscal pluralism,
privatization, and individualism). In this Article, we use the term “health system” to
describe the ideal in which public health and health care are integrated into a single
system, “[t]he defining goal” of which “is to improve the health of the population.”
Christopher J.L. Murray & Julio Frenk, A Framework for Assessing the Performance of
Health Systems, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 717, 719 (2000). We use the term “health
care system” to describe the current U.S. system of health care financing and delivery,
in which health care providers, insurers, financers, and regulators are largely insulated
from being measured according to their ability to improve the public’s health. See
WILLIAM L. KISSICK, MEDICINE’S DILEMMA’S: INFINITE NEEDS VERSUS FINITE RESOURCES 2-3
(1994).
2 See Alexandra Ellerbeck, The Health 202: Here’s How the U.S. Compares to Other
Countries on the Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2021, 7:52 AM EDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/12/health-202-here-how-us-comparesother-countries-coronavirus-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/A53K-VV45] (surveying
statistical measures of COVID-19 impacts in the US and comparing them to measures
from similarly situated countries).
3 See Lindsay F. Wiley, Democratizing the Law of Social Distancing, 19 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y., L. & ETHICS 50, 68-79 (2020) [hereinafter Social Distancing] (documenting the U.S.
response to the COVID pandemic); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Some Said the Vaccine Rollout Would
Be a ‘Nightmare.’ They Were Right., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/12/23/opinion/vaccine-distribution.html [https://perma.cc/XG4H-UTDF] (“[I]t turns
out that getting fuel, tanks and tents into war-torn mountainous Afghanistan is in many ways
simpler than passing out a vaccine in our privatized, profit-focused and highly fragmented
medical system.”).
4 See Emily A. Benfer, Seema Mohapatra, Lindsay F. Wiley & Ruqaiijah Yearby,
Health Justice Strategies to Combat the Pandemic: Eliminating Discrimination, Poverty, and
Health Disparities During and After COVID-19, 19 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 122,
124-27, 129-35 (2020) (surveying literature on disparities in COVID infection, severe
illness and death and connecting disparities to racism, poverty, and other forms of
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The health care system was not the only — or even the most important
— social determinant of the failed pandemic response in the United
States.5 Risks associated with employment, housing, and other factors
were critical,6 as were failures of leadership, law, and policy. An
equitable system for health care delivery and financing is thus a
necessary but insufficient requirement for a successful pandemic
response.
It has been clear for decades that the U.S. health system is broken, but
the sheer scale of injustice during the pandemic has made it impossible
to pretend that haphazardly incremental reforms will be adequate. With
subordination); Angela P. Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of Health: A New
Approach to Challenging Structural Inequality, 67 UCLA L. REV. 758, 762 (2020) (arguing
that “[s]ubordination based on markers of social stigma such as race, gender, sexuality,
and class is chief among the structural forces creating unjust access to health-promoting
opportunities and resources” and explaining choice to use the term subordination rather
than oppression “in recognition of the legal literature distinguishing antisubordination
from anticlassification approaches to the Equal Protection Clause”); Ruqaiijah Yearby
& Seema Mohapatra, Systemic Racism, the Government’s Pandemic Response, and Racial
Inequities in COVID-19, 70 EMORY L.J. 1419, 1428-31 (2021) (describing the influence
of systemic racism on racial inequities during the COVID pandemic).
5 See Benfer et al., supra note 4, 130-36 (describing the impact of health care and
other social determinants of health on racial disparities during the COVID pandemic).
6 Access to health care is “one among many social determinants of health.” Lindsay
F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 53 (2014)
[hereinafter Social Justice]. The social determinants of health “encompass[] the full set
of social conditions in which people live and work” including both the “structural
determinants of health inequities” and “the more immediate determinants of individual
health.” ORIELLE SOLAR & ALEC IRWIN, WORLD HEALTH ORG., A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
FOR
ACTION ON THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH 9 (2010),
https://www.who.int/sdhconference/resources/ConceptualframeworkforactiononSDH_
eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT3W-JKSU]. The structural determinants of health
inequities include “social and political mechanisms that generate, configure and
maintain social hierarchies,” while the more immediate determinants of individual
health include “material circumstances; psychosocial circumstances; behavioral and/or
biological factors; and the health system itself.” Id. at 5-6; see UNEQUAL TREATMENT:
CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 35 (Brian D. Smedley,
Adrienne Y. Stith & Alan R. Nelson eds., 2003), https://doi.org/10.17226/12875
[https://perma.cc/7TRU-YE7P] [hereinafter UNEQUAL TREATMENT] (noting that
universal health care is “necessary but insufficient in and of itself to address racial and
ethnic disparities in healthcare”); William M. Sage & Jennifer E. Laurin, The
Medicalization of Poverty: If You Would Not Criminalize Poverty, Do Not Medicalize It, 46
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 573, 573 (2018) (“Both federal and state actors under-invest in
education and neglect non-medical social services while massively indulging in
overpriced, often ineffective medical care—a skew that is particularly bad for the
poor. . . . [L]aw helped create and now perpetuates this gross misallocation of social
resources.”); see, e.g., Benfer et al., supra note 4 (tracing racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic disparities in COVID to disparities in housing, employment, and health
care).

2021]

Health Reform Reconstruction

661

this knowledge, it is not enough to renew our commitment to pre-2020
health reform principles. The “iron triangle” — health care access, cost,
and quality — that has informed a half-century of reforms lacks the
ambition and scope to guide our next steps. We must reconstruct health
reform, and ultimately the health system, using new principles and a
new method. Incremental reforms may be unavoidable but they must
be designed to be intentionally confrontational, with an eye toward their
place in the broader project of upending or transcending the legal
structures that undermine public health and propagate subordination
and inequity.
The thesis of this Article is that decades of reforms failed to prepare
the United States for 2020 because health reform has been conceptually
and structurally constrained and to transcend these constraints requires
nothing short of reconstruction.7
7 Casting the project of overcoming and replacing the conceptions and structures
that have defined and constrained health reform as a reconstruction recognizes three
dimensions of the term: first, its definition, “to construct again” especially after severe
damage, captures our argument that the U.S. system is even more damaged after the
pandemic and requires rebuilding with a new ethos for a new age. See Reconstruct,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reconstruct (last
visited Aug. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/BU2Q-AX5L]. Second, its medical meaning
contemplates surgical restoration of function in a body part, also after damage or to
correct structural defects. See, e.g., Reconstructive Surgery, WEBMD,
https://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/reconstructive-surgery (last visited Aug. 24,
2021) [https://perma.cc/C67M-P9KG] (describing reconstructive surgery in the clinical
sense). Third, the anti-subordination valence of our argument makes normative claims
about the transformative reforms necessary to address the effects of systemic racism. It
thus draws normative perspective from the post-Civil War Reconstruction period and
Civil Rights movement (often referred to as the Second Reconstruction), as well as the
laws and critical theory that have grown out of them. Cf., e.g., Rhonda V. Magee
Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race Consciousness and
Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483, 486 (2003) (“A fully
reconstructed America must necessarily commit to redressing the myriad present-day
harms that result from the legacy and contemporaneous manifestations of racialist
thought and policy.”); Richard Thompson Ford, Rethinking Rights After the Second
Reconstruction, 123 YALE L. J. 2942, 2949-50 (2014) (describing civil rights and antidiscrimination law as part of the Second Reconstruction); Angela P. Harris, Foreword:
The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 741, 765 (1994) (describing
“reconstruction jurisprudence” as “committed to transforming . . . paradigms as well as
criticizing them,” and embodying reference to “the legacy of slavery in the New World
and the unfinished revolutions of the First and Second Reconstructions”); Jeneen
Interlandi, Why Doesn’t the United States Have Universal Health Care? The Answer Has
Everything to Do with Race, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/universal-health-care-racism.html [https://perma.cc/
RY8U-NSGS] (tracing the history of the U.S. health system from the post-Civil War
Reconstruction era to the present day and noting that “[d]isparity is built into the
system”); Vann R. Newkirk II, America’s Health Segregation Problem, ATLANTIC (May 18,
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We develop the project of health reform reconstruction by drawing
four vital lessons from the pandemic — a pair of normative lessons
bookending a pair of constructive lessons. First, health justice must
replace the long-dominant but conceptually blinkered iron triangle.
Second, legally and logistically entrenched fixtures of individualism,
fiscal fragmentation, federalism, and privatization constrain health
reform even when it reaches toward health justice, as it has done at
times during the pandemic. Third, each of these fixtures reinforces and
stems from racism and other forms of social subordination. Fourth, to
make meaningful progress toward health justice, even incremental
reforms must confront or transcend the fixtures that have constrained
reform for decades.
The first lesson we draw from the pandemic is that health reform
requires new principles rooted in solidarity, equity, and justice. In Part
I, we argue that 2020 should mark the end of what we call “the iron
triangle era” of health reform, dating back to the 1960s, in which
reforms sought to balance three points: access to, quality of, and costs
of medical care. Over time, the iron triangle’s mode of pragmatic
tradeoffs created a piecemeal approach to health care regulation that
culminated in the Affordable Care Act.

2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/americas-health-segregationproblem/483219/ [https://perma.cc/PJA4-KM5G] (tracing the history of de facto and de
jure racial segregation in health care from the Jim Crow era to today). We recognize
that reconstruction efforts come with trenchant backlash. See generally Keith Aoki, The
Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1468
(1996) (describing backlash as “vituperative and largely unconscious reaction to the
social progress” of marginalized communities); Ford, supra, at 2949 (“The Supreme
Court has used individual rights to undermine much of the practical work of the Second
Reconstruction . . . .”); Harris, supra, at 758 (noting the “political backlash against
feminism and civil rights”). In health reform, even the modest, market-based ACA has
already sparked backlash. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, The ACA, Repeal, and the Politics of
Backlash, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20200305.771008/full/ [https://perma.cc/A22T-TWRD] (tracing the
political backlash during the first decade after the ACA’s enactment). So acknowledging
that the backlash to health reform is inevitable, we argue that such reform should at
least aim for a reconstruction. For an early use of “reconstruction” with respect to health
reform, see Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social
Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509,
551 (1984) (“[T]he very struggle to reconstruct health care, organized along mutual aid
lines which stress cooperative and caring relations, helps to provide a grace . . . and
character to society and to each person who struggles for it.”). Harris & Pamukcu, supra
note 4. On the legacies of slavery, segregation, and civil rights in health care, consider
DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST MEDICINE: A CURE FOR RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE 9-32 (NYU Press 1st ed. 2015).
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To guide post-2020 health reform, we propose a new set of principles
oriented toward realizing health justice and social solidarity in health
care.8 Justice and social solidarity have long been core values of public
health law, policy, practice, and ethics9 — albeit “still largely
aspirational” ones.10 We aim to integrate them as core values of health
care law and policy. Health justice demands that reformers address the
role of health care laws and policies in reinforcing — or, alternatively,
dismantling — racism, economic injustice, and other forms of social
subordination. Reformers must ensure equitable distribution of the
benefits and burdens of robust public investments in health care and
public health, measured in terms of population-level health outcomes
and community wellbeing, in addition to the intermediate indicators of
health care access, quality, and cost. Decision-making processes related
to health must ensure recognition, representation, and empowerment
of subordinated individuals and communities. In short, health care
regulation should embrace public health principles and strive for antisubordination, equity, and community empowerment, expanding far
beyond the cramped iron triangle.
The second, related lesson we draw from the pandemic is that health
reform has been structurally constrained by fixtures that impede
solidarity and egalitarian justice. In Part II, we describe how the U.S.
response to the COVID pandemic was stymied by four fixtures:
individualism, fiscal fragmentation, federalism, and privatization. These
fixtures, which we identified in a prior collaboration,11 hold back
mutual aid in the U.S. health care system, causing the system to function
particularly poorly under the stress of a national public health crisis.
Our individualistic, multi-payer, state-by-state, privately-administered
health care system, in which health care entities are insulated from

8 See WILLIAM M. SAGE, SOLIDARITY: UNFASHIONABLE, BUT STILL AMERICAN 10 (2009);
Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 411-12; Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and
Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 205 (2008); Deborah
Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 287,
290 (1993); Lindsay F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public’s
Interest in Affordable, High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 859 (2016)
[hereinafter Health Justice].
9 See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin & Madison Powers, What Does Social Justice Require
for the Public’s Health? Public Health Ethics and Policy Imperatives, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 1053,
1053 (2006) (“Justice is viewed as so central to the mission of public health that it has
been described as the field’s core value . . . .”).
10 Lindsay F. Wiley & Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Personal Responsibility Pandemic:
Centering Social Solidarity in Public Health and Employment Law, 52 ARIZ. STATE L.J.
1235, 1237 (2020).
11 Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 414-17.
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public health responsibilities, failed to support the medical
countermeasures that are critical in a communicable disease crisis —
including testing, therapeutics, and vaccination.12 Our inability to
distribute scarce resources in ways that maximize collective benefits has
undermined the effectiveness of the pandemic response, representing a
functional failure of the health care system.
An embedded lesson here is that individualism, fiscal fragmentation,
federalism, and privatization are more than mere features of American
health law. They are gravitational. We describe these structures
conceptually as fixtures because they are legally and logistically
entrenched. They are rooted in a constellation of constitutional
provisions, laws, institutions, economic arrangements, and cultural and
ideological commitments, rather than a single law.13 Agencies,
companies, workforces, relationships, and economies are built around
the fixtures.
The third lesson we draw from the pandemic is that the fixtures of
individualism, fiscal fragmentation, federalism, and privatization have
contributed to a failure of American health care so profound we describe
it as existential: stark racial inequity in the burden of disease. In Part
III, we describe how each of the fixtures is historically rooted in and
perpetuates racism, thereby subverting health equity and community
empowerment. Because the fixtures have played historic and inherent
roles in creating and reinforcing subordination, reforms
accommodating them will continue to perpetuate racial injustice. The
12 Medical countermeasures have a dual purpose. They are used for clinical
purposes (diagnosis and treatment of individuals), distinguishing them from “nonpharmaceutical interventions” such as mask mandates, school closures, and business
restrictions. But medical countermeasures also serve public health purposes. For
example, testing is both a tool for individual diagnosis as well as a tool of public health
surveillance and disease control. Vaccination has benefits for the vaccinated individual
as well as for others who may be protected by reduced transmission. A robust and
comprehensive pandemic response requires both clinical interventions for the benefit
of individuals and public health interventions for the common good. LAWRENCE O.
GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 346, 392 (3d.
ed. 2016) (describing the role of medical countermeasures in public health surveillance
and disease control, and contrasting medical countermeasures for pandemic response
with non-pharmaceutical interventions). As this Article focuses on the failures of the
U.S. health care system, our analysis focuses on the medical interventions that system
is expected to deliver, rather than on non-pharmaceutical interventions.
13 The concept of a fixture is thus related to the concept of “super-statutes” in its
description of entrenchment, but distinct in the origins and effects of that
entrenchment. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes,
50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215, 1230-37 (2001) (describing “super-statutes” as singular
statutory enactments that “successfully penetrate public normative and institutional
culture in a deep way”).
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accommodative stance of iron-triangle reforms has become untenable
for reformers who are committed to anti-racism. The existential failures
during the pandemic thus demand a more confrontational approach to
the fixtures in future reforms.
The fourth lesson we draw from the pandemic is that implementing
reform requires a new method. In Part IV, we offer an approach for
operationalizing our bolder health justice reform principles within a
system still constrained by the fixtures. We call this method
confrontational incrementalism. Its end goal is to reconstruct health
reform by dismantling the legal structures that hold it back. Its
approach acknowledges the difficulty of that task, owing to the fixtures’
entrenchment.
Reforms can reconcile ambition with pragmatism by identifying
whether an incremental policy change serves as a stepping stone or
stumbling block for confronting the fixtures that stymie health justice.
Although incremental, this approach to the fixtures promotes vigilance
about the accumulated effects of reforms that accommodate, rather than
confront them. It provides an assessment of each incremental reform’s
confrontation with the fixtures based on its contribution to anti-racism,
equitable distribution, and community empowerment. Ultimately,
confrontational incrementalism demands more attention to the
tradeoffs and accumulated accommodations that come with
incrementalism, as well as to the ways that incremental
accommodations to the fixtures perpetuate subordination.
Confrontational incrementalism thus offers a navigational tool for
getting us closer to realizing the ambitious goals of health justice. By
elucidating the concept of fixtures and providing a method for health
reforms to confront them, we hope to provide reformers who focus on
other areas — the criminal justice system, drug policy, environmental
regulation, the education system, housing, and employment, to name a
few — with a navigational tool for crafting and assessing anti-racist
reform efforts rooted in solidarity and community empowerment.
The project of health reform reconstruction may seem overwhelming,
especially because it starts with a recognition of the potency and
stickiness of obstacles to health justice in the United States. We draw
hope, however, in the fact that scholars and advocates are already laying
the groundwork for reconstruction as we understand it. Angela Harris’s
& Aysha Pamukcu’s recent call for the development of a civil rights of
health, rooted in health justice, is a bold example of confrontational
incrementalism targeted directly at individualism and its perverse
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implications for both health and subordination.14 In prior work, each of
us has proposed pragmatic reforms that, upon reflection, also show
particular promise in the ways they confront the structural fixtures of
individualism, fragmentation, privatization, or federalism.15 Some
policymakers have shown nascent interest in such proposals.16 Linking
together these efforts as part of the larger project of health reform
reconstruction provides new direction, motivation, and a framework for
not only recognizing structural bias in our law but doing something
about it.
I.

LESSON 1: HEALTH REFORM RECONSTRUCTION REQUIRES A NEW
ETHOS

Generations of health reform advocates and health care scholars
across disciplines have warned that the U.S. health care system has
serious deficiencies.17 Many have acknowledged that it is, more

14

Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 4, at 765.
See Erin C. Fuse Brown & Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Federalism, ERISA, and State
Single-Payer Health Care, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 389, 452-59 (2020) (proposing ERISA
waiver that would erode federalism and privatization); Matthew B. Lawrence, Fiscal
Waivers and State “Innovation” in Health Care, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1477, 1544-47
(2021) (proposing waiver pathway to facilitate sharing of federal savings between states
and federal government, bridging fragmented fiscal categories); Lindsay F. Wiley,
Medicaid for All?: State-Level Single-Payer Health Care, 79 OHIO STATE L.J. 843, 889
(2018) (exploring state-based single payer reforms with potential to erode
individualism and privatization).
16 E.g., Press Release, Nat’l Council of Ins. Legislators, NCOIL Passes Resolution to
Amend ERISA (Mar. 28, 2019), http://ncoil.org/2019/03/28/ncoil-passes-resolution-toamend-erisa [https://perma.cc/NS5C-QSGT] (adopting McCuskey and Fuse Brown’s
proposal to create and ERISA waiver for state health reform).
17 See Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health Care
Access for the Uninsured, 24 UC DAVIS L. REV. 255, 258 (1990) (“The health care system
in the United States is plagued with serious distributional inequalities . . . .”). See
generally, e.g., STEPHEN M. DAVIDSON, STILL BROKEN: UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM 10 (2010) (saying, “the U.S. health care system is broken”); LAWRENCE R.
JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 17-30 (2010) (same); TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE
AT RISK 1 (2007) (describing the U.S. health care system as “broken”); UWE E.
REINHARDT, PRICED OUT: THE ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL COSTS OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE,
at XXVIII (2019) (describing the U.S. system of health care financing system as the
“bogeyman of health policy — as an example of how not to structure a nation’s health
system”); ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS: HOW HEALTHCARE BECAME BIG
BUSINESS AND HOW YOU CAN TAKE IT BACK 8 (2017) (calling the health care market
“dysfunctional”).
15
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accurately, a non-system.18 The stress of the COVID pandemic revealed
the depth of these failures to a broader audience.19 We argue that the
magnitude of failure — both functional and existential — flows from
decades of reforms under an intellectually-cramped ethos. Thus, the
first lesson we draw from the pandemic is that the gestalt of health
reform itself demands reconstruction, jettisoning the old “iron triangle”
ethos and embracing a new era of health justice.
A. The Iron Triangle Era
The U.S. health care system that met the pandemic is a patchwork
product of more than half a century of reforms driven by
incrementalism, individualism, and commitment to private ordering.
The prevailing ethos of this half-century of health reforms has sought
to balance (1) access to, (2) the quality of, and (3) the costs of medical
care, famously dubbed the “iron triangle” by William Kissick in 1994.20
The iron triangle accepts as a fundamental starting point that these three
priorities are the most important and that there are unavoidable tradeoffs between them.21 Kissick’s iron triangle described the thrust behind
18 See, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown, The Amazing Noncollapsing U.S. Health Care System
— Is Reform Finally at Hand?, 358 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 325, 325 (2008) (“a
nonsystem, an incoherent pastiche that has long repulsed reforms sought by private and
public stakeholders”); Isaac D. Buck, Affording Obamacare, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 261, 305
(2020) (“a bloated and under-regulated non-system”); Walter B. Maher, Health Care in
America: Implications for Business and the Economy, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 55, 55 (1991)
(referencing the term “nonsystem”).
19 The failure of the U.S. health care system to cope with the stress of a pandemic
was tragically predictable. See, e.g., WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND
THE LAW 193 (2009) (“By ignoring the interdependency of health and the importance
of populations, American health law has helped establish a health care system that is
unprepared both for public health emergencies and the more common, everyday threats
that populations face.”); William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the
Widening Gap Between Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J.
497, 522 (2008) [hereinafter Relational Duties] (“It may indeed take a public health
crisis—pandemic influenza, natural disaster, or bioterrorism—to dislodge health law
from its relational roots, but progress without panic is preferable.”).
20 KISSICK, supra note 1, at 2-3. Over the course of his career in health policy, Dr.
Kissick shaped multiple reforms characteristic of the era we borrow his phrase to label.
As a White House staffer, he participated in a task force launched in 1964 that led to
the proposal for Medicare, among other reforms. The book in which he coined his most
famous phrase focused on Clinton-era health reform proposals, which culminated
(somewhat disappointingly) in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”).
21 Id. at 2 (“[I]n what I call the iron triangle of health care . . . access, quality, and
cost containment have equal angles, representing identical priorities, and an expansion
of any one angle compromises one or both of the other two. All societies confront the

668

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:657

reforms of the prior three decades and became the prevailing frame for
assessing every health reform effort in the ensuing twenty-five years,
setting up the dominant narrative that U.S. efforts to expand access and
quality come with inevitable and substantial cost increases.22 Kissick
treated public health as ancillary to the health care system and equity
concerns as answered through universal access to medical care, which
he assumed would be too expensive to be feasible.23 The iron triangle
ethos guided the advent of Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s,
managed care cost-containment practices in the 1970s and 80s, the
failed Clinton-era health security proposal in the 1990s, and the ACA’s
vision of fragmentary-but-universal coverage in the 2010s.24
Some health-system reformers have pursued a sublimated version of
the iron triangle, called the “triple aim,” which retooled the triangle into
three new points: (1) improving the patient experience of care (a
patient-service approach to quality), (2) improving the health of
populations (blending access, quality, and “population health,” though
not necessarily public health), and (3) reducing per capita costs of
care.25 Pointing to the “unacceptable social cost” of health care that is
equal tensions among access to health services, quality of health care, and cost
containment. Trade-offs are inevitable . . . .”).
22 See id.
23 Id. at 38, 50, 159 (contrasting the U.S. with the U.K. or Canada, which have
“demonstrated the priority of equity through universality of access,” noting that it is
improbable that the U.S. would ever achieve equity of access because of the cost, and
describing the medical and public health systems as fundamentally distinct).
24 Id. at 80-83 (describing six eras of health reform in the U.S.); see Sylvia Mathews
Burwell, Preface, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR REVOLUTION 1, 2 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Abbe
R. Gluck eds., 2020) (framing the ACA in terms of the iron triangle).
25 Donald M. Berwick, Thomas W. Nolan & John Whittington, The Triple Aim:
Care, Health, And Cost, 27 HEALTH AFFS. 759, 760 (2008). While the triple aim is
sometimes described as a framework for “[i]mproving the U.S. health care system,” id.
at 759, comprehensively reforming the U.S. system also involves “the realms of ethics
and policy,” which Berwick, Nolan, and Whittington characterize as external to the
triple aim, id. at 760. The triple aim is perhaps more comprehensible as a tool for
improving the functioning of any one of the many discrete “health systems” that make
up the U.S. health care system — integrated networks of hospitals and physician
practice groups, serving patient populations defined by geographic areas, and relying
on capitated payment from third-party payers. See Achieving the IHI Triple Aim:
Summaries of Success, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, http://www.ihi.org/
Engage/Initiatives/TripleAim/Pages/ImprovementStories.aspx (last visited Aug. 25,
2021) [https://perma.cc/7ANK-HXJT] (describing the success of “sites participating in
the IHI Triple Aim Initiative,” including “organizations providing health care services”).
Relatedly, the triple aim’s focus on “the health of populations” is not synonymous with
“public health.” See Ana V. Diez Roux, On the Distinction—or Lack of Distinction—
Between Population Health and Public Health, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 619, 619 (2016)
(lamenting how “[t]he recent explosion of the use of the term [population health] in
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“overpriced, wasteful, useless, or harmful,” Bill Sage has argued that the
triple aim allows reformers to pursue all points of the access-qualitycost triad simultaneously, rather than viewing them as inherently in
conflict.26 Don Berwick and his fellow originators of the triple aim
gestured toward “population health” and “health equity.”27 But they
ultimately rooted the triple aim in a medicalized model (focusing
exclusively on the delivery of medical care to individual patients),
leaving public health and solidarity to ethicists and future
policymakers.28
Health law scholars have advanced competing models for how the
points of the iron triangle should be balanced or how the triple aim
should be achieved — by securing the professional autonomy of
physicians, the rights of patients, or the competitiveness of health care
markets.29 These models have been united by a foundational focus on
the medical world . . . has unfortunately narrowed the concept” by focusing on “groups
of patients, receiving care with a certain provider, covered by a certain health plan,
sharing a certain health condition, or living in a certain geographic area” and
emphasizing “improving the outcomes of care and reducing costs”).
26 William Sage, Fracking Health Care: How to Safely De-Medicalize America and
Recover Trapped Value for Its People, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 635, 637, 662-63 (2017)
[hereinafter Fracking Health Care]. For a version of this argument that pre-dates the
triple aim, see Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A
Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 244-45 (1978) (“The absence of effective
regulation to increase access to health care services, ensure quality, and control costs
has . . . contributed to . . . severe inflation of health care costs, maldistribution of
facilities and personnel, gross profiteering from public and private funds, and
unnecessary, deficient, and often harmful care. Perhaps equally important, if less
obvious, has been the impact of government passivity on the experience of citizenship
itself.”).
27 Berwick et al., supra note 25, at 760 (“The most important of all such [policy]
constraints, we believe, should be the promise of equity; the gain in health in one
subpopulation ought not to be achieved at the expense of another subpopulation. But
that decision lies in the realms of ethics and policy; it is not technically inherent in the
Triple Aim.”).
28 See Sage, Fracking Health Care, supra note 26, at 664 (“Where the Triple Aim may
fall short is in its expectation that population health can be substantially improved
within a medical framework.”).
29 See Wiley, Health Justice, supra note 8 (describing professional autonomy, patient
rights, market power, and health consumerism as the four main models); see also
PARMET, supra note 19, at 196-98 (tracing health law from its initial stage reflecting “the
prestige and influence of the medical profession” to the “patients’ rights paradigm” of
the late 1960s and 1970s, to the most recent paradigm “emphasizing the role and values
of the market”); Maxwell Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
247, 253, 256, 271 (2003) (contrasting the “economic paradigm for health care law”
with “the informed consent model” and arguing for an alternative approach that “takes
a pragmatic account of Americans’ conflicting expectations of medicine”); James F.
Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care: Antitrust and State
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meeting individual health care needs and regulating individual
relationships in the clinical context.30 Solidarity (interdependence
among individuals and groups),31 mutual aid (reciprocity of support),32
communitarianism (connectedness between individuals and their
communities),33 and equity (the absence of systematic disparities in
Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1459 (1994) (describing “the
competing visions of medical care represented by the professional paradigm and the
market-based economic paradigm”); Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82
CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1994) (identifying four resource-allocation paradigms in
health law: market, professional, moral, and political); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and
Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 465-66 (2002) (identifying social justice and economic
efficiency as competing “unifying themes” for health law, and advocating for
“therapeutic jurisprudence”); Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Where Is the “There”
in Health Law? Can It Become a Coherent Field?, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 101, 102-04 (2004)
(describing the “patient’s rights” and “law and economics” approaches as the two
“competing paradigms” of health law); David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come Out
Behind: Fixing the Distributive Injustices of American Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 265, 265 (2006) (contrasting “market-oriented policy scholars” with
“collectivist-oriented policy scholars” in the health law field).
30 Wiley, Health Justice, supra note 8, at 107-20 (describing the individualistic bias
of the professional autonomy, patient rights, and market power models); see also
NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 2 (1985) (linking individualistic bias in health law
and policy to the bioethics tradition, which “has focused heavily on . . . the dyadic
relationship between doctors and patients or research subjects, or on the potential
benefits and risks for those individuals that can arise from new [medical]
technologies”); Sage, Relational Duties, supra note 19, at 500 (“[P]oliticians and
policymakers apply the mental construct of the specific patient, and that patient’s
therapeutic relationship with a specific physician, to problems of collective costs and
benefits for which such a starting point . . . is not appropriate.”).
31 See, e.g., Françoise Baylis, Nuala P. Kenny & Susan Sherwin, A Relational Account
of Public Health Ethics, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 196, 198 (2008) (“[I]ssues of trust,
neighborliness, reciprocity and solidarity must be made central [to public health
ethics].”); Angus Dawson & Bruce Jennings, The Place of Solidarity in Public Health
Ethics, 34 PUB. HEALTH REV. 65, 76-77 (2012) (“[S]olidarity is and ought to be at the
heart of ethical thinking about public health. It does not only come into existence or
prove relevant at times of grave ‘threats’ to a nation state, such as when a major
pandemic hits the population.”); Ryan M. Melnychuk & Nuala P. Kenny, Commentary,
Pandemic Triage: The Ethical Challenge, 175 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1393, 1394 (2006)
(noting that “solidarity (we are all in this together, and protecting the public and hence
ourselves will require society-wide collaborations)” is highly relevant to pandemic
planning).
32 See, e.g., Bruce Jennings, Relational Liberty Revisited: Membership, Solidarity and a
Public Health Ethics of Place, 2015 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 1, 1 (“[T]he practical success of
public health policies and programs and their capacity to gain normative legitimacy and
trust rely on the presence of a cultural sense of obligation and mutual aid in a world of
common vulnerability.”).
33 See, e.g., Dan E. Beauchamp, Community: The Neglected Tradition of Public Health,
15 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 34 (1985) (“By ignoring the communitarian language of
public health, we risk shrinking its claims… [and] undermining the sense in which
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health outcomes based on social hierarchies)34 are critical to securing
the public’s health. But in the iron triangle era, few reformers have
dreamed of incorporating a public health ethos into the financing and
regulation of the U.S. health care system.35
The ACA was the apotheosis of the iron triangle era.36 Its boldest aim
was “universal coverage” — affordable health insurance for 100 percent
of Americans — under a multi-payer system heavily dependent on

health and safety are a signal commitment of the common life—a central practice by
which the body-politic defines itself and affirms its values.”).
34 See, e.g., Paula Braveman & Sofia Gruskin, Defining Equity in Health, 57 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 254, 254 (2003) (“For the purposes of
operationalisation and measurement, equity in health can be defined as the absence of
systematic disparities in health (or in the major social determinants of health) between
social groups who have different levels of underlying social advantage/disadvantage—
that is, different positions in a social hierarchy.”); Diez Roux, supra note 25, at 619
(advocating for a “conceptual approach to understanding the drivers of health and
consequently the strategies most useful to improve health” that involves “integrating
social and biologic processes” and “an explicit concern with health equity because we
cannot substantially improve the health of the population as a whole without addressing
health inequities and because the drivers of health inequities are often the drivers of the
health the population generally”).
35 See, e.g., Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155,
191 (2004) (describing the divide “between hyper-individualism and unrestrained
competition” and “some way of reconstituting solidarity and associated social
policies”); Sage, Relational Duties, supra note 19, at 507, 519 (noting “access to health
care for economically disadvantaged groups has been ‘fiscalized’ as a problem of
allocating scarce tax dollars rather than as a source of social solidarity and future
stability,” and “public health law represents the paradigm case for a regulatory,
collective approach to health policy, but has been marginalized both legally and
financially compared with the diagnosis and treatment of individual patients”); Stone,
supra note 8, at 290 (“The private insurance industry . . . is organized around a principle
profoundly antithetical to the idea of mutual aid . . . .”). For a discussion of emerging
efforts to incorporate a public health ethos into the health care system, see Wiley, Social
Justice, supra note 6, at 52 (“[T]he convergence of three distinct social movements
(environmental justice, reproductive justice, and food justice) on health disparities as a
central focus; the growing prominence of health disparities as a focus of health reform
efforts; the recent boom in “health and social justice” monographs by political
philosophers and ethicists; and the growing emphasis on social consciousness (as
opposed to distinctly individualistic values like patient autonomy) in health law
scholarship might together indicate the beginnings of a loosely defined “health justice”
movement.”).
36 See Burwell, supra note 24, at 2 (“[A]ccessibility, affordability and quality . . . are
the through-line of the history of the ACA . . . .”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & John E.
McDonough, The Path to the Affordable Care Act, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR REVOLUTION,
supra note 24, at 28 (noting that the ACA is “the only federal law in US history” that
seeks to improve “all 3 essential components of health policy: access, quality, and
costs.”).
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employers to provide coverage.37 Those who accept that goal as an
endpoint (which we do not) assume modest reforms further that goal
as long as they increase the sheer number of insured Americans.38 On
this common and influential view, the ACA has been a positive
incremental step simply because it led to coverage for an additional
twenty million Americans.39 This approach can mislead because it
makes these ostensible gains while reinforcing the divisions of multipayer coverage, amplifying some states’ cries for flexibility to erode
coverage gains, and increasing the stealth subsidization of private
markets with public funds. The coverage gains are not, in some
important respects, “universal.” Worse, they have the potential to
further entrench the fixtures that make truly transformative reforms so
difficult in the first place.
Even the public option — arguably the most radical proposal to gain
much traction during the iron triangle era — sought to
“accommodate[e] the path-dependent history of American health
insurance” by limiting access to individuals who did not have the option
of purchasing affordable employer-based coverage.40 And the public
option was ultimately left out of the ACA in spite of its proponents’
accommodating stance.41
In the ACA’s first decade, Republican-led legal challenges and
political sabotage have significantly undermined its ability to achieve its
central aim of universal (but fragmented) coverage.42 While the ACA
37 See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA OF
RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 27 (2009), https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/BUDGET-2010-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2010-BUD.pdf [https://perma.cc/KXS76N7L] (noting eight goals for health reform, including universal coverage, choice of
health plans, and the option of keeping one’s employer-based health plan); Peter Orszag
& Rahul Rekhi, Policy Design: Tensions and Tradeoffs, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR
REVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 53 (recalling the reform imperatives of the ACA included
universality but also to “do no harm” to employer-sponsored insurance coverage);
Theodore R. Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, Paths to Universal Health Insurance:
Progressive Lessons from the Past for the Future, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 205, 225-26
(describing focus of health reform efforts on expanding coverage and endorsing
“pragmatic universalism”).
38 E.g., Marmor & Oberlander, supra note 37, at 215-16.
39 See David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform: What Has Been Accomplished? What
Comes Next?, 44 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 397, 401 (2018) (describing universal coverage
goal).
40 See Jacob S. Hacker, From the ACA to Medicare for All?, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR
REVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 346 (describing the public option proposals that were
part of Democratic reform plans in the 2008 election).
41 Id.
42 See Abbe R. Gluck, Mark Regan & Erica Turret, The Affordable Care Act’s
Litigation Decade, 108 GEO. L.J. 1471, 1473 (2020); Thomas Rice, Lynne Y. Unruh,
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nudged the U.S. health care system in the direction of solidarity and
reduced racial disparities in health insurance coverage,43 large gaps
remain. Health and life expectancy continue to be powerfully correlated
with socio-economic status, race, and ethnicity.44
Ewout van Ginneken, Pauline Rosenau & Andrew J. Barnes, Universal Coverage Reforms
in the USA: From Obamacare Through Trump, 122 HEALTH POL’Y 698, 699 (2018).
43 See, e.g., Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1579-80 (2011) (“The [ACA]
embodies a social contract of health care solidarity through private ownership, markets,
choice, and individual responsibility.”); Thomas C. Buchmueller, Zachary M. Levinson,
Helen G. Levy & Barbara L. Wolfe, Effect of the Affordable Care Act on Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Health Insurance Coverage, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1416, 1420 (2016)
(concluding that the ACA “led to a slight reduction in coverage disparities related to
race and ethnicity” but noting that “racial and ethnic minorities make up a
disproportionate share” of the remaining uninsured); Molly Frean, Shelbie Shelder,
Meredith Rosenthal, Thomas D. Sequist & Benjamin D. Sommers, Health Reform and
Coverage Changes Among Native Americans, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 858, 860 (2016)
(“The ACA was associated with significant coverage increases for Native Americans,
primarily in Medicaid expansion states, consistent with national trends for all racial
ethnic groups” ); Sergio Gonzales & Benjamin D. Sommers, Intra-Ethnic Coverage
Disparities Among Latinos and the Effects of Health Reform, 53 HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 1373,
1381 (2018) (finding that the “ACA has increased coverage by three additional
percentage points among all Latinos compared to whites” but also noting significant
heterogeneity among Latino subgroups); Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and
Intimations of Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1996 (2011) (“[T]he [ACA] will
strengthen social norms of solidarity and responsibility . . . .”); John J. Park, Sarah
Humble, Benjamin D. Sommers, Graham A. Colditz, Arnold M. Epstein & Howard K.
Koh, Health Insurance for Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders Under
the Affordable Care Act, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1128, 1128 (2018) (“Our findings
document AANHPI coverage gains that essentially eliminated pre-ACA coverage
disparities relative to whites”).
44 See, e.g., Jermane M. Bond & Allen A. Herman, Lagging Life Expectancy for Black
Men: A Public Health Imperative, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1167, 1167 (2016)
(documenting persistent disparities in mortality and health outcomes for Black males
compared to white males); Thomas A. LaVeist, Disentangling Race and Socioeconomic
Status: A Key to Understanding Health Inequalities, 82 J. URB. HEALTH iii26, iii27 (2005)
(examining the inter-relationships among race, socio-economic status, and health
disparities); Thomas A. LaVeist, Mindy Fullilove & Robert Fullilove, 400 Years of
Inequality Since Jamestown of 1619, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 83, 83 (2019); Yin Paradies,
Colonisation, Racism and Indigenous Health, J. POPULATION RSCH. 83, 87-88 (2016)
(discussing health disparities among colonized indigenous populations); John M. Ruiz,
Belinda Campos & James J. Garcia, Special Issue on Latino Physical Health: Disparities,
Paradoxes, and Future Directions, 4 J. LATINA/O PSYCH. 61, 64 (2016) (describing
disparities in Latino “income, education, employment opportunities, discrimination,
and access to health insurance and access to quality care”); Linda R. Stanley, Randall C.
Swaim, Joseph Keawe’aimoku Kaholokula, Kathleen J. Kelly, Annie Belcourt & James
Allen, The Imperative for Research to Promote Health Equity in Indigenous Communities,
21 PREVENTION SCI. 13, 19 (2020) (noting persistent disparities in life expectancy,
disease morbidity, chronic disease risk factors, and quality of life among indigenous
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The COVID pandemic has simultaneously exposed the systemic
failure of the U.S. health care system to secure the public’s health and
the limitations of the iron triangle framework. Growing awareness of
structural racism and other forms of subordination as determinants of
health has made the iron triangle’s neglect of health equity untenable.
It is time to turn the page. The year 2020 should mark the end of what
we term the iron triangle era of health policy and usher in a new era
focused on realizing health justice.
B. Pandemic Failures, Functional & Existential
The COVID pandemic has subjected the iron triangle health care
system to a stress test, revealing the magnitude of weaknesses and
inequities that were baked in from the start. The pandemic revealed how
functionally ineffective a diffuse, multi-payer, largely privatized health
care system is at protecting individual and public health. And it reveals
how, existentially, such a system is built on and perpetuates
subordination.
Of the numerous functional weaknesses exacerbating the public
health and economic harms of the pandemic, the lack of universal
coverage, the linkage between employment and coverage, and the
fragmentary and inefficient financing of basic services like disease
testing and vaccination have been especially glaring. A narrow focus on
meeting the needs of individuals has stymied our public health response
to the pandemic. Moreover, the diffusion of authority between levels of
government, fragmented fiscal supports, and the many diverse
providers in our largely privatized health care system have led to a U.S.
failure to fairly allocate, adequately supply, or constrain prices for
essential testing, therapeutics, and vaccines. Widespread public health
measures may be delivered more effectively in countries with a
centralized and unified public health care delivery system.45 Future
reform must reflect what we are learning from these functional failures.

U.S. populations); Ruqaiijah Yearby, Structural Racism and Health Disparities:
Reconfiguring the Social Determinants of Health Framework to Include the Root Cause, 48
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 518, 518 (2020) (“As of 2018, racial health disparities continue and
are estimated to cost the United States $175 billion in lost life years (3.5. million lost
years times $50,000 per life year) and $135 billion per year in excess health care costs
and untapped productivity”). But see Raj Chetty, Michael Stepner, Sarah Abraham,
Shelby Lin, Benjamin Scuderi, Nicolas Turner, Augustin Bergeron & David Cutler, The
Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014, 315
JAMA 1750, 1763 (2016).
45 See infra Part II.B (“Our individualistic, fragmented, diffuse, private-industry
health care system has failed us in the COVID pandemic.”).

2021]

Health Reform Reconstruction

675

More fundamentally, the pandemic has tragically amplified the most
profound failure of the U.S. health care system: its unjust and
inequitable burdens on communities of color, which health care and
public health scholars have recognized for decades.46 Although the
uninitiated claimed COVID was “the great equalizer,”47 it was clear to
public health experts from the early days of the pandemic that it would
disproportionately ravage low-income, Black and Brown
communities.48
Due to structural racism and economic injustice, people of color and
people living in low-income households and neighborhoods are more
likely to be exposed to infection through their working and living
conditions.49 They are less likely to have ready access to testing, less
46 See infra Part III (discussing the four fixtures “broader existential failure
illuminated by the pandemic”).
47 Bethany L. Jones & Jonathan S. Jones, Gov. Cuomo Is Wrong, Covid-19 Is Anything but
an Equalizer, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
2020/04/05/gov-cuomo-is-wrong-covid-19-is-anything-an-equalizer/ [https://perma.cc/
FJY2-WLWH]; Tim Molloy, Madonna’s COVID-19 Bathtub Message: ‘It’s the Great Equalizer’,
SPIN (Mar. 22, 2020, 4:05 PM), https://www.spin.com/2020/03/madonnas-covid-19bathtub-message-its-the-great-equalizer/ [https://perma.cc/4SLU-HXLM].
48 See, e.g., Samrachana Adhikari, Nicholas P. Pantaleo & Justin M. Feldman,
Olugbenga Ogedegbe, Lorna Thorpe & Andrea B. Troxel, Assessment of CommunityLevel Disparities in Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Infections and Deaths in Large
US Metropolitan Areas, 3 JAMA NETWORK (2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/
jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2768723 [https://perma.cc/Z2FF-2AQ8] (study finding
higher cumulative COVID infections and deaths in counties with substantially nonWhite or more diverse populations as of May 11, 2020); Jarvis T. Chen & Nancy
Krieger, Revealing the Unequal Burden of COVID-19 by Income, Race/Ethnicity, and
Household Crowding: US County vs. ZIP Code Analyses, 27 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC.
S43 (study finding that as of May 5, 2020, COVID death rates per 100,000 person-years
were correlated at the county level with the percentage of persons living below poverty,
the percentage of persons experiencing household crowding, and the percentage of
persons who are not identified as White and non-Hispanic); Cary P. Gross, Utibe R.
Essien, Saamir Pasha, Jacob R. Gross, Shi-yi Wang & Marcella Nunez-Smith, Racial and
Ethnic Disparities in Population-Level Covid-19 Mortality, 35 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 3097,
3097 (2020) (study finding that in states that reported race- and ethnicity-stratified
COVID mortality data as of April 21, 2020, age-adjusted COVID mortality rates were
significantly higher for Black versus White populations and for Latinx versus White
populations); Lonnae O’Neal, Public Health Expert Says African Americans are at Greater
Risk of Death from Coronavirus, UNDEFEATED (Mar. 13, 2020), https://theundefeated.
com/features/public-health-expert-says-african-americans-are-at-greater-risk-of-deathfrom-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/K7TA-38AL] (interview with Dr. Georges
Benjamin, Executive Director of the American Public Health Association warning of the
likelihood that, upon exposure to the coronavirus, African Americans would be at
greater risk of death and severe illness due to disparities in chronic conditions, health
care access, employment protections, and other factors).
49 Benfer et al., supra note 4, at 133-34, 148, 154, 163-164.
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likely to have the financial resources and employment protections
required to stay home when they test positive, and less likely to be able
to safely isolate from others within their homes.50 Black, Indigenous,
and Latino and Latina patients are more likely to become severely ill or
die from COVID.51 Due to environmental factors, access to health care,
and social subordination, people who are racialized or ethnicized as part
of a minority group are more likely to have underlying chronic
conditions that COVID preys upon.52 They may be more likely to be
treated in hospitals with fewer resources and lower quality of care.53
They are more likely to experience institutional and interpersonal
discrimination in health care delivery.54 Moreover, Black, Indigenous,
Latino and Latina communities and low-income communities across
the country are disproportionately harmed by the economic impacts of
the pandemic, including job loss and eviction.55
50

Id.; Wiley & Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 1263.
See Gross et al., supra note 48, at 3097.
52 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS:
NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, at Table A-1a (2018) https://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/
Health_Statistics/NCHS/NHIS/SHS/2018_SHS_Table_A-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PACXTFR] (age-adjusted percentages of U.S. adults with circulatory diseases, by race,
ethnicity, income, poverty status, and health insurance coverage status); CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra, at Table A-2a (emphysema, asthma, and chronic
bronchitis); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL DIABETES STATISTICS
REPORT, at Figure 2 (type-2 diabetes) (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/
statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7K3-EYDT]; Shreya
Rao, Matthew W. Segar, Adam P. Bress, Pankaj Arora, Wanpen Vongpatanasin, Vijay
Agusala, Utibe R. Essien, Adolfo Correa, Alanna A. Morris, James A. de Lemos &
Ambarish Pandey, Association of Genetic West African Ancestry, Blood Pressure Response
to Therapy, and Cardiovascular Risk Among Self-Reported Black Individuals in the Systolic
Blood Pressure Reduction Intervention Trial (SPRINT), 6 JAMA CARDIOLOGY 368, 389
(2020) (“highlight[ing] the greater importance of nonbiological risk factors—including
socioeconomic status, environmental factors, educational attainment, behavioral
characteristics, structural racism, and access to health care—in existing disparities in
hypertension control”); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Evidence Used to
Update the List of Underlying Medical Conditions that Increase a Person’s Risk of Severe
Illness from COVID-19, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extraprecautions/evidence-table.html (last updated Nov. 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6SLDV252] (surveying studies associating various chronic conditions with COVID severity).
53 See Brian M. Rosenthal, Joseph Goldstein, Sharon Otterman & Sheri Fink, Why
Surviving the Virus Might Come Down to Which Hospital Admits You, N.Y. TIMES (July
1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/nyregion/Coronavirus-hospitals.html
[https://perma.cc/9QEM-YJBT].
54 See Héctor E. Alcalá, Amanda E. Ng, Sujoy Gayen & Alexander N. Ortega,
Insurance Types, Usual Sources of Health Care, and Perceived Discrimination, 33 J. AM. BD.
FAM. MED. 580, 588-89 (2020).
55 See GREGORY ACS & MICHAEL KARPMAN, URB. INST., EMPLOYMENT, INCOME, AND
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 3-7 (June 2020),
51
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The pandemic has amplified the scale and visibility of this tragic
failure. U.S. health care’s racial injustice is a failure on an existential
scale, with effects that ripple throughout all aspects of American life.
Future reforms must confront this existential failure with a bolder ethos
that expands far beyond the iron triangle of quality, cost, and access –
to eradicate subordination and its health effects.
C. Health Reform Reconstruction: The Health Justice Era
The COVID pandemic hit at a moment when the U.S. was in the early
stages of what may prove to be a major shift in ethos — from
distributing costs associated with sickness based on the principle of
actuarial fairness toward a social solidarity principle premised on the
“goals of mutual aid and support.”56 The pandemic also coincided with
growing support for the Black Lives Matter movement in response to
systemic police violence against Black people.57 The public health and
economic devastation wreaked by the virus and the growing awareness
among white people of the role of structural racism in American law
and society have highlighted our fundamental interdependence, while
also putting our emerging commitments to mutual aid and solidarity to
the test. The pandemic is teaching us that twenty-first century health
reform demands attention to more than the iron triangle of quality, cost,
and access. At this critical juncture, we must more explicitly center anti-

https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102485/employment-income-andunemployment-insurance-during-the-covid-19-pandemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2R675EF]; Emily Benfer, David Bloom Robinson, Stacy Butler, Lavar Edmonds, Sam
Gilman, Katherine Lucas McKay, Lisa Owens, Neil Steinkamp, Diane Yentel & Zach
Neumann, The COVID-19 Eviction Crisis: An Estimated 30-40 Million People in America
Are at Risk, ASPEN INST. (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/
the-covid-19-eviction-crisis-an-estimated-30-40-million-people-in-america-are-at-risk/
[https://perma.cc/6C7X-8693].
56 Mariner, supra note 8, at 205; Stone, supra note 8, at 289-90 (contrasting actuarial
fairness, which holds that “each person should pay for his own risk,” with the principle
of mutual aid, whereby “sickness is widely accepted as a condition that should trigger”
a social solidarity response); Wiley, Health Justice, supra note 8, at 859 (“[T]he ACA
represents a major shift from an actuarial fairness approach to health care financing to
one premised largely on mutual aid.”).
57 See Tasnim Motala, “Foreseeable Violence” & Black Lives Matter: How Mckesson Can
Stifle a Movement, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 61, 64 (2020) (“The events of the last three
months have galvanized Americans across the political spectrum to demand accountability
for police brutality and racial justice.”); Michael Tesler, The Floyd Protests Will Likely Change
Public Attitudes About Race and Policing. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (June 5, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/05/floyd-protests-will-likely-changepublic-attitudes-about-race-policing-heres-why/ [https://perma.cc/H72G-2F4Z].
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racism, equity, and community empowerment in the criteria by which
we evaluate our health care system and proposed reforms.
We identify three core criteria for evaluating health reforms in the
post-2020 era: anti-subordination, equitable distribution, and
community empowerment. We draw these criteria from works by
public health ethicists and critical race feminists, and from the health
justice model developed in our prior work and in conversation with
others.58
First, anti-subordination: reforms must address the role of health laws
and policies in reinforcing — or, alternatively, dismantling — structural
racism, economic injustice, and other forms of social subordination.59
As Angela Harris and Aysha Pamukcu have argued, “[r]ecognizing
subordination as a driver of health is essential to solving the puzzle of
persistent health disparities linked to group status.”60
Second, equitable distribution: health laws and policies must ensure
just distribution of the burdens and benefits of public investments in
health care and public health.61 Access to health care, its quality, and its
58 See Benfer et al., supra note 4, at 141-51; Matthew B. Lawrence, Against the “Safety
Net”, 72 FLA. L. REV. 49, 65 (2020) (applying the health justice framework and
vulnerability analysis to critique the safety net metaphor for public benefits); Wiley,
Health Justice, supra note 8, at 864; Wiley, Social Justice, supra note 6, at 53; see also
Emily A. Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for the Elimination of
Health Inequity and Social Injustice, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 277-78 (2015) (“[H]ealth
justice requires that all persons have the same chance to be free from hazards that
jeopardize health, fully participate in society, and access opportunity.”); Harris &
Pamukcu, supra note 4, at 758 (arguing that “a civil rights of health initiative built on a
health justice framework can help educate policymakers and the public about the health
effects of subordination, create new legal tools for challenging subordination, and
ultimately reduce or eliminate unjust health disparities”); Yearby & Mohapatra, supra
note 4, at 13-15.
59 See Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 4, at 763 (“Recognizing subordination as a
driver of health is essential to solving the puzzle of persistent health disparities linked
to group status.”); Yearby, supra note 44, at 524 (“To achieve racial health equity,
government and public health officials must aggressively work to end structural racism
and . . . ensure that racial and ethnic minorities are not only treated equally, but also
receive the material support they need to overcome the harms they have already
suffered.”); see also Benfer et al., supra note 4, at 137 (“[L]egal and policy interventions
must address the structural determinants of health inequities.”); Wiley, Social Justice,
supra note 6, at 95 (“[By] prob[ing] the influence of class and racial bias on the goals
and processes adopted by progressive reformers[, social justice movements] . . . have
particularly highlighted the importance of collective responsibility for assuring healthy
living conditions . . . .”).
60 Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 4, at 763.
61 See GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 12, at 19 (“Distributive justice—which stresses
the fair disbursement of common advantages and sharing of common burdens—
requires government to limit the extent to which the burden of disease falls unfairly on
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affordability are important metrics for assessing distributive justice, but
they are not the only important metrics. Health care is not the only
resource that determines health outcomes.62 Individual access to health
care may or may not correlate with improvements in financial security,
community wellbeing, and population-level health outcomes.63
Distributive justice must also be responsive to the ways in which
individuals are interconnected within groups — from families and
households, to racial and ethnic groups, to schools, workplaces, and
neighborhoods.
Third, community empowerment: Decision-making processes related
to health must ensure recognition, representation, and empowerment
as means for collective self-determination, particularly for subordinated
groups.64 Realizing health justice requires a “probing inquiry into the
effects of social and cultural bias on the design and implementation of
measures to reduce health disparities.”65 Emily Benfer and other health
justice scholars have argued, “[t]hese efforts cannot be led by
the least advantaged, and to ensure that the burdens and benefits of interventions are
distributed equitably.”); Lindsay F. Wiley, Privatized Public Health Insurance and the
Goals of Progressive Health Reform, 54 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2149, 2192-203 (2021)
[hereinafter Privatized Public Health Insurance] (assessing progressive health reform
proposals in terms of fair distribution of health benefits and financial burdens). Of
course, egalitarian distributive justice is not the only understanding of what justice
requires with regard to health. See, e.g., Paul T. Menzel, Justice and Fairness: Mandating
Universal Participation, 2009 HASTINGS CTR. 4, 4 (contrasting the egalitarian sense of
justice that “pushes toward universal [health care] access and its equitable financing”
with “libertarian views of justice, [which] contend that those who have no contractual
or special relationship with the unlucky victim of disease—and have not themselves
exacerbated her plight—have no obligation to assist her”); Stone, supra note 8
(contrasting mutual aid and actuarial fairness as competing visions of what fairness
requires in health care financing).
62 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION ON THE SOCIAL
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH 1, 9 (2010), https://www.who.int/sdhconference/resources/
ConceptualframeworkforactiononSDH_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8YM-QZM8].
63 See Murray & Frenk, supra note 1, at 719; cf. Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models
of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1945 (2011) (discussing health promotion and financial
security as competing conceptions of what health insurance coverage should achieve).
64 See GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 12, at 19 (“Social justice thus encompasses
participatory parity: equal respect for all community members and recognition,
participatory engagement, and voice for historically underrepresented groups.”); Harris
& Pamukcu, supra note 4, at 780 (identifying “collective agency and self-determination”
as an important form of empowerment to further health justice); Wiley, Social Justice,
supra note 6, at 101 (“[T]he health justice framework might root ongoing efforts to
ensure access to health care and healthy living conditions more firmly in community
engagement and participatory parity.”).
65 Wiley, Social Justice, supra note 6, at 53.
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communities who have benefited from the very forms of subordination
that must be dismantled if health justice is to be achieved.
Empowerment of affected communities in decision-making processes
helps ensure that the design and implementation of interventions
intended to benefit them are actually tailored to their needs.”66
The points of the iron triangle will certainly remain relevant in the
post-2020 era, but they should be encompassed within a more
expansive conceptual framework that centers equity, solidarity, and
public health, rather than marginalizing them. In the post-pandemic
era, “the goals of public health (what we as a society do collectively to
ensure the conditions for people to be healthy) and health care reform
(efforts to improve systems for health care financing and delivery)
should be more fully integrated within a communitarian ethic.”67
“Rather than merely adopting social justice as the ‘core value’ of public
health as . . . others have done,” we argue that social justice should be
embraced as “a core value of health law and policy writ large.”68 Using
new criteria rooted in health justice, we can evaluate both the functional
failures of the pandemic response and the broader existential failure to
secure racial justice in health.
II.

LESSON 2: FOUR FIXTURES CONTRIBUTE TO FUNCTIONAL FAILURES

The second lesson we draw: the failed U.S. response to the COVID
pandemic highlights the role of four fixtures — individualism, fiscal
fragmentation, federalism, and privatization — as structural constraints
on health reform.69 Precisely because the criteria we propose are rooted
in anti-subordination, equity, and community empowerment, they
inevitably collide with the fixtures, which are legally and logistically
entrenched and have crippled the health care system’s ability to meet
public health needs.
A. Fixtures
A reconstruction project initially must survey the structures to be
confronted and reconstructed. For health reform reconstruction, we
begin with the concept of fixtures: forces whose “structural and political
entrenchment, as well as longstanding normative commitments, make
66

Benfer et al., supra note 4, at 139.
Wiley, Privatized Public Health Insurance, supra note 61, at 2160 n.40.
68 Wiley, Social Justice, supra note 6, at 52 (emphasis added); see also Wiley, Health
Justice, supra note 8, at 881.
69 Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 411.
67
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them difficult to displace.”70 Recent scholarship has highlighted
problems wrought by the forces of individualism, fiscal fragmentation,
federalism, and privatization in American health care.71 This literature
has largely treated these concepts singly and as if they were ordinary
policy choices that might simply be accepted or rejected by
policymakers.72 We have posed, however, that individualism, fiscal
fragmentation, federalism, and privatization are more aptly described as
“fixtures of American law” that reform cannot simply “turn off” without
paying a steep price.73 Their entrenchment means that fixtures operate
not as mere policy options, but instead as forces that must be
accommodated or confronted.
Our concept of fixtures begins with their legal entrenchment. Similar
to “super-statutes,” the fixtures “exhibit . . . normative gravity” and
“bend and reshape the surrounding landscape.”74 Unlike super-statutes,
fixtures are not embodied in one statute — or even one field of law.
Instead, the fixtures we describe are embodied in a constellation of legal
and regulatory provisions. This makes the fixtures more diffuse in their
entrenchment than super-statutes, and thus harder to overcome.75
Consider the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), a plausible super-statute.76
70

Id. at 414.
See, e.g., Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra note 15, at 443 (describing federalism);
Allison K. Hoffman, The ACA’s Choice Problem, 45 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 501, 508
(2020) (describing individual choice); Nicole Huberfeld, Sarah H. Gordon & David K.
Jones, Federalism Complicates the Response to the COVID-19 Health and Economic Crisis:
What Can Be Done?, 45 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 951, 952 (2020) (describing
federalism); Craig Konnoth, Privatization’s Preemptive Effects, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1937,
1951 (2021) (describing privatization); David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis,
and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 461 (2008) (describing fiscal fragmentation).
72 See, e.g., Huberfeld et al., supra note 71, at 958-61 (suggesting policy options to
“mitigate federalism’s harmful side effects”); Konnoth, supra note 71, at 1990
(describing policy limitations due to privatization). But see Hoffman, supra note 71, at
508-09 (describing individual choice in health insurance as embodying and propagating
an underlying normative commitment).
73 Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 414.
74 Eskridge, Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 13, at 1215-16 (describing “super-statutes”
as singular statutory enactments that “successfully penetrate public normative and
institutional culture in a deep way”).
75 See id.
76 The ACA’s status as super-statute is debatable and debated. E.g., Eric C. Fuse
Brown, Developing a Durable Right to Health Care, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 439, 44344 (2013) (arguing that while “[t]he ACA has the pedigree of a superstatute” in its
ambition and breadth, the fragility of its right to health care places it in the category of
“quasi-superstatutes” whose entrenchment remains in doubt); Abbe R. Gluck &
Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment, 108 GEO. L.J. 495, 516-17
(2020) (arguing that the “ACA’s staying power has . . . come from more diffuse and
71
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The ACA was a single enactment that touched hundreds of existing
laws, spawned innumerable regulations, and significantly altered the
landscape of health insurance regulation.77 Its legal entrenchment in a
single statute means that it can, in theory, be repealed in a single piece
of legislation or struck down by Supreme Court in a single decision.78
By contrast, the fixture of federalism, for example, is legally entrenched
through the Constitution, countless federal and state statutes, and two
centuries of jurisprudence on comity and deference to state authority.79
Beyond their legal manifestations, fixtures exhibit a form of
entrenchment not previously explored in legal scholarship: logistical
entrenchment. Institutions are built around the fixtures, as are
workforces and bodies of expertise. These logistical considerations
make it difficult to implement any reform that confronts the fixtures.
For example, the administrative apparatus for our health care system is
heavily dependent on private insurers and private health care providers,
which means it would be practically difficult for a single-payer reform
to switch entirely to government administration and rate setting.80
Reliance on existing private structures would almost be compelled as a
logistical matter, owing to the privatization fixture’s logistical
entrenchment. Moreover, the fixtures reinforce and further entrench
each other, as seen in the deeply individualistic orientation of medical
ethics, which entwines with private-law regulation of relationships

multi-modal factors that are mostly unaccounted for by super-statute theorists,”
particularly its “specific statutory design choices — the structural features of a law that
entrench it — [and] the federalist architecture”).
77 See generally Gluck et al., supra note 42, at 1473 (“The ACA is the most
significant healthcare legislation in recent American history . . . .”); Gluck & ScottRailton, supra note 76, at 498 (“[T]he ACA has not only endured, but it has changed
the way many Americans and the political arena think about healthcare and the
entitlement to it.”); Miriam Reisman, The Affordable Care Act, Five Years Later: Policies,
Progress, and Politics, 40 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 575, 575 (2015) (“The ACA . . . is
one of the most complex and comprehensive reforms of the American health system
ever enacted.”).
78 See, e.g., Timothy Jost, Examining the House Republican ACA Repeal and Replace
Legislation, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Mar. 7, 2017) https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/
10.1377/hblog20170307.059064/full/ [https://perma.cc/EN35-BWNW] (describing
proposed legislation in Congress that would repeal the ACA); Pratik Shah, Symposium:
Severability Poses a High-stakes Question with (What Should Be) an Easy Answer,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 9, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/11/
symposium-severability-poses-a-high-stakes-question-with-what-should-be-an-easyanswer/ [https://perma.cc/WJ69-D8VU] (arguing the ACA can function without the
individual mandate and should not be fully unenforceable).
79 See infra Parts II.B.3, III.C.
80 E.g., Wiley, Privatized Public Health Insurance, supra note 61, at 2162.
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among private providers and insurers.81 Fiscal fragmentation (with
multiple, segregated sources of unequal payments to physicians and
hospitals depending on the patient’s source of coverage) and federalism
(with health care providers regulated largely at the state level) further
entrench the individualistic, privatized nature of health care financing
and delivery in the United States.
Recognizing individualism, fragmentation, federalism, and
privatization as fixtures forces attention not only to the ubiquity of their
impacts but also to strategies for overcoming them. They may not be as
concrete as individual laws (whether super-statutes or regular ones),
but neither are they as amorphous as purely abstract cultural norms or
ideologies. Their legal and logistical entrenchment makes them more
stubborn in some ways, but, as Part IV elaborates, more vulnerable in
others.
These four fixtures shape law and policy in fields beyond health care.
And our conception of a fixture applies to forces beyond the four we
highlight here. For example, the sovereignty of professional control
over medicine could be a fixture, though professional autonomy
arguably manifests individualism and privatization.82 By elucidating the
concept of fixtures here and applying it to health reform, we hope to
provide reformers across disciplines with a navigational tool for crafting
and assessing comprehensive reform efforts in other fields in which
reconstruction is needed.83
B. Fixtures’ Functional Failures
Our individualistic, fragmented, diffuse, private-industry health care
system has failed us in the COVID pandemic. We focus this critique on
the medical countermeasures that the health care system is responsible
for delivering: testing, treatment, and vaccination, each of which has
public health benefits in addition to the benefits they confer on
individual patients. Our inability to distribute scarce supplies in a way
81 See, e.g., William M. Sage, Adding Principle to Pragmatism: The Transformative
Potential of “Medicare-for-All” 1, 33 (Feb. 2020) (unpublished draft),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3387120 [https://perma.cc/UL6PSJSK] [hereinafter Adding Principle to Pragmatism] (arguing that individualistic
professional ethics for physicians and pro-physician sentiment undermine the political
viability of single-payer health reform proposals).
82 For a historical account of the rise of professional medical control and corporate
dominance of the health system, see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST
INDUSTRY 28 (1982).
83 See infra Part IV.
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that maximizes collective benefits has undermined the effectiveness of
the pandemic response.
1.

Individualism

Individualism is a defining fixture of American cultural norms,
policy, and law.84 Without a sufficient communitarian counterweight85
it manifests in three distinct, but interconnected ways that impede the
realization of health justice. First, the individual — rather than the
family, household, or community — is prioritized as the most important
unit of inquiry, intervention, welfare maximization, and
responsibility.86 Second, regulating discrete interpersonal relations
among atomistic individuals — rather than identifying and
implementing structural solutions to structural problems — is
prioritized as the aim of laws and policies.87 Third, individual autonomy
is prioritized over social values.88
Individualism is legally entrenched in our Constitution’s emphasis on
securing rights to be left alone and in health law’s historical grounding
in private law (generally) and freedom of contract (in particular).89 It is
84 See, e.g., Salter Storrs Clark, Individualism and Legal Procedure, 14 YALE L.J. 263,
263 (1905) (“American individualism . . . is the most important factor in American
liberty, and . . . also, perhaps, a large factor in our material prosperity. . . . [It] marks
the highest tide of political progress in the world.”).
85 See THE ESSENTIAL COMMUNITARIAN READER, at xi (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1998)
(describing “new” or “responsive communitarianism” in terms of “balance between
individual rights and social responsibilities, between autonomy and the common
good”).
86 See Nancy Krieger, Theories for Social Epidemiology in the 21st Century: An
Ecosocial Perspective, 30 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 668, 670 (2001).
87 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2006) (arguing that a structural
approach is necessary to address workplace inequities); Sage, Relational Duties, supra
note 19, at 500 (“[F]ar more legal issues in health care are approached as relational than
as regulatory problems, making it very difficult for law to serve truly ‘public’ policy.”).
88 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, 4
OSLO L. REV. 133, 140-41 (2017) (“[A]n emphasis on personal liberty and autonomy
was combined with an assertion of equality or impartiality and used to argue against
directing law and policy to address existing inequalities. . . . [A]rguments for a collective
ideal of justice were beaten back by reference to the ideal of individual, not institutional,
responsibility.”).
89 See e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming
Embedded Influences into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. L.
REV. 839, 884 (1999) (“The norms of justice and fairness are seen as competitors to the
formalistic use of contract rules to promote certainty in contractual transactions. The
latter is individualistic in its perspective and incorporates notions of freedom, security,
and efficiency. The former is communitarian centered in its focus.”); Wiley, Health

2021]

Health Reform Reconstruction

685

logistically entrenched in the individualistic professional ethics of
medicine and our political and legal system’s emphasis on personal
responsibility for misfortune.90 Iron-triangle reforms have been
remarkably accommodating of individualism. So much so that “choice”
is often treated as a fourth pillar of health law.91 Moreover, the iron
triangle’s emphasis on meeting individual needs for health care
embraces a fundamentally individualistic orientation toward solving
social problems.
Many commentators have pointed to the focus of American cultural
norms on the interests and rights of individuals as the key to explaining
our failed pandemic response.92 Some have specifically noted the
individualistic focus of American law on personal responsibility as an
impediment.93 These criticisms have focused on individual resistance
to, and inability to comply with, community mitigation measures (also
known as non-pharmaceutical interventions): isolation of the infected,
quarantine of the exposed, and social distancing and face-covering
among the general population.94 But individualism also pervades our
Justice, supra note 8, at 835-36 (discussing how the individualistic bias of health care
models is marked by private law regimes and relational professional ethics).
90 See Wiley & Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 1241-42; Sage, Adding Principle to
Pragmatism, supra note 81, at 33-34.
91 See, e.g., BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY
STOLTZFUS JOST, ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, BRIETTA R. CLARK, ERIN C. FUSE BROWN, ROBERT
GATTER, JAMIE S. KING & ELIZABETH PENDO, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 1 (8th ed. 2018) (“Cost, quality, access, and choice are the chief concerns of
the health care system . . . .”).
92 See, e.g., Meghan O’Rourke, The Shift Americans Must Make to Fight the
Coronavirus, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
archive/2020/03/we-need-isolate-ourselves-during-coronavirus-outbreak/607840/
[https://perma.cc/6EY2-GZCX] (“[Flattening the curve] requires a radical shift in
Americans’ thinking from an individual-first to a communitarian ethos . . . “); Edward
D. Vargas & Gabriel R. Sanchez, American Individualism Is an Obstacle to Wider Mask
Wearing in the US, BROOKINGS (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2020/08/31/american-individualism-is-an-obstacle-to-wider-mask-wearing-in-theus/ [https://perma.cc/5HJD-LL4K] (“[T]he number one reason given by Americans who
are not wearing a mask is that it is their right as an American to not have to do so.”).
93 See, e.g., Wiley & Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 1235-36 (describing the emphasis
on personal responsibility in public health and employment law as a factor in the failed
U.S. response to the COVID pandemic).
94 Id. at 1243. Lawsuits challenging coronavirus emergency orders on the grounds
that they violate individual rights have been largely unsuccessful, except for claims that
orders discriminate based on religion. See Wiley, Social Distancing, supra note 3, at 8594. Outside of the courts, opposition to and defiance of public health emergency orders
and guidelines have undermined the effectiveness of community mitigation measures
in the United States and in several other countries. The relationship between cultural
norms and compliance with social distancing is as yet unclear. See, e.g., Toan Luu Duc
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health care system in ways that have stymied the effectiveness of
medical countermeasures for pandemic response. Diagnostic tests,
therapeutic treatments, and vaccinations are the foundations of a
modern public health response. Our strong orientation toward viewing
these tools through a clinical lens that centers individual patients and
the providers who care for them has undermined our ability to deploy
them as public health interventions.
Disease testing is “the foundation of modern pandemic prevention
and response,” particularly for a virus that can be transmitted by
asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic individuals.95 When public health
infrastructure is adequate, a positive test result should prompt health
officials to provide social supports for isolation of the infected
individual, investigation to trace their contacts, and quarantine of those
contacts to disrupt onward transmission. Testing is also essential for
disease surveillance purposes. To be effective and sustainable, public
health orders closing schools and businesses should be tailored to local
conditions. Without a carefully designed disease surveillance program
based on random sampling and carefully defined parameters, the sheer
number of reported cases is an unreliable indicator for comparing the
scale of outbreaks from place to place and time to time. Recognizing the
importance of testing as a public health tool, several countries quickly
ramped up public health infrastructure for screening, isolation, contact
tracing, quarantine, and disease surveillance.96
Huynh, Does Culture Matter Social Distancing Under the COVID-19 Pandemic?, 130
SAFETY SCI. 1 (2020) (analyzing different countries’ responses to curbing the pandemic);
Neha Deopa & Piergiuseppe Fortunato, Coronagraben. Culture and Social Distancing in
Times of COVID-19, at 4-5 (U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Research Paper No. 49, 2020),
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ser-rp-2020d8_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D4WV-QEV4] (using Switzerland as a case study example of cultural compliance with
social distancing requirements); Hohjin Im & Chuansheng Chen, Social Distancing
Around the Globe: Cultural Correlates of Reduced Mobility 2-5 (June 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/
Hohjin_Im/publication/342507715_Social_Distancing_Around_the_Globe_Cultural_
Correlates_of_Reduced_Mobility/links/5f01063d92851c52d619ab8c/Social-DistancingAround-the-Globe-Cultural-Correlates-of-Reduced-Mobility.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CL48CLC] (describing how collectivist nations dealt with social distancing compared to
more individualistic countries).
95 Lindsay F. Wiley, Federalism in Pandemic Prevention and Response, in 2 COVID19 POL’Y PLAYBOOK: ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, at 65, 66 (Scott Burris,
Sarah de Guia, Lance Gable, Donna Levin, Wendy E. Parmet & Nicolas P. Terry eds.,
2020), https://www.publichealthlawwatch.org/covid19-policy-playbook [https://perma.cc/
5GHD-5LM6] [hereinafter Federalism].
96 Parinaz Tabari, Mitra Amini, Mohsen Moghadami & Mahsa Moosavi,
International Public Health Responses to COVID-19 Outbreak: A Rapid Review, 45 IRAN J.
MED. SCI. 157, 159-60 (2020); see Thomas Hale, Noam Angrist, Beatriz Kira, Anna
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In contrast, in the U.S., coronavirus testing has been driven by a focus
on the clinical significance of results for individuals.97 Testing was slow
to ramp up, supplies were scarce,98 and early criteria for allocation of
scarce resources focused almost exclusively on patient care.99 The
emphasis was on testing to inform clinical decisions about the care of
individual patients. In halting an early disease surveillance program in
the Seattle area, the FDA disregarded the importance of monitoring
trends at the population level — a purpose for which lower accuracy
would be acceptable if carefully communicated to test subjects.100 Lack
of access to testing and the failure of the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (“CDC”) to implement a rational disease surveillance
system has left people unsure about whether they pose a risk of
transmitting the virus to others and state and local leaders ill-equipped
to deploy targeted disease control strategies.
The same focus on individualism undermined early vaccination
efforts. A rationally designed, carefully implemented public health
vaccination campaign can support sustainable suppression of disease
transmission. Even without enough vaccine supply to achieve
suppression, a vaccination campaign can dramatically reduce
hospitalizations and deaths by prioritizing groups for vaccination based
on factors such as residential and workplace exposure, age, and
underlying medical vulnerabilities.101 Careful prioritization maximizes
Petherick, Toby Phillips & Samuel Webster, Variation in Government Responses to
COVID-19, at 9, 17-18 (Univ. Oxford Blavatnik Sch. Gov’t, Working Paper No. BSGWP-2020/032, version 6.0, 2020).
97 Joshua M. Sharfstein & Melissa A. Marx, Opinion, Testing Is Just the Beginning in
the Battle Against Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/03/30/opinion/coronavirus-testing.html [https://perma.cc/SHP3-53MX] (“Our
national tendency is to see testing, and all health care, as being about the individual.
But in this crisis, the primary purpose of testing is not self awareness; it is disease
control.”).
98 Michael D. Shear, Abby Goodnough, Sheila Kaplan, Sheri Fink, Katie Thomas &
Noah Weiland, The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronaviruspandemic.html [https://perma.cc/8J8G-T3UM].
99 See CDC HEALTH ALERT NETWORK, Update and Interim Guidance on Outbreak of
2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), CDC (Feb. 1, 2020, 9:00 AM ET),
https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/HAN00427.asp [https://perma.cc/9UT2-SCPD].
100 See Erin Brodwin, Experts Decry FDA’s Halting of a High-Profile Covid-19 Study
Over Approvals, STAT (May 27, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/27/
coronavirus-testing-seattle-bill-gates-fda/ [https://perma.cc/L6GD-42AF].
101 See, e.g., Bruce Y. Lee, Shawn T. Brown, George W. Korch, Philip C. Cooley,
Richard K. Zimmerman, William D. Wheaton, Shanta M. Zimmer, John J. Grefenstette,
Rachel R. Bailey, Tina-Marie Assi & Donald S. Burke, A Computer Simulation of Vaccine
Prioritization, Allocation, and Rationing During the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, 28
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public health benefits by recognizing that some individuals’ vaccination
will have a greater impact than others. Alternatively, haphazard
distribution of scarce supplies based on passive “you come to us”
systems results in disproportionately allocating scarce resources to
people who are healthier and have greater resources. Without careful
planning, reductions in hospitalizations and deaths take longer than
necessary and health equity suffers.102
In late 2020 and early 2021, underfunded state and local public health
departments had insufficient capacity to administer or even oversee
distribution,103 leaving the vaccination campaign largely in the hands of
large hospital systems and pharmaceutical chains.104 Privately
administered vaccination clinics had little incentive to engage in active
outreach to particularly vulnerable communities where many do not
have the resources or time to aggressively pursue vaccination
opportunities. Commentators attacked prioritization schemes as a
waste of time.105 Many governors rapidly abandoned CDC prioritization
guidelines. Some states supplemented or replaced CDC guidelines with

VACCINE 4875, 4878 (2010) (explaining the relationships among vaccination
prioritization, public health benefit, virus characteristics and vaccine scarcity); see also
Kathleen Dooling, Mona Marin, Megan Wallace, Nancy McClung, Mary Chamberland,
Grace M. Lee, H. Keipp Talbot, José R. Romero, Beth P. Bell & Sara E. Oliver, The
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices’ Updated Interim Recommendation for
Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine — United States, December 2020, 69 MORTALITY &
MORBIDITY WKLY. REP. 1657, 1659 (2021) (explaining the role of ethical criteria in
prioritization).
102 See Ian Millhiser, Florida County Has Elderly Residents Camp Out Overnight to Get
Covid-19 Vaccine, VOX (Dec. 29, 2020, 3:50 PM EST), https://www.vox.com/
2020/12/29/22205031/florida-covid-vaccine-camp-out-lee-county-ron-desanis-estero
[https://perma.cc/KAE6-AZ3L].
103 Abby Goodnough & Sheila Kaplan, Missing from State Plans to Distribute the
Coronavirus Vaccine: Money to Do It, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/14/health/covid-vaccine-distribution-plans.html
[https://perma.cc/22B7-74NM].
104 Rebecca Robbins, Frances Robles & Tim Arango, Here’s Why Distribution of the
Vaccine Is Taking Longer Than Expected, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/12/31/health/vaccine-distribution-delays.html [https://perma.cc/2S74-EYQF]; see
Lena H. Sun & Frances Stead Sellers, Now Comes the Hardest Part: Getting a Coronavirus
Vaccine from Loading Dock to Upper Arm, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2020, 6:06 PM EST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/11/23/covid-getting-vaccine/ [https://perma.
cc/CW3Z-CFF8].
105 See, e.g., Jessie Hellmann, Frustration Builds Over Slow Pace of Vaccine Rollout,
THE HILL (Jan. 5, 2021, 5:22 PM EST) https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/532792frustration-builds-over-slow-pace-of-vaccine-rollout [https://perma.cc/P9HF-X2B3]
(discussing numerous criticisms of the vaccine rollout).
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more targeted strategies that enhanced equity,106 but many governors
expanded access to too-large groups while dumping scarce doses into a
small number of difficult-to-access sites.107
By mid-March 2021, the speed of the U.S. vaccination effort had
rapidly increased as doses became more widely available.108 Rather than
administer vaccinations through the existing health care system,
however, federal-state partnerships relied heavily on mass vaccination
sites, including many run by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and National Guard troops.109 The vast majority of U.S.
residents have been vaccinated outside of the systems where they
ordinarily receive medical care.110 This “bypass” of our individualistic,
fragmentary, privatized health care system was remarkably effective at
ramping up the pace of vaccination, but it was expensive and may not
have been a good fit for vaccine-hesitant people in vulnerable
communities. Vaccine demand peaked in April 2021 and many mass
vaccination sites began to draw down their operations.111 Meanwhile,
surveys indicated that many unvaccinated people would be more likely

106 See, e.g., Deanna Pan, Should Residents of Hard-Hit Cities and Towns Be Vaccinated
Before Other Groups? Some Epidemiologists Think So, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 24, 2020, 4:28
AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/12/23/nation/should-residents-hard-hit-citiestowns-be-vaccinated-before-other-groups-some-epidemiologists-think-so/ [https://perma.
cc/5DWX-9UR9] (discussing state strategies for prioritizing vulnerable populations).
107 See, e.g., Jen Christensen, As ‘Messy’ Vaccine Rollout Continues, States Begin to
Prioritize More People for Vaccination, CNN (Jan. 6, 2021, 9:28 PM ET),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/06/health/covid-19-messy-roll-out-state-expandpriorities/index.html [https://perma.cc/43DN-EXF5] (describing Florida Governor Ron
Desantis’s expansion of eligibility criteria to anyone over age 65, resulting in demand
“so high that some seniors camped out overnight to get one.”); Hellmann, supra note
105 (“Frustrated by the slow pace of vaccination, governors are . . . questioning the
priority guidelines adopted by the CDC for who should receive the first doses of the
vaccines.”).
108 See Eileen Sullivan, COVID-19: Pace of U.S. Vaccinations Accelerates, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/03/12/world/covid-19-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/32XQ-YQLU].
109 Federally Supported Community Vaccination Centers, FEMA https://www.fema.gov/
disasters/coronavirus/vaccine-support/vaccine-center# (last updated July 6, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/L722-L6AG].
110 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EXPANDING COVID-19 VACCINE
DISTRIBUTION TO PRIMARY CARE PROVIDERS TO ADDRESS DISPARITIES IN IMMUNIZATION: GUIDE
FOR JURISDICTIONS 2 (2021), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/covid-19/downloads/Guide-forJurisdictions-on-PCP-COVID-19-Vaccination.pdf [https://perma.cc/29YB-JQQ8].
111 Meghann Myers, Troops Heading Home as COVID-19 Mass Vaccination Sites Close
Up Shop, MILITARY TIMES (June 8, 2021), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/yourmilitary/2021/06/08/troops-heading-home-as-covid-19-mass-vaccination-sites-closeup-shop/ [https://perma.cc/GR87-KD2J].
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to accept vaccination if offered by their regular health care provider,
who could answer their questions and discuss risks and benefits.112
A key insight of public health is that “health is not just an individual
good; it is a distinctly public good, too.”113 In contrast, the iron triangle
ethos is individualistic at its core. It guides evaluation of our health care
system based on individual access to high-quality health care and the
costs associated with it, not on public health outcomes or equity.
Deeper commitment to solidarity prompts us to assess the system in
terms of its ability to serve “uniquely public — as opposed to the mere
aggregation of private — interests.”114 The COVID pandemic has amply
demonstrated our health care system’s catastrophic failures by these
criteria.
2.

Fiscal Fragmentation

Fiscal fragmentation is the “tendency to divide costs associated with
Americans’ sickness and health into separate, fiscally disintegrated
categories.”115 Public health programs aimed at community prevention
are financed separately from health care at a rate of pennies on the
dollar.116 The costs of health care for individuals who become sick are
divided between the health care provider, the patient, the taxpayer, and
the patient’s insurer, if she has one.117 Costs borne by insurers are
pooled across all enrollees, but fragmented among somewhat arbitrary
actuarial groups based on payer, region, employer, age, and other
categories. Insurance risk pools are divided by design.118 Fiscal
112 Scott Ratzan, Eric C. Schneider, Hilary Hatch & Joseph Cacchione, Missing the
Point — How Primary Care Can Overcome Covid-19 Vaccine “Hesitancy”, 384 NEW ENG.
J. MEDICINE e100(1), e100(2)-(3) (2021).
113 Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 4, at 792.
114 Wiley, Health Justice, supra note 8, at 855 (emphasis omitted).
115 Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 415. The law’s focus on individualism does not
mean that persons are seen in their fullness and inter-connectedness. Instead, persons
are fragmented into categories — employee, mother, child, consumer — and regulated
one piece at a time. See Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability and Health
Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 277, 281 (2010) (suggesting “that an individual must be viewed
holistically, across the full range of environments in which she functions”).
116 See David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Public Health’s Falling Share of
US Health Spending, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 56, 56-57 (2016); see also Nason Maani &
Sandro Galea, COVID-19 and Underinvestment in the Health of the U.S. Population, 98
MILBANK Q. 239, 240 (2020).
117 See Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 415.
118 See Stone, supra note 8, at 290 (“Actuarial fairness . . . is a method of organizing
mutual aid by fragmenting communities into ever-smaller, more homogeneous groups
. . . that leads ultimately to the destruction of mutual aid. This fragmentation must be
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fragmentation manifests most noticeably in our splintered multi-payer
system of federal (e.g., Medicare) and state (e.g., Medicaid) public
programs, and employer-based group and individual insurance plans.
The result is a bewildering assortment of fiscal categories, overseen by
different entities, each incentivized to reduce its own costs, but not
others’.
Fragmentation impedes health justice in three ways. First, the legal
division of responsibility for costs and benefits gives individuals,
agencies, and programs an economic incentive to think only of
themselves or the costs within their charge. In economic terms, this
means that negative externalities (including harms to the public’s
health) will be over-produced, positive externalities (including public
health benefits) will be under-produced, and equitable distribution will
be marginalized.119 Second, the logistical division of costs and benefits
obscures health care’s true costs and makes it easier to neglect those
outside one’s group — by ignoring the fiscal categories to which they
are assigned or failing to account for costs in certain categories
altogether.120 The invisibility of care work provided by loved ones —
especially by women to children, the elderly, and the sick — is a prime
example.121 Third, in a world of scarcity, the division of costs and
benefits poses an additional challenge, making marshaling resources for
significant investments in public goods with dispersed benefits difficult,
susceptible both to coordination failures and collective action problems.
Fragmentation it exacerbates the scarcity of resources needed to
support a modern public health response.122
In the U.S. pandemic response, fiscal fragmentation shifted and hid
costs and forced false, tragic choices. These effects began years before
the pandemic. Fiscal fragmentation impeded efforts to invest in public
accomplished by fostering in people a sense of their differences, rather than their
commonalities . . . .”).
119 See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 66-67 (William J. Baumol ed., 1972)
(discussing externalities and subsidies to counteract them).
120 See PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER
HEALTH CARE REFORM 11 (2011) (“Every aspect of this financing system serves to
obscure its true costs. So when people who have good health benefits evaluate reforms,
they do so from a standpoint shielded from the full realities of the problem.”).
121 Allison K. Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 147, 184 (2016) (“[D]amage to intimate relationships or health and
an inability to pursue life goals” for caretakers are “the invisible copayment of current
long-term care social insurance programs”).
122 See Len M. Nichols & Lauren A. Taylor, Social Determinants As Public Goods: A
New Approach to Financing Key Investments in Healthy Communities, 37 HEALTH AFFS.
1223, 1225 (2018) (describing lack of community public health investment and
coordination challenges in financing such investment).
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health infrastructure for pandemic prevention and response. Section
4002 of the Affordable Care Act created an 18.75 billion dollar
Prevention and Public Health Fund “to provide for expanded and
sustained national investment in prevention and public health programs
to improve health and help restrain the rate of growth in private and
public sector health care costs.”123 Unfortunately, however, the fund
was a sitting duck because it counts as “mandatory” federal spending
within our fragmented financing system. Budget rules push Congress to
cut mandatory funding in existing law whenever it wants to pass a
statute that cuts taxes or creates new mandatory spending, but
mandatory funding programs are usually protected by powerful interest
groups.124 Public health is a rare exception — it tends to benefit the
public generally, not particular interest groups — so Congress
repeatedly (and tragically) raided the fund in the years leading up to
2020 to offset costly changes in federal law benefiting discrete interests,
including the “doc fix” and the 2017 tax cuts.125
It is reasonable to presume that CDC’s funding challenges in the years
before the pandemic contributed to the agency’s testing missteps.
Indeed, as early as 2018, observers expressed fear that raiding the
Prevention and Public Health Fund would render CDC unable to
respond quickly and effectively to a pandemic. “[W]ithout funding, the
CDC won’t be able to protect us,” former CDC Director Tom Frieden
observed after one of Congress’s raids on the fund in 2018.126 As a result,
he said, “[w]e’re more likely to have to fight dangerous organisms here
in the U.S.”127
Fiscal fragmentation has also stymied investments in the quality of
nursing home care and coordination between acute hospital care and
long-term care. The perverse game of “hot potato” between families,
states, providers, and the federal government over elderly Americans’
123 42 U.S.C. § 300u-11 (2018); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, § 4002, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
124 See William M. Sage & Timothy M. Westmoreland, Following the Money: The
ACA’s Fiscal-Political Economy and Lessons for Future Health Care Reform, 48 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 434, 436 (2020) (describing PAYGO, a rule adopted by Congress to prohibit
mandatory spending or revenue legislation if it would worsen the deficit).
125 Michael R. Fraser, A Brief History of the Prevention and Public Health Fund:
Implications for Public Health Advocates, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 572, 573-74 (2019)
(discussing the “doc fix”); Sage & Westmoreland, supra note 124, at 440 (discussing
the removal of funds because of the 2017 tax cuts and other funding decisions).
126 Ashley Yeager, Cuts to Prevention and Public Health Fund Puts CDC Programs at Risk,
THE SCIENTIST (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.the-scientist.com/daily-news/cuts-to-preventionand-public-health-fund-puts-cdc-programs-at-risk-30298 [https://perma.cc/ULV7-7ANQ].
127 Id.
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care offers a stark illustration. In the U.S., much of the cost of daily care
for the elderly is borne, by default, by themselves or their loved ones.128
Medicare, which is federally financed, only pays for one hundred days
of nursing home or home health care after an enrollee is hospitalized
for 3-days.129 The reason for these arbitrary cutoffs is fiscal
fragmentation: Medicare’s designers worried about tapping the
Medicare trust fund for nursing home care, and opted to shift the cost
to families and states.130 Medicaid, which is jointly financed by states
and the federal government, is the largest payer of long-term care; about
half of nursing home residents either satisfy Medicaid’s indigence
requirement for coverage or else spend down their assets paying for care
until Medicaid kicks in.131 The arbitrary limits on Medicare-financed
nursing home care cause perverse behavioral effects, as families
conspire to get their loved ones admitted to hospitals in order to trigger
nursing home coverage, or struggle once the 100 days are up to find
alternative arrangements.132
A pandemic that threatens the elderly in particular is a terrible time
for families to navigate the fragmented churn through hospitalization,
long-term care, and home health. By mid-March of 2020, the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) realized that the 3day rule and 100-day limit threatened to exacerbate the pandemic.133 It
issued an emergency waiver, purporting to relax the 3-day rule and 100day limit for COVID patients.134 But fiscal fragmentation is more
stubborn: these costs are first born by providers who then seek
reimbursement. With a long history of being denied reimbursement,
providers continued to apply the old limits, despite the waiver. As Adam
Zimmerman described, providers were either ignorant about the last128 See METLIFE MATURE MKT. INST., THE METLIFE STUDY OF CAREGIVING COSTS TO
WORKING CAREGIVERS: DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR BABY BOOMERS CARING FOR THEIR PARENTS
15 (2011) (estimating costs to family caregivers approaching $3 trillion).
129 See Richard L. Kaplan, Reflections on Medicare at 50: Breaking the Chains of Path
Dependency for a New Era, 23 ELDER L.J. 1, 9-10 (2015).
130 See Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community Care:
Lessons from Medicaid’s History, 26 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 937, 956 (2010) (“Wilbur
Cohen, President Johnson’s chief strategist on the Medicare bill, was concerned that
nursing home coverage would open up a bottomless pit of demand that would destroy
the delicate political budgetary balance needed to support Medicare through mandatory
payroll deductions.”).
131 Id. at 939, 952.
132 Id. at 956-57.
133 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FINDINGS CONCERNING SECTION 1812(F) OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT IN RESPONSE TO THE EFFECTS OF THE 2019-NOVEL CORONAVIRUS
(COVID-19) OUTBREAK 1-2 (2020).
134 Id.
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minute waiver or fearful it would be applied strictly, a fear that was
bolstered by early-summer guidance describing the waiver in limited
terms.135 Thus, Medicare enrollees and their families continued to
struggle to access care.136
The fragmentation of financing mechanisms also plagued testing.
Workplaces and schools had reason to push their employees and
students to get tested — for the good of other employees, customers,
teachers, and students, and so they could remain open. This was easier
said than done, however. The $100 to $199 cost of a COVID test for an
asymptomatic person typically has been worth it, in terms of the
protective interventions a positive test enables and the assurance a
negative test provides.137 But fiscal fragmentation produced a legal and
logistical mismatch between those who benefit from such a test and
those in a position to pay.138 At the start of the pandemic, Congress
mandated that insurers pay for coronavirus testing without costsharing.139 But insurers argued that precautionary tests were not
covered by insurance contracts to cover “medically necessary” care.140
Workplaces and schools, in turn, usually declined to mandate testing

135 See Adam S. Zimmerman, Medicare’s Broken Promise to People in Nursing Homes,
THE HILL (June 27, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/504830-medicaresbroken-promise-to-people-in-nursing-homes [https://perma.cc/2A7Y-XJJ7].
136 Chuck Buck, Amid Confusion, the SNF 3-Day Waiver Remains Intact Nationally,
RAC MONITOR (July 8, 2020), https://www.racmonitor.com/amid-confusion-the-snf-3day-waiver-remains-intact-nationally [https://perma.cc/TB8B-WE2M] (describing
widespread reluctance by skilled nursing facilities to accept Medicare patients lacking
prior 3-day inpatient admission despite waiver).
137 See Nisha Kurani, Karen Pollitz, Dustin Cotliar, Giorlando Ramirez & Cynthia
Cox, COVID-19 Test Prices and Payment Policy, PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS. TRACKER,
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/covid-19-test-prices-and-payment-policy/
(Apr. 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/WV5N-398Z].
138 The benefit of avoided exposures justifies the cost from the perspective of those
saved from the virus, but they lack any way to pay for the test. The individual’s insurer
has the capacity to pay for a test, but is unlikely to derive any benefit from avoiding a
COVID case only if the patient happens to be one of its beneficiaries.
139 Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 6001,
134 Stat. 178 (2020) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320b-5, 1395l, 1396d(a)(3));
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
§ 3202(a), 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
140 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FAQS ABOUT FAMILIES FIRST CORONAVIRUS
RESPONSE ACT AND CORONAVIRUS AID, RELIEF, AND ECONOMIC SECURITY ACT IMPLEMENTATION
Part 42, at 6 (2020) (requiring coverage applies only where the test is “medically appropriate
for the individual . . . in accordance with current accepted standards of medical practice”);
see Julie Appleby, For COVID Tests, the Question of Who Pays Comes Down to Interpretation,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 20, 2020), https://khn.org/news/for-covid-tests-the-question-ofwho-pays-comes-down-to-interpretation/ [https://perma.cc/5ZJ7-Q6AP].
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not due to a lack of availability, but due to the cost and administrative
complexity,141 and individuals found themselves unexpectedly being
billed for coronavirus tests,142 or delayed or refused tests for fear of that
result.143
After approval of the first vaccines, frustrating and deadly delays in
their distribution evidenced fiscal fragmentation’s logistical
entrenchment. The federal government had an acute fiscal interest in
promptly vaccinating residents in long-term care facilities (“LTCF”),
including skilled nursing facilities, assisted living facilities, and
residential care homes. When COVID outbreaks hit nursing homes, the
resulting hospital treatment expenses are borne primarily by Medicare
(which covers hospital care costs without regard to whether a person
was previously in a nursing home).144 Unsurprisingly, then, the federal
government aspired to provide and pay for vaccination for all LTCF
residents and staff.
Fragmentation’s logistical entrenchment proved an impediment to
this public health intervention, however. While the federal government
found itself with the will to finance a public health intervention, it failed
to create a way — an apparatus to administer vaccinations to skilled
nursing facility residents and workers as rapidly as possible.145 After
141 NATHANIEL L. WADE & MARA G. ASPINALL, ASU COLLEGE OF HEALTH SOLS., FACING
UNCERTAINTY: THE CHALLENGES OF COVID-19 IN THE WORKPLACE 6-7 (2020),
https://issuu.com/asuhealthsolutions/docs/asu_workplace_commons_nov2020?fr=sYjh
jZjE5NTg1NjM [https://perma.cc/5968-X99F] (noting in survey of more than 1100
employers, vast majority declined to test asymptomatic employees; cost was cited as
number one impediment and complexity as number two); Elissa Nadworny, Many
Colleges Aren’t Aggressively Testing Students for Coronavirus, NPR, at 1:01 (Oct. 6, 2020,
5:04 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/06/920642789/many-colleges-arentaggressively-testing-students-for-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/3PUD-JGF3] (noting in
survey of more than 1400 colleges with in-person classes, vast majority declined to test
asymptomatic students; lack of CDC recommendation and cost were top two reasons).
142 Donna Rosato, How ‘Free’ Coronavirus Testing Has Become the New Surprise
Medical Bill, CONSUMER REPS. (July 27, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/
coronavirus/how-free-coronavirus-testing-has-become-new-surprise-medical-bill/
[https://perma.cc/5V3P-7RU2].
143 See Brendan Keefe, Where to Get Free COVID-19 Test if You Have No Symptoms,
11ALIVE (May 20, 2020, 10:55 PM EDT) https://www.11alive.com/article/news/health/
coronavirus/georgia-testing-lack-of-free-accessibility/85-ce70d88b-17a8-4819-9a5b792710212caf [https://perma.cc/5FKD-27SZ] (reporting examples of patients told they
would be billed for tests despite coverage requirements and encouraging readers afraid
of cost to seek tests from particular sites).
144 42 U.S.C. § 1395(d)(a) (2018) (describing Medicare coverage of inpatient
hospital costs).
145 Noam N. Levey, Vaccine Rollout Relies Heavily on CVS and Walgreens, DAILY
HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE (Dec. 5, 2020, 1:25 PM), https://www.gazettenet.com/COVID-19-
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months of failed legislative efforts to fund vaccine distribution by state
and local health departments,146 Operation Warp Speed (the joint HHS
and Department of Defense effort to develop and deploy COVID
vaccines) could not simply stand up a public health apparatus
overnight. In the absence of publicly financed infrastructure, Operation
Warp Speed contracted with private companies to provide
immunizations: CVS, Walgreens, and a handful of smaller pharmacy
chains.147 Under the Pharmacy Partnership for Long-Term Care
Program, Operation Warp Speed shipped millions of doses to
pharmacies in mid-December 2020 and instructed them to bill
Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance for each vaccine administered
to an LTCF resident or worker.148
This workaround, touted by federal officials as not imposing any
additional cost on the federal government to send mobile vaccination
teams directly to facilities, was “a fiasco.”149 Experts predicted that the
pharmacies’ profit motive would undermine their interest in active
outreach to vulnerable populations, particularly since the pharmacies
were paid no more for the effort of staffing mobile teams than they
would have been for passively administering them at their own retail
clinics.150 Millions of doses were held in storage while the pharmacies
vaccine-rollout-relies-heavily-on-CVS-and-Walgreens-37625338 [https://perma.cc/S5QRWCQ9] (“We’re in a situation where we don’t have a public sector that’s able to do
something like this.”).
146 Nicholas Florko, Trump Officials Actively Lobbied to Deny States Money for Vaccine
Rollout Last Fall, STAT (Jan. 31, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/01/31/trumpofficials-lobbied-to-deny-states-money-for-vaccine-rollout/ [https://perma.cc/F5JA-G2F4].
147 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Trump Administration
Partners with CVS and Walgreens to Provide COVID-19 Vaccine to Protect Vulnerable
Americans Living in Long-Term Care Facilities (Oct. 16, 2020) https://www.hhs.gov/
about/news/2020/10/16/trump-aministration-partners-cvs-walgreens-provide-covid-19vaccine-protect-vulnerable-americans-long-term-care-facilities-nationwide.html
[https://perma.cc/U9KR-G6ZJ]; Florko, supra note 146.
148 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., supra note 147.
149 Rachel Bluth & Lauren Weber, CVS and Walgreens Under Fire for Slow Pace of
Vaccination in Nursing Homes, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://khn.org/news/article/cvs-and-walgreens-under-fire-for-slow-pace-of-vaccinationin-nursing-homes/ [https://perma.cc/YJ4D-Q84D] (quoting Mississippi’s state health
offer, who also stated that Mississippi pharmacies had administered only five percent of
the doses committed to the program as of January 14); John Pacenti, “Time Is of the
Essence” for COVID Vaccine: Gov. DeSantis Frustrated with CVS and Walgreens, PALM
BEACH POST (Dec. 16, 2020, 4:40 PM ET), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/story/news/
coronavirus/2020/12/16/covid-desantis-expresses-frustration-cvs-and-walgreens/
3925203001/ [https://perma.cc/R5PS-466S].
150 Levey, supra note 145; see Sarah Mervosh, How West Virginia Became a U.S.
Leader in Vaccine Rollout, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
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imposed burdensome consent paperwork requirements on facilities.
Efforts to secure hard-copy consent forms from residents and their
family members do not appear to have been motivated by the threat of
liability (vaccine administrators are shielded from liability). Rather, the
deadly delays caused by consent paperwork appear to have been
motivated by third-party billing requirements.151 Vaccine
administration fell far short of projections, except in the one state that
declined to rely on the federal program.152
The fragmentation of responsibility for health costs has contributed
to a lack of pandemic preparedness, impeding public health
investments. Once the pandemic hit, fragmentation stood in the way of
critical interventions with collective benefits. The federal government
had the resources to implement a modern public health response but it
lacked both the administrative capacity and the political will to displace
our fragmented status quo.
3.

Federalism

Federalism further divides authority for legal interventions in the
pandemic response among federal, state, and local governments. It is
legally entrenched in the Constitution’s enumeration of federal
regulatory powers in Article I and its reservation of non-enumerated
powers for states in the Tenth Amendment, establishing dual
sovereignty.153 It extends to states’ conferral of regulatory power on
local authorities via home rule doctrine, creating a second layer of subnational regulatory power, but one heavily dependent on state sovereign
authority.154 The legal pecking order establishes federal law as supreme

2021/01/24/us/west-virginia-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/UZ6W-MFC2]; Yuki Noguchi,
Why West Virginia’s Winning the Race to Get COVID-19 Vaccines Into Arms, NPR (Jan. 7,
2021, 4:16 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/01/07/954409347/
why-west-virginias-winning-the-race-to-get-covid-19-vaccine-into-arms [https://perma.cc/
3UQW-L3P8].
151 Bluth & Weber, supra note 149.
152 Noah Higgins-Dunn, Operation Warp Speed Chief Says Covid Vaccine Distribution
‘Should Be Better’ as U.S. Misses Goal, CNBC (Dec. 30, 2020, 2:30 PM EST)
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/30/covid-vaccine-operation-warp-speed-chief-saysdistribution-should-be-better-.html [https://perma.cc/SB8W-BZ6F].
153 See generally Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124
HARV. L. REV. 4, 11-12 (2010) [hereinafter All the Way Down] (presenting the
conventional account of sovereignty in federalism).
154 Id. at 22-25 (extending federalism principles to local governments); Heather K.
Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1722 (2017) [hereinafter Federalism
3.0]; cf. Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995
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but somewhat limited in scope, state law as subordinate to conflicting
federal law but otherwise plenary in scope, and local law as subordinate
to both federal and state laws and dependent on state authorization for
its scope.155
Federalism’s logistical entrenchment is more complex. It is found in
the political and jurisprudential narratives of comity and deference to
state sovereignty and the practical devolution to state authority.156
Federalism embraces the normative values of state experimentation and
local variation within an overarching national system of uniform
priorities.157 Practically, however, the logistical entrenchment of state
influence on federal policy — despite the breadth and supremacy of
federal regulatory power — means that deference to states characterizes
federalism as a fixture.158
Health care federalism has an inconsistent and often ineffective
legacy: federal authority dominates the field of regulating medical
products, establishing nationwide standards for safety and efficacy and
serving as a singular clearinghouse for scientific knowledge on diseases
and their diagnosis, treatment, mitigation, and cures.159 States, however,
(2018) (describing a trend of “aggressive” and even “punitive” trend in state preemption
of local laws, as a backlash to local progressive regulation and a violation of home rule).
155 See, e.g., Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding Innovation: State Preemption of
Progressive Local Regulations, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225 (2018) (discussing states’
reassertion of sovereignty through preemption of local laws).
156 Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 414; e.g., Bridget A. Fahey, Federalism by
Contract, 129 YALE L. J. 2326, 2331-32 (2020); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National]
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1997-2000 (2014); cf. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra
note 154, at 1722 (arguing that a state’s “democratic role is just as important as its
regulatory one” because states serve as “the front lines for national debates, the key sites
where we work out our disagreements before taking them to a national stage”).
157 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 525 (1995);
Gluck, supra note 156, at 1999, 2020.
158 See Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 414; see also Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism
in Health Care Reform, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM AND POVERTY 198 (Ezra
Rosser ed., 2019) [hereinafter Federalism in Health Care Reform] (noting that
“federalism tends to be understood to mean that states are in charge”).
159 Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Body of Preemption: Health Law Traditions and the
Presumption Against Preemption, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 95, 135 (2016) (concluding that
“[r]egulation of medical products is thus heavily and historically federal” considering
the involvement of FDA, NIH, Medicare, and Medicaid regulation); Patricia J. Zettler,
Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 851 (2017) (“[T]he federal government
rigorously regulates drugs—drugs generally cannot be sold, prescribed, or dispensed to
patients until the federal government determines that they are safe and effective”). See
generally ROBERT I. FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED “FREEMARKET” HEALTH CARE 24-28, 48-84 (2014) (explaining how the NIH, FDA, and federal
Patent and Trademark Office “created the pharmaceutical industry”). CDC supplements
all of these federal functions.
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retain primary authority over regulating medical facilities and
practitioners who prescribe and administer these products.160 When it
comes to the practical dimensions of accessing health care, federalism
has stymied normatively desirable health care financing and payment
reforms and perpetuated interstate inequities.161 The ACA’s design
accommodated states by offering them Spending Clause enticements for
Medicaid expansion and operating insurance exchanges, and relying on
them to implement federal policy priorities and standards.162 States
responded in polarized and polarizing ways, with conservative-led
states refusing to cooperate and attempting to use federal waivers to
fund “experiments” that undermine the core protections in those

160 Zettler, supra note 159, at 885 (acknowledging and questioning the
“[c]onventional wisdom in health law and policy . . . that states regulate the practice of
medicine, while the federal government—specifically the FDA — regulates drugs”).
161 See, e.g., Huberfeld, Federalism in Health Care Reform, supra note 158, at 197-98
(“States generally cannot and do not act alone” in health reform); Fuse Brown &
McCuskey, supra note 15, at 443-47 (describing the “pitfalls” of federalism in health
care as enabling states to undermine federal protections, while preempting states from
enacting further protections); Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism
in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1698 (2018) (“[H]ealth policy that allows for
interstate variation might be a benefit of federalism, but it also leads to significant
inequality when it comes to healthcare access across the country.”); Scott L. Greer &
Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L.
203, 206 (2010) (recognizing “that the distressing litany of historical failure at both the
state and federal levels provides no guidance in answering the question of federalism in
health care reform”); Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism
and Health Care Reform, 28 CONN. L. REV. 115, 116-17 (1995) (outlining the potential
for state reform to produce “workable and acceptable” changes that respond to local
preferences, but also the “serious and plausible objections to leaving much of health
planning to the states”); McCuskey, supra note 159, at 97-100 (tracing the growing ratio
of federal-to-state health laws); Richard P. Nathan, Federalism and Health Policy, 24
HEALTH AFFS. 1458, 1461 (2005) (explaining that “richer states have richer [Medicaid]
programs; hence, the federalism state-push factor for Medicaid is primarily from liberal
states”); Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to State Health
Care Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 121, 130 (1993) (identifying “a variety of federal
statutes, all of which raise potential impediments to would-be state reformers”).
162 See, e.g., Fahey, supra note 156, at 2362 (highlighting the Supreme Court’s anticoercion holding in NFIB v. Sebelius as part of a broader phenomenon of
intergovernmental agreements); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory
Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121
YALE L.J. 534, 582-90 (2011) (cataloging the many different versions of federalism in
the ACA, and explaining that the statute “requires elaborate infrastructures to be created
and implemented at the state and local levels”); see also Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and
the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE L.J.F. 1, 15 (2017); Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at
414-15; Gluck et al., supra note 42, at 1473.
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federal programs.163 As Abbe Gluck and Nicole Huberfeld have
observed, “the ACA’s federalism served state power,” but did not
necessarily “produce[] better health policy outcomes.”164 As a final
federalism trap, ERISA preempts states and localities from enforcing
their own protective laws against most employer-sponsored health
insurance plans.165 Federalism’s dysfunction cuts in multiple directions
simultaneously, but mostly against solidarity-enhancing policies.
The U.S. response to the COVID pandemic was dependent on an
incoherent and inequitable state-by-state patchwork approach to
distributing the burdens and benefits of public investments in health.
In theory, the deft division of labor among different levels of
government166 could benefit health care167 and public health168
responses by tailoring regulatory authority and responsibility for
execution to the particular strengths of each level. In practice, however,
federalism has sowed dysfunction in testing, treatment, and vaccination
policy — compounding its crippling disruption of community
mitigation measures like masking and social distancing.169
163 E.g., Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Big Waiver Under Statutory Sabotage, 45 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 213, 233 (2019); Jonathan Oberlander, The End of Obamacare, 376 NEW ENG. J.
MEDICINE 1, 3 (2017); Sara Rosenbaum, The (Almost) Great Unraveling, 43 J. HEALTH
POL., POL’Y & L. 579, 595 (2018).
164 Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, The New Health Care Federalism on the
Ground, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (“We can say more assuredly that the ACA’s
federalism served state power than we can say that its federalism produced better health
policy outcomes . . . .”).
165 See Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra note 15, at 389.
166 See generally Jenna Bednar, The Political Science of Federalism, 7 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 269, 270 (2011) (explaining dual sovereignty principles of federalism theory).
167 E.g., Kristin Madison, Building a Better Laboratory: The Federal Role in Promoting
Health System Experimentation, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 765, 766 (2014); Michael Serota &
Michelle Singer, Maintaining Healthy Laboratories of Experimentation: Federalism, Health
Care Reform, and ERISA, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 557, 600-04 (2011).
168 E.g., Lawrence O. Gostin & Lindsay F. Wiley, Governmental Public Health Powers
During the COVID-19 Pandemic Stay-at-Home Orders, Business Closures, and Travel
Restrictions, 323 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2137, 2137 (2020) (explaining the legal powers of
federal, state, and local governments to implement public health interventions).
169 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Thinking Globally, Acting
Locally – the U.S. Response to Covid-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE e75, 1 (2020)
(“COVID-19 has exposed major weaknesses in the United States’ federalist system of
public health governance . . . .”); Huberfeld et al., supra note 71, at 956-57; Nancy J.
Knauer, The COVID-19 Pandemic and Federalism: Who Decides?, 23 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (2020) (“The varying state and local responses to the pandemic
underscore both the promise and the limitations of federalism.”); Nicolas Terry,
COVID-19 and Healthcare Lessons Already Learned, 7 J.L. & BIOSCI. 1, 1 (2020) (using
“COVID-19 as a frame on the . . . flaws inherent in healthcare federalism,” among other
longstanding problems); Wiley, Federalism, supra note 95, at 69 (explaining how
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First, on the aspects of pandemic response that demand economies of
scale and interstate coordination, the federal government abdicated its
role.170 When it came to funding and supply-chain preparations for the
crucial pandemic-response tools of tests, medical equipment,
therapeutics, and vaccine doses, the federal government shunted to
states responsibilities that they neither asked for nor could bear —
functionally or financially.171 A functional response to the pandemic
would have harnessed the power of FDA’s longstanding role as medical
innovation intermediary, and the equally longstanding power of federal
funding for “research, development, stockpiling, and distribution of
critical supplies.”172 Yet FDA initially flexed its regulatory power to
prevent the dissemination of local lab-developed testing protocols from
the University of Washington.173 HHS later rescinded FDA’s authority
to clear lab-developed tests before use,174 but not until after missteps

federalism “stymied the U.S. coronavirus response” on public health mitigation
measures, and offering recommendations for how a deft division of federal and state
powers should work).
170 Haffajee & Mello, supra note 169, at 2 (noting that “the federal government has
done too little”).
171 See Sheila Grigsby et al., Resistance to Racial Equity in U.S. Federalism and Its
Impact on Fragmented Regions, 50 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 658, 660 (2020) (“Even before
COVID-19, studies have shown that state and county governments were neither
prepared nor resourced to implement strategic plans to address global health crises.”);
Huberfeld et al., supra note 71, at 955 (“States have been the primary payer for the
majority of the response, including purchasing personal protective equipment . . .
increasing charity care payments to hospital . . . . The lack of federal coordination and
funding leaves states scrambling to pay for an emergency that far outpaces what they
could have budgeted for . . . .”).
172 Wiley, Federalism, supra note 95, at 66.
173 See Sheri Fink & Mike Baker, ‘It’s Just Everywhere Already’: How Delays in Testing Set
Back the U.S. Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/03/10/us/coronavirus-testing-delays.html [https://perma.cc/S7Q9-84CK]; Atul
Gawande, We Can Solve the Coronavirus-Test Mess Now—If We Want To, NEW YORKER
(Sept. 2, 2020) https://www.newyorker.com/science/medical-dispatch/we-can-solvethe-coronavirus-test-mess-now-if-we-want-to [https://perma.cc/34ZP-9927] (“In fact,
the United States has stymied rather than accelerated the ability of laboratories to
develop testing capacity. [The labs of . . . hospital system[s] [and] other academic and
commercial labs . . . began developing a coronavirus test in January, concerned that the
outbreak in Asia could become a danger here. But, through February, the F.D.A.
authorized only the C.D.C.’s coronavirus test.”).
174 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESCISSION OF GUIDANCES AND OTHER
INFORMAL ISSUANCES CONCERNING PREMARKET REVIEW OF LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS
1 (2020).
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and contamination had frustrated the rollout of CDC-developed federal
test kits.175
States, as co-equal sovereign governments in the federalist system,
sometimes sought to work together to secure needed supplies, and other
times competed with each other for the scarce resources, rather than
benefitting from a centralized supply chain that could distribute testing
supplies based on pandemic conditions in each state.176 Federal
abdication of supply and distribution authority put states in
competition with each other for other needed supplies. In short, as Atul
Gawande has argued, “[w]e have no national grid for the generation,
transmission, or distribution of our testing supply — or, for that matter,
the supply of ventilators, masks, intensive-care beds, or almost any
other health care resources. Now we’re paying the price.”177
Federal funding, accelerated approval pathways, and supply-chain
coordination of Operation Warp Speed helped private companies
develop COVID vaccines with astonishing speed and ensured that the
United States, unlike most other countries in the world, could quickly
procure more than enough doses for its entire population.178 But the
distribution problems that flowed from federal shirking on testing and
treatments have also undermined the effectiveness of a nationwide
vaccination campaign.179 The Trump administration’s Operation Warp
Speed deferred to state officials to determine, implement, and enforce
prioritization schemes to allocate doses that (in the early months) were
far too scarce for herd immunity to be achievable.180 When the initial

175 See Sheila Kaplan, C.D.C. Labs Were Contaminated, Delaying Coronavirus Testing,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/health/
cdc-coronavirus-lab-contamination-testing.html [https://perma.cc/2HT7-82SG].
176 See Terry, supra note 169, at 5 (“[T]he federal government has eschewed its
leadership role . . . seem[ing] to favor a Darwinian competition among states for scarce
resources, or worse, [] blocking state access to some supplies.”); Wiley, Federalism,
supra note 95, at 66.
177 Gawande, supra note 173.
178 The first vaccine to receive emergency use authorization was developed by Pfizer
outside of the federally-funded Operation Warp Speed program, but federal authorities
provided critical supply-chain support for raw materials to speed up the manufacturing
of Pfizer doses.
179 See Wiley, Federalism, supra note 95, at 66; see also Isaac Stanley-Becker, Shots
Are Slow to Reach Arms as Trump Administration Leaves Final Steps of Mass Vaccination
to Beleaguered States, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2020, 9:30 AM EST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/12/30/covid-vaccine-delay/ [https://perma.cc/
ALV7-S7HR].
180 See Caroline Chen, Isaac Arnsdorf & Ryan Gabrielson, How Operation Warp Speed
Created Vaccination Chaos, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 19, 2021, 10:27 A.M. EST)
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months of the vaccine roll-out were predictably disastrous, federal
officials blamed state leaders, essentially arguing that their work was
done the moment doses were shipped.181 Eligibility criteria varied
widely from state to state, though the Biden administration occasionally
stepped in to direct state and local officials to expand eligibility to
include educators and eventually all adults.182 The lack of a nationally
coordinated vaccination strategy mirrored the lack of a nationally
coordinated strategy for non-pharmaceutical interventions, including
school closures, restrictions on businesses and travel, and mask
mandates.183 “This is the dark side of federalism: it encourages a
patchwork response to epidemics” which are inherently borderless in
character.184
Second, an entire era of devolution to state power produced an
unstable and inequitable system for ensuring that people can afford
access to medical countermeasures.185 As unemployment skyrocketed,
many households lost employer-sponsored health insurance.186 While
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-operation-warp-speed-created-vaccinationchaos [https://perma.cc/X9ZE-64S5].
181 Elizabeth Crisp, HHS Secretary Alex Azar Blames States for Slow Rollout of COVID19 Vaccines, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.newsweek.com/hhs-secretary-alexazar-blames-states-slow-rollout-covid-19-vaccines-1560981 [https://perma.cc/XR6TVGT5]; Will Feuer & Kevin Stankiewicz, Trump Blames States as He Faces Criticism for
Slow Covid Vaccine Rollout, CNBC (Dec. 30, 2020) https://www.cnbc.com/2020/
12/30/trump-blames-states-as-he-faces-criticism-for-slow-covid-vaccine-rollout.html
[https://perma.cc/J87E-2LTF].
182 CDC relied on the fact that doses were federally procured and owned to impose
conditions on recipients of doses. See CDC COVID-19 Vaccination Program Provider
Requirements and Support, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/covid-19/vaccination-provider-support.html#:~:text=At
%20this%20time%2C%20all%20COVID,administered%20to%20the%20vaccination%2
0recipient (last reviewed Aug. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/K7GH-ASEC].
183 See Wiley, Social Distancing, supra note 3, at 110-13.
184 Haffajee & Mello, supra note 169, at 5 (“The defining feature of the U.S. response
to Covid-19 continues to be localized action against a threat that” is “highly
transmissible, crosses borders efficiently, and threatens our national infrastructure and
economy.”); accord Huberfeld et al., supra note 71, at 952 (“This fragmented and
disjointed response has undoubtedly cost time and lives.”).
185 See Karyn Schwartz, Karen Pollitz, Jennifer Tolbert & MaryBeth Musumeci, Gaps
in Cost Sharing Protections for COVID-19 Testing and Treatment Could Spark Public
Concerns About COVID-19 Vaccine Costs, KFF (Dec. 18, 2020) https://www.kff.org/healthcosts/issue-brief/gaps-in-cost-sharing-protections-for-covid-19-testing-and-treatmentcould-spark-public-concerns-about-covid-19-vaccine-costs/ [https://perma.cc/M27QNKNE].
186 See Terry, supra note 169, at 7-9; Huberfeld et al., supra note 71, at 956 (“As a
countercyclical program, enrollment in Medicaid increases when the economy declines
. . . .”).
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some could still afford COBRA or subsidized insurance on the ACA
exchanges,187 the majority were left to rely on Medicaid.188 But twelve
states have refused to expand Medicaid eligibility to all low-income,
childless, non-disabled adults.189 Thus, even when the federal Families
First Coronavirus Response Act added COVID testing without a copay
to Medicaid coverage,190 individuals and communities in nonexpansion states could not benefit from this enhanced safety net for
access to testing. Thanks to federalism, a person’s ability to afford a
COVID test could depend on whether she lives in North Dakota (which
expanded Medicaid) or South Dakota (which did not),191 despite the
enhancement of federal funding.
To make matters worse, it is not simply the variation in state Medicaid
programs that complicates the pandemic response. It is also the fact that
“many states with the deepest needs” for safety-net programs “are also
least equipped to respond” to public health crises “due to a culture of
low taxes and distrust of government,” which “often means an
inadequate infrastructure of funds, people, and institutions to
implement an emergency response.”192
A health system that replaced knee-jerk deference to states with an
allocation of responsibility among governmental units according to
their legal and logistical capacities to improve public health would
harness the power of federalism for good. At the federal level, we should
expect a consistent, stable, nationwide public health infrastructure,
coupled with durable federal baselines for financing equitable access to
187

Which also have significant state-by-state variations.
See Rachel Garfield, Gary Claxton, Anthony Damico & Larry Levitt, Eligibility for
ACA Health Coverage Following Job Loss, KFF (May 13, 2020) https://www.kff.org/
coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/eligibility-for-aca-health-coverage-following-job-loss/
[https://perma.cc/4ATL-JCM7]; Press Release, CMS, New Medicaid and CHIP
Enrollment Snapshot Shows Almost 10 Million Americans Enrolled in Coverage During
the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency (June 21, 2021) https://www.cms.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/new-medicaid-and-chip-enrollment-snapshot-shows-almost10-million-americans-enrolled-coverage-during [https://perma.cc/ZU89-TC5W].
189 E.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging
into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 76 (2013); Status of State Medicaid Expansion
Decisions: Interactive Map, KFF (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/ [https://perma.cc/
XBA4-6BPF] (at the end of 2020, 12 states had refused to expand Medicaid); see also
Huberfeld et al., supra note 71, at 956 (“Medicaid’s countercyclical effects will be
severely limited in nonexpansion states . . . .”).
190 FFCRA, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 6004, 134 Stat. 178 (2020).
191 See Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, supra note 189.
192 Huberfeld et al., supra note 71, at 952.
188
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health care. Federal financing and support flowing to states for
implementation should not empower resistant states to engage in a raceto-the-bottom, eroding public health measures. Federal authorities
should stop shirking in the name of state deference and start assisting
states in a race-to-the-top of evidence-based policy and social supports.
4.

Privatization

The country’s longstanding preference for private markets rather than
government programs to finance and deliver health care means most
people are covered by private health insurance.193 The privatized nature
of the U.S.’s health care system has hampered the COVID pandemic
response. A system that depends on private health financing lacks the
breadth, capacity, and financial incentives to deliver widespread public
health measures, such as testing or vaccination, at levels necessary to be
effective and equitable. Instead, our private health insurance system
creates cost-barriers to basic public health measures at every step.
First, the reliance on employer-based coverage is a significant
vulnerability when millions lose their job-based insurance due to the
pandemic’s economic recession.194 During the early phase of the
pandemic, at least twenty million people lost their jobs,195 which
translated to approximately ten million workers and dependents losing
their employer-sponsored health coverage,196 3.5 million of whom

193

See Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 416.
See Stuart M. Butler, Four COVID-19 Lessons for Achieving Health Equity, 324
JAMA 2245, 2246 (2020).
195 See David Blumenthal, Elizabeth J. Fowler, Melinda Abrams & Sara R. Collins,
Covid-19 – Implications for the Health Care System, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1483, 1483
(2020). In the months that followed, approximately half of those who initially lost jobs
were able to return to work. See Jeanna Smialek, Ben Casselman & Gillian Friedman,
Workers Face Permanent Job Losses as the Virus Persists, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/business/economy/coronavirus-permanent-joblosses.html [https://perma.cc/5FNA-VZ46].
196 There are a variety of estimates of the numbers who lost employer-sponsored
insurance (“ESI”) coverage. See, e.g., JESSICA BANTHIN & JOHN HOLAHAN, MAKING SENSE
OF COMPETING ESTIMATES: THE COVID-19 RECESSION’S EFFECTS ON HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE 2 (2020), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/making-sense-competingestimates-covid-19-recessions-effects-health-insurance-coverage [https://perma.cc/RMK3RW4M] (comparing several studies’ estimating 21.9-31 million lost ESI); Josh Bivens &
Ben Zipperer, Health Insurance and the COVID-19 Shock, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug.
26, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/health-insurance-and-the-covid-19-shock/
[https://perma.cc/L5CL-FR3W] (estimating that 6.2 million workers lost access to
employer-sponsored coverage in the first few months of the pandemic, but noting many
of these may have gained other forms of coverage).
194
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became uninsured.197 America’s reliance on job-based coverage means
that in an economic recession caused by a public health crisis, many are
vulnerable to coverage loss, churn from switching to other sources of
coverage, and disruption to their health care.198 People in states that did
not expand Medicaid and thus had a higher rate of uninsurance were
more likely to contract and die of COVID.199 The U.S.’s reliance on jobbased insurance and lack of universal health care made it more
vulnerable to the pandemic and weakened the country’s response
compared to other countries.200 The CARES Act created a Provider
Relief Fund that allocated $175 billion to providers to compensate them
for providing COVID testing, treatment, and vaccination to uninsured
patients.201 Yet the funding is not a benefit that uninsured patients can
access directly and does not bar providers from charging patients for
their COVID care; rather, coverage depends on their provider

197 Some of those who lost employer-sponsored insurance coverage were able to be
covered by another family member’s health plan or by Medicaid, CHIP, or ACA
marketplace coverage. JESSICA BANTHIN, MICHAEL SIMPSON, MATTHEW BUETTGENS, LINDA
J. BLUMBERG & ROBIN WANG, CHANGES IN HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE DUE TO THE
COVID-19 RECESSION: PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES USING MICROSIMULATION 1-3 (2020),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102552/changes-in-health-insurancecoverage-due-to-the-covid-19-recession_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/73Y8-334H]. An additional
3.3 million lost their employer-sponsored coverage between mid-May and mid-July
2020, 2 million of whom became uninsured. ANUJ GANGOPADHYAYA, MICHAEL KARPMAN
& JOSHUA AARONS, URB. INST., AS THE COVID-19 RECESSION EXTENDED INTO THE SUMMER
OF 2020, MORE THAN 3 MILLION ADULTS LOST EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE AND 2 MILLION BECAME UNINSURED 1 (2020), https://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/publication/102852/as-the-covid-19-recession-extended-into-the-summer-of2020-more-than-3-million-adults-lost-employer-sponsored-health-insurance-coverage-and2-million-became-uninsured.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K2U-6SZL].
198 See Terry, supra note 169, at 3.
199 Tarun Ramesh, Emily Gee & Maura Calsyn, The Pandemic and Economic Crisis
Are Wake-Up Call for State Medicaid Expansion, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 9, 2020),
americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2020/11/09/492808/pandemic-economiccrisis-wake-call-state-medicaid-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/C82A-VBP4].
200 Dylan Scott, Coronavirus Is Exposing All of the Weaknesses in the US Health System,
VOX (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/3/16/21173766/
coronavirus-covid-19-us-cases-health-care-system [https://perma.cc/DV8V-DNK6]; Ed
Yong, How the Pandemic Defeated America, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/coronavirus-american-failure/
614191/ [https://perma.cc/4QH3-WBUX].
201 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116136, § 5001, 134 Stat. 281 (2020); Covid-19 Claims Reimbursement, HEALTH RES. &
SERVS. ADMIN., https://coviduninsuredclaim.linkhealth.com/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/5AJ9-TAS8]; Provider Relief Fund, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/cares-act-provider-relief-fund/index.html (last visited
Sept. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/Z75Y-RCYX].
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submitting a claim for reimbursement to the government.202 Moreover,
the Provider Relief Fund was distributed according to entities’ revenues,
which means that providers in predominantly Black communities
received disproportionately smaller allocations than others despite their
higher COVID-related burden and financial need.203 Thus, the risk that
an uninsured patient could be charged for their COVID care remained,
along with the barriers to care that threat carried.
Even for those with coverage, several features of private health
insurance (cost-sharing, limited enrollment periods, limited provider
networks) work against an effective pandemic response because they
create barriers to the widespread testing and vaccination needed to stem
the spread. Thus, even for those who maintained their insurance
coverage in the pandemic, the coverage itself contains significant holes
that expose them to financial shocks. Legal measures were rushed into
place by the CARES Act and Families First Coronavirus Response Act
(“FFCRA”) to patch some of these holes in the private health insurance
system, namely by prohibiting most types of health coverage from
imposing patient cost-sharing for COVID testing or vaccination.204
Despite these patches, holes remained — they did not prohibit costsharing for COVID treatment, they did not protect against out-ofnetwork charges or cost-sharing for related services (e.g., flu tests, chest
x-rays, facility fees, ambulance rides), and services were not covered
unless they were deemed medically appropriate by a provider.205

202 Julie Appleby, Trump’s COVID Program for Uninsured People: It Exists, but Falls
Short, KHN (Oct. 2, 2020), https://khn.org/news/fact-check-president-trump-executiveorder-covid-program-for-uninsured-people-falls-short/ [https://perma.cc/G8C7-UNUQ].
203 Pragya Kakani, Amitabh Chandra, Sendhil Mullainathan & Ziad Obermeyer,
Allocation of COVID-19 Relief Funding to Disproportionately Black Counties, 324 JAMA
1000, 1001-02 (2020).
204 Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 6001
- 6004, 134 Stat. 178 (2020) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b–5, 1395l,
1396d(a)(3)); CARES Act § 3201 (amending FFCRA § 6001 to apply coverage without
cost-sharing to out-of-network rests), § 3203 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13,
covering COVID-19 vaccines); see also Rachel Fehr, Cynthia Cox, Karen Pollitz,
Jennifer Tolbert, Juliette Cubanski & Robin Rudowitz, Five Things to Know About the
Cost of COVID-19 Testing and Treatment, KFF (May 26, 2020),
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/five-things-to-know-about-thecost-of-covid-19-testing-and-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/89QZ-JU4U].
205 Loren Adler & Christen Linke Young, The Laws Governing COVID-19 Test
Payment and How to Improve Them, BROOKINGS (July 13, 2020),
https://brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2020/07/13/thelaws-governing-covid-19-test-payment-and-how-to-improve-them/ [https://perma.cc/
LZM5-UHEH].
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Patients were right to worry, as stories mounted of both legal and illegal
billing for COVID testing and care.206
The private insurance and medical model of care is fundamentally illsuited to deployment of public health measures for mitigating or
suppressing transmission of a highly communicable disease: testing for
surveillance and disease-control purposes and mass vaccination. In a
pandemic of a highly contagious virus with asymptomatic transmission,
widespread screening of asymptomatic persons is critical to prevent
spread.207 Yet Trump administration guidance on the CARES Act and
FFCRA resorted to a private medical model, only requiring insurers to
cover the costs of COVID testing for “diagnostic purposes” and when
deemed “medically appropriate” by an individual’s attending medical
provider.208
Sabrina Corlette and others argued forcefully that relying upon an
insurance model that limits access to diagnostic or medically indicated
situations is inadequate because widespread testing for public health
purposes is required to track and slow the spread of asymptomatic
transmission, particularly in the context of employment or education.209
To put a finer point on it, widespread testing is necessary for employers,
such as nursing homes or meat-packing plants, or schools or
universities to carry on their activities safely, but the costs of such
testing fall on the institution or individual because they would not be
206 See Sarah Kliff, A $52,112 Air Ambulance Ride: Coronavirus Patients Battle Surprise
Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/13/upshot/
coronavirus-surprise-medical-bills.html [https://perma.cc/94R9-G2S8]; Sarah Kliff,
Coronavirus Tests Are Supposed to Be Free. The Surprise Bills Come Anyway., N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/upshot/coronavirus-surprisetest-fees.html [https://perma.cc/A2CU-7F7C]; Sarah Kliff, How to Avoid a Surprise Bill
for Your Coronavirus Test, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/11/13/upshot/coronavirus-surprise-bills-guide.html [https://perma.cc/2CMQ-3KRJ].
207 See Caroline Chen, America Doesn’t Have a Coherent Strategy for Asymptomatic
Testing. It Needs One., PROPUBLICA (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/
america-doesnt-have-a-coherent-strategy-for-asymptomatic-testing-it-needs-one
[https://perma.cc/VW3Q-5WJU].
208 FAQS ABOUT FAMILIES FIRST CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE ACT AND CORONAVIRUS AID,
RELIEF, AND ECONOMIC SECURITY ACT IMPLEMENTATION PART 43, at 3-6 (2020)
(interpreting FFCRA to cover COVID-19 testing only if medically appropriate and
diagnostic, excluding “testing conducted to screen for general workplace health and
safety (such as employee ‘return to work’ programs), for public health surveillance . . . ,
or for any other purpose not primarily intended for individualized diagnosis or
treatment of COVID-19”); see also Adler & Linke Young, supra note 205.
209 Sabrina Corlette, I’ve Been Calling for Greater Private Insurance Coverage of
COVID-19 Testing. I’ve Been Wrong, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (May 18, 2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200513.267462/full/ [https://perma.
cc/UUG6-BC9F].
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considered diagnostic or medically appropriate under the medicalinsurance model.210 If the individual, the employer, or even the health
insurer is forced to bear the cost, then the burden will
disproportionately fall on lower-income and minority populations and
may serve as a barrier to employment, education, or the ability to
control disease.211 A better approach would be for the government to
arrange for the direct provision of COVID testing and vaccine, free to
all, and provided where the population is (grocery stores, workplaces,
schools, parking lots, community centers) rather than just in medical
care settings.212
Our privatized and fragmented health care system does a terrible job
of constraining prices for health care services and leads to wild and
inexplicable price discrimination.213 Though one of main theoretical
advantages of a private health care system is the ability to harness the
salutary effects of competition, in reality the lack of centralized
governmental rate controls means U.S. health care prices are far higher
than anywhere else.214 In the case of coronavirus, this means the prices
of testing and vaccines were left to the wildly unpredictable and
undisciplined private market. The price of a COVID test varied fortyfold, from $20 to $850 at hospitals, and into the thousands of dollars at
private, labs.215 The CARES Act required insurers to pay for COVID
tests but didn’t limit the amount providers can charge for the tests,

210 Linda J. Blumberg, Sabrina Corlette & Michael Simpson, Imposing the Costs of
Workplace Coronavirus Testing on Group Plan Coverage Would Place an Excessive Burden
on Essential Workers, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (July 28, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20200727.300119/full/ [https://perma.cc/D4S4-GZPQ].
211 See id.; Noam Scheiber, Many Employers Avoid Coronavirus Tests Over Cost, Not
Availability, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/19/
business/virus-testing-companies.html [https://perma.cc/FP72-UN99].
212 See Butler, supra note 194, at 2245; Corlette, supra note 209.
213 See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind the Veil
of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFFS. BLOG 57, 63 (2006).
214 Gerard F. Anderson, Peter Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, It’s Still the Prices,
Stupid: Why the US Spends So Much on Health Care, and a Tribute to Uwe Reinhardt, 38
HEALTH AFFS. 87, 93 (2019).
215 Sarah Kliff, Most Coronavirus Tests Cost About $100. Why Did One Cost $2,315?,
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/upshot/coronavirustest-cost-varies-widely.html [https://perma.cc/XP3L-QK6A]; Nisha Kurani, Karen
Pollitz, Dustin Cotliar, Giorlando Ramirez & Cynthia Cox, COVID-19 Test Prices
HEALTH
SYS.
TRACKER
(Apr.
28,
2021),
and
Payment
Policy,
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/covid-19-test-prices-and-payment-policy/
[https://perma.cc/QZ24-HZFH].
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which invited price gouging.216 In the absence of a contractual price, the
provider could charge whatever it wanted and the insurer had to pay.
For new vaccines and therapeutics, there are no price constraints
because without competition from generics, the manufacturer can
unilaterally set its price.217 The cost of COVID vaccine doses in the U.S.
has been borne largely by the federal government and left to negotiation
with the manufacturers, including billions in government aid for
research, development, and manufacturing costs.218 Fundamental
public health measures like testing and vaccine should be free to the
public at the point of service to eliminate barriers to these generally lowcost, high-value measures, and the prices for these measures should be
capped by the government to eliminate price gouging, price
discrimination, and waste.
Finally, our private and fragmented health care system failed to
provide a mechanism for public decision-making over the distribution
of therapeutics to treat COVID, thwarting nimble, need-based
allocations of critical therapies. For example, the process for
distributing the antiviral remdesivir219 was driven by private industry
and lacked transparency.220 Even when HHS assumed responsibility for
allocation over the summer of 2020, the process remained confusing
216 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116136, § 3202, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 256b); Loren Adler,
How the Cares Act Affects Covid-19 Test Pricing, BROOKINGS (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2020/04/09/
how-the-cares-act-affects-covid-19-test-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/G252-R7RS].
217 See, e.g., Matthew Herper, Gilead Announces Long-Awaited Price for Covid-19 Drug
Remdesivir, STAT (June 29, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/29/gileadannounces-remdesivir-price-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/TYZ3-V5N3] (describing how
Gilead set the initial price for its COVID-19 drug, remdesivir).
218 See Sydney Lupkin, Novavax Posts Coronavirus Vaccine Contract That Government
Didn’t Disclose, NPR (Nov. 11, 2020, 1:10 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/11/11/933864908/novavax-posts-coronavirus-vaccine-contract-thatgovernment-didnt-disclose [https://perma.cc/4YXU-NRDS] (noting that Operation
Warp Speed limited the government’s “march-in” rights to curtail price gouging by
recipients of federal funding); Schwartz, supra note 185.
219 FDA authorized remdesivir, an investigational drug not approved for any
indication, under an emergency use authorization (“EUA”) for use in hospitalized
patients with severe COVID-19 on May 1, 2020. Letter from RADM Denise M. Hinton,
Chief Scientist, FDA, to Ashley Rhoades, Manager of Regul. Affs., Gilead Sciences, Inc.
(Oct. 22, 2020) https://www.fda.gov/media/137564/download [https://perma.cc/CV58DJ6X].
220 Sydney Lupkin, Remdesivir Distribution Causes Confusion, Leaves Some Hospitals
Empty-Handed, NPR (May 14, 2020, 11:12 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2020/05/14/855663819/remdesivir-distribution-causes-confusion-leavessome-hospitals-empty-handed [https://perma.cc/QY8X-QAP6].
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and seemingly unresponsive to need.221 To the extent there has been
public guidance and deliberation on the ethical distribution of scarce
therapeutics, ventilators, ICU beds, or critical care staff, the guidance
focused on private decisions within a hospital, but did not meaningfully
grapple with the allocation of the resources between hospitals or among
states.222 When there was a shortage of ventilators, the lack of a
centralized distribution plan meant that ventilators did not go to states,
regions, or hospitals that need them the most but rather to those who
were able to pay and who had existing transactional connections to the
suppliers.223 Without a centralized governmental payer or publicly
accountable system to distribute health care resources, private actors
make distributional decisions that are opaque, tend to follow existing
well-greased supply chains,224 and bid up the cost of the scarce
resource.225
221 Sydney Lupkin, How Feds Decide on Remdesivir Shipments to States Remains
Mysterious, NPR, (Aug. 19, 2020, 4:21 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2020/08/19/903946857/how-feds-decide-on-remdesivir-shipments-to-statesremains-mysterious [https://perma.cc/37FC-6GHM].
222 See Colette DeJong, Alice Hm Chen & Bernard Lo, An Ethical Framework for
Allocating Scarce Inpatient Medications for COVID-19 in the US, 323 JAMA 2367, 2367
(2020); Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Govind Persad, Ross Upshur, Beatriz Thome, Michael
Parker, Aaron Glickman, Cathy Zhang, Connor Boyle, Maxwell Smith & James P.
Phillips, Fair Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in the Time of Covid-19, 382 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2049, 2053 (2020); Strategies to Allocate Ventilators from Stockpiles to
Facilities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/
2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/ventilators.html (last updated Mar. 20, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/VHE6-GA88]; see, e.g., Strategies to Mitigate Healthcare Personnel
Staffing Shortages, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/mitigating-staff-shortages.html (last updated Mar. 10,
2021) [https://perma.cc/8X88-NBCS] (providing guidance on how health facilities can
mitigate staffing shortages within a facility).
223 Nathan Layne, Outbid and Left Hanging, U.S. States Scramble for Ventilators,
REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2020, 12:32 PM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-usa-ventilators/outbid-and-left-hanging-u-s-states-scramble-for-ventilatorsidUSKCN21S20D [https://perma.cc/RHK6-DQRE]; see Megan L. Ranney, Valerie
Griffeth & Ashish K. Jha, Critical Supply Shortages — The Need for Ventilators and
Personal Protective Equipment During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 382 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE
e41(1), e41(2) (2020).
224 See e.g., Press Release, Gilead, Gilead Sciences Update on Supply and Distribution
of Veklury® (remdesivir) in the United States (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.gilead.com/
news-and-press/press-room/press-releases/2020/10/gilead-sciences-update-on-supply-anddistribution-of-veklury-remdesivir-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/992S-K9AH]
(announcing that remdesivir’s manufacturer, Gilead, would supply the drug directly to
hospitals via its sole distributor, Amerisourcebergen).
225 Price Gouging in a Public Health Crisis: Out-of-Network COVID-19 Test Costs
Continue to Far Exceed In-Network Costs, AM. HEALTH INS. PLANS (Nov. 2020),
https://www.ahip.org/wp-content/uploads/202008-AHIP_COVID-PriceGouging.pdf
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Our reliance on private health insurance in the U.S. stymied our
pandemic response in critical ways. The economic unemployment crisis
left millions uninsured in the height of a public health crisis; those who
kept their coverage still faced risks of unexpected costs for testing and
treatment; our reliance on private markets meant the prices of these
services were uncontrolled and wildly variable; and the system failed to
provide for public decision-making about the fair allocation and
efficient distribution of scarce resources in the pandemic.226 The
pandemic revealed in stark terms that our privatized health care system
suffers from a profound cost and affordability crisis while it lacks
incentives and the coordination needed to provide for public goods. The
fear of the cost of services creates barriers to widespread testing and
vaccination, which foment disease spread; burdens government, private
payers, and individuals; and crowds out resources for other social goods
needed to address the pandemic’s economic and societal dislocation —
such as housing, education, food, or income maintenance. Our private
health care system is bad for public health and well-being.
***
Inadequate and inequitable access to COVID testing, treatments, and
vaccinations has compounded the economic and health harms caused
by the pandemic. Individualism, fiscal fragmentation, federalism, and
privatization have each played a role in these failures. To reconstruct a
functional system, future reforms must confront the fixtures.
III. LESSON 3: RACISM AND SUBORDINATION ARE FOUNDATIONAL TO
THE FOUR FIXTURES
The fixtures play an abiding role in the broader existential failure
illuminated by the pandemic: racial inequity in the burden of disease.
The iron triangle ethos gestured toward equity as a worthy but
ultimately unattainable goal. That simply isn’t good enough in a post2020 world. “Racism is a fundamental determinant of health.”227 It

[https://perma.cc/B68V-W2UV] (reporting that out-of-network providers charged
significantly higher prices for COVID-19 tests forty percent of the time).
226 See Terry, supra note 169, at 10 (“COVID-19 not only illustrates how private
actors failed to invest in prophylactic structures but also their relatively poor
performance once the pandemic arrived.”).
227 RUQAIIJAH YEARBY, CRYSTAL N. LEWIS, KEON L. GILBERT & KIRA BANKS, THE JUST.
COLLABORATIVE INST., RACISM IS A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS. HERE’S HOW TO RESPOND. 7
(2020), https://www.filesforprogress.org/memos/racism-is-a-public-health-crisis.pdf;
Roland J. Thorpe, Jr., Keith C. Norris, Bettina M. Beech & Marino A. Bruce, Racism
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includes, and extends far beyond, interpersonal racism experienced by
many patients in clinical encounters.228 Racism is foundational to “the
political, social, and economic environments that influence access to
resources necessary to prevent, manage, or overcome disease.”229
Realizing health justice demands that health reform grapple with the
racist foundations of the American legal and health care systems and
embrace an anti-subordination agenda. It demands equitable
distribution of the benefits and burdens of public investments in health
care and public health. It demands empowerment and selfdetermination for Black and Brown communities.
The third lesson we draw: All four fixtures are rooted in and
perpetuate structural racism and subordination based on
socioeconomic class, thereby subverting equity and community
empowerment. The fixtures’ historic and inherent roles in inequity and
subordination mean that reforms accommodating them will continue to
accommodate inequity and subordination. To begin to address the
existential failures, future reforms must confront the fixtures with
unswerving resolve.
A. Individualism
The “you’re on your own” ethos of individualism has provided a
superficially neutral ideological mask for racist cultural norms and
ideological notions of deservingness and blame throughout American
history. “American individualism, a philosophy deeply imbedded in the
American psyche, prevents whites from seeing themselves as a
privileged racialized group.”230 To resist structural change, white people
in power may claim that the goal of racial justice is for everyone to be
treated as individuals. “When white people insist on Individualism in
discussions about racism, they are in essence saying, . . . ‘It is talking
about race as if it mattered that divides us . . . . Generalizing discounts

Across the Life Course, in RACISM: SCIENCE & TOOLS FOR THE PUBLIC HEALTH PROFESSIONAL
1, 209 (2019).[https://perma.cc/3HTW-2JP4]; see also Yearby, supra note 44, at 518.
228 See Yearby, supra note 44, at 524.
229 Ronald J. Thorpe, Jr., Derek M. Griffith, Marino A. Bruce & Lawnrece Brown,
Racism as a Fundamnetal Determinant of Health for Black Boys in NADINE M. FINIGANCARR, ED., LINKING HEALTH AND EDUCATION FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENTS’ SUCCESS 13
(2017).
230 Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the
United States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 903, 912 (2003).
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my individuality . . . . Further, as an individual I am objective and view
others as individuals and not as members of racial groups.”231
Rhetoric about health disparities often shifts blame to individuals,
adopting the view that “the most important determinants of health are
the catastrophes, genetic inheritances, and disease agents that cause
illness or injury, and the individual patient’s responsible or
irresponsible reaction to these challenges.”232 As “[i]n all matters of
Black disadvantage, the first question is often, ‘What is wrong with
Black people?’ [instead of asking,] ‘What is wrong with the policies and
institutions?’”233 Mary Bassett and Jasmine Graves have argued that
individualistic explanations for public health problems are a “litmus
test” for anti-racism.234 Their focus is on the particularities of anti-Black
racism in the United States, but their insights may be applicable to
racism and other forms of subordination more broadly: “Any framework
that identifies the problem as people should be challenged.
Communities are vulnerable because of bad policies and disinvestment,
not because of the people who live in them.”235 In the ethos of
individualism, health disparities ranging from heart disease, diabetes,
and cancer to sexually transmitted infections, and now COVID, are
attributed to “lack of knowledge and flawed decision-making . . . . This
‘lifestyle hypothesis’ assigns responsibility to individuals without
reference to the context of their lives. In addition to dismissing racial
patterning of power and opportunity, it ignores the toll of daily and
lifelong experiences of discrimination. [Like the hypothesis that Blackwhite disparities in health are genetically based], it is a racist idea.”236
Implicitly racist, classist, and xenophobic notions of deservingness
and individualism have permeated US health reform debates. Actuarial
fairness and mutual aid offer “competing visions” of “how Americans
should think about what ties them together and to whom they have

231 Robin J. DiAngelo, Why Can’t We All Just Be Individuals?: Countering the Discourse
of Individualism in Anti-Racist Education, 6 INTERACTIONS: UCLA J. EDUC. & INFO. STUDS.
1, 1 (2010).
232 Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 4, at 767.
233 Mary T. Bassett & Jasmine D. Graves, Uprooting Institutionalized Racism as Public
Health Practice, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 457, 458 (2018).
234 Id.
235 Id.; see MATTHEW, supra note 7, at 10 (“Throughout most of our country’s history,
the rule of law has been perversely instrumental in enabling the racism…that has
produced, and continues to exacerbate, the unjust distribution of health care, as well as
the resources that permit people to live healthy lives, such as property, wealth, income,
housing, food, employment, and education.”).
236 Bassett & Graves, supra note 233, at 457.
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ties.”237 In its efforts to undermine progressive health reform, the health
insurance industry has attempted to “persuade the . . . public that
‘paying for someone else’s risks’ is a bad idea.”238 Attribution of
premature death and morbidity to personal failures “[s]erves a
symbolic, or value expressive function . . . , reinforcing a world view
consistent with a belief in a just world, self-determination, the
Protestant work ethic, self-contained individualism, and the notion that
people get what they deserve.”239 Individualism and notions of personal
responsibility give privileged people a free pass to ignore their role in
subordinating others and to disregard the needs of subordinated people
and the inequitable burdens they bear. Individualism erodes the social
solidarity that underpins mutual aid and community empowerment.
Notions of individualism and deservingness have reared their heads
again and again in the design and implementation of the ACA.
Expansion of Medicaid eligibility beyond the “deserving poor” triggered
rhetoric reminiscent of Reagan’s dog whistles about social welfare
programs.240 The mutual aid principles reflected in guaranteed issue
and community rating requirements for private insurers were undercut
by a “personal responsibility” amendment adopted in the name of giving
people incentives for “wellness.”241 Waivers granted by the Trump
administration permitting states to impose work requirements as a
condition of Medicaid eligibility further entrenched an individualistic
ethic of deservingness even as more states have opted into the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion.242 Litigation challenging the ACA’s individual
mandate and Medicaid expansion pressed the limits of majoritarian rule
and the communitarian ethos.243 Challengers asked what individuals
can be required by the majority to do for the benefit of the community
and what states can be required by the national community to do for
those residing within their borders.
In the pandemic, these themes have been repeated with even more
devastating consequences. Federal, state, and local officials have urged
237

Stone, supra note 8, at 289 (emphasis added).
Id. at 287 (quoting an advertising campaign in the late 1980s).
239 Christian S. Crandall & Rebecca Martinez, Culture, Ideology, and Antifat Attitudes,
22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1165, 1166 (1996).
240 See Lindsay F. Wiley, Access to Health Care as an Incentive for Healthy Behavior?
An Assessment of the Affordable Care Act’s Personal Responsibility for Wellness Reforms,
11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 635, 707 (2014).
241 Id. at 679.
242 See Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid, Work, and the Courts: Reigning in HHS Overreach,
46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 887, 889 (2018).
243 See Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 416-17 (discussing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)).
238

716

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:657

personal responsibility while failing to protect and support people who
are required to report for duty in high-exposure workplaces, those who
live in crowded, multi-generation homes, and those who are exposed in
institutions like jails, prisons, and detention centers.244 “Infectious
disease pandemics are fueled by the connection of people to one another
in society. The same human interconnectedness demands prevention
and response measures grounded in mutual aid . . . Public health
emergency prevention and response measures are meant to benefit
society as a whole. The burdens should also be shared.”245
As Harris and Pamukcu argue, “[o]ur health is not just an individual
matter; it is deeply influenced by institutional and structural forces that
shape who has access to the opportunities and resources needed to
thrive.”246 Viewing health through an individualistic lens obscures the
root causes of racial disparities and the structural interventions
necessary to realize health justice. Health reforms that go too far in
accommodating the fixture of individualism will have limited impact on
injustice because, at root, “social problems need social or collective, not
just individual, solutions.”247 Deeper commitment to solidarity prompts
us to assess the system in terms of its ability to serve “uniquely public
— as opposed to the mere aggregation of private — interests.”248 To
serve solidarity, health reform must embrace collective problem-solving
to meet collective needs. To do so justly, it must ensure that the benefits
and burdens of public investments in health and public health are
equitably distributed and that communities are empowered to protect
themselves and others. To realize health justice, health reform must be
both universalist and anti-subordinationist.249
244 See, e.g., Wiley & Bagenstos, supra note 10, at 1235-36 (“Elected officials have
asked each of us to take personal responsibility for weathering this crisis rather than
providing community supports and legal protections that would cushion the blow,
spread the costs more widely, and enable everyone to abide by and benefit from public
health recommendations.”).
245 Id. at 1236-37.
246 Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 4, at 762.
247 Fineman, supra note 88, at 141; see Wiley, Health Justice, supra note 8, at 874
(describing “collective action grounded in community engagement and participatory
parity” as a core commitment of health justice); see also Wiley, Social Justice, supra note
6, at 95 (highlighting “collective responsibility for assuring healthy living conditions,
rather than reinforcing individualistic assumptions about personal responsibility for
health”).
248 Wiley, Health Justice, supra note 8, at 855.
249 Lindsay F. Wiley, Universality, Vulnerability, and the Goals of Twenty-First
Century Health Reform 2 (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“the
universalization of social supports for access to health care and healthy living conditions
can and should be antisubordinationist”).
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B. Fiscal Fragmentation
At the most basic level, fiscal fragmentation is a product of two
complexes of laws that divide up control over resources within the
United States: property laws and fiscal (spending and tax) laws. Both
bodies of law have been used as tools of structural racism and
subordination. Property laws assign control and ownership of existing
and newly generated resources of all types, including land, capital,
ideas, and labor.250 Tax and spending laws, in turn, alter this baseline
allocation of resources from the default set by property law, creating
additional fragmented pots of money.251
Tax laws create revenue for government redistribution, and spending
laws re-allocate resources or commit resources for future allocation. For
example, the Medicare statute commits to Medicare beneficiaries and
the providers who serve them reimbursement for covered services, in
perpetuity, and funds that entitlement largely by directing payroll taxes
into the Medicare trust fund.252 It thereby creates a discrete pot of
national resources that serve a distinct constituency of Medicare
beneficiaries253 — just as property laws create millions of pots of
resources that serve distinct constituencies of property owners. The
higher reimbursement rates paid to providers for services rendered to
patients covered by Medicare (including for COVID testing and
vaccination) incentivize more outreach to those patients than to
Medicaid beneficiaries, whose coverage is more precariously financed
and whose providers receive substantially less generous reimbursement
rates.254
The fragmentation of the nation’s wealth and redistributive programs
is not random; it creates, perpetuates, and reflects subordination. The
baseline of property ownership locks in and carries forward any
unaddressed inequity in wealth or the means to generate it. Thus, Black
Americans today control less, and have less, because their ancestors
250 See generally David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773,
1778-80 (2013) (describing nature and purposes of property law).
251 See Daniel Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L.
REV. 183, 191 (2003) (“The distinction between taxes and spending [] depends on pure
form.”).
252 See Matthew B. Lawrence, Medicare Bankruptcy, 63 B.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2022) (manuscript at 6-12) (draft Sept. 13, 2021) (on file with authors) (describing
Medicare financing structure).
253 Id.
254 See Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health
Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 HOW. L.J. 855, 868 (2012) (“Physicians tend to avoid
Medicaid patients primarily, but not exclusively, because reimbursement rates are often
lower than for privately insured and Medicare patients.”).
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were able to pass less on to them — at first because they were prohibited
from owning property, even their own labor, and then because of
systematic discrimination in access to education, jobs, equal pay,
housing, and health care.
Similarly, the creation and separation of spending programs through
which the nation alters the baseline distribution of property has not
been neutral to subordination, either. It has favored powerful groups
and disfavored the powerless.255 Thus, programs like Medicare and
Social Security that benefit the middle class are sturdy, with permanent
federal funding flows protected from disruption — government
“shutdowns” do not hurt Medicare beneficiaries.256 Meanwhile,
programs that predominantly benefit the poorest Americans and
communities, like Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (“SNAP”), are fiscally fragile. They require annual
appropriations just to keep operating and, therefore, are susceptible to
sabotage or hostage-taking by the House, Senate, and President — as
the weeks-long lapse in SNAP benefits during the 2019 government
shutdown illustrated.257
Because fiscal fragmentation reflects subordination, it propagates it.
Fiscal fragmentation makes inequity durable. There are many good
arguments in favor of durability in property ownership and spending
programs like Medicare, but that durability comes at the cost of
entrenching inequity.258 Furthermore, fiscal fragmentation facilitates
the nation’s failure to offer a robust response to all its residents’ health
needs. It allows us to conceptualize poverty, want of health care, and
want of health investment as individual or community failures, what
economists call “wealth effects,” rather than as the societal choices they
ultimately are.
C. Federalism
The concept of shared sovereignty is not unavoidably racist. But the
historical and political manifestations of deference to state authority in
American federalism are racist in origin and perpetuate

255

DANIEL E. DAWES, THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH 143 (2020).
See Matthew B. Lawrence, Subordination and Separation of Powers, 131 YALE L.J.
87, 107-13 (2021) (describing privileged financial status of spending programs that
benefit middle class).
257 See id. at 23.
258 See id.
256
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subordination.259 States’ rights in American federalism have long been
the rallying cry for proponents of slavery and racial segregation — from
the drafting of the Tenth Amendment, to the Civil War, through
Reconstruction and the Civil Rights movement, to the “Contract for
America,” and the resistance to the Affordable Care Act.260 “People of
color have long been disproportionately disadvantaged by
federalism,”261 and the “core problems of racial inequality” still find
their “core . . . in questions of federalism.262
In health care, devolution to state authority has been most visible in
health care infrastructure investments and the Medicaid safety net —
so-called “cooperative federalism” and spending clause programs.263
Historically, when federal reforms have extended the reach of public
programs, legal and political concessions to former Confederate states
in the South have allowed for the continued exclusion or subordination
of Black and Brown people from the health care system.264 For example,
in the 1945 Hill-Burton Act, representatives from Southern states

259 See Peggy Cooper Davis, Anderson Francois & Colin Starger, The Persistence of
the Confederate Narrative, 84 TENN. L. REV. 301, 302-03 (2017) (“The Confederate
narrative . . . . is a story grounded in the assumption that People’s rights are best
protected by limiting federal power and protecting the power and independence of
states . . . . [It] is notoriously significant for having protected slave power, undermined
the Civil War Amendments, and justified Jim Crow subordination.”); see, e.g., Grigsby
et al., supra note 171, at 659 (“The real failure of our federalist system is rooted in
systemic racism and a resistance to racial equity.”).
260 Gerken, All the Way Down, supra note 153, at 48 (“Federalism has often been a
code-word for letting racists be racists.”); e.g., Jamila Michener, Race, Politics, and the
Affordable Care Act, 45 J. HEALTH POLS., POL’Y & L. 547, 550 (2020); Denise C. Morgan
& Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and Rights of Belonging, 73 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1369-70 (2005); cf. Paul D. Moreno, “So Long as Our System Shall
Exist”: Myth, History, and the New Federalism, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 714
(2005) (noting “the devolution of power from Washington to the states is a cause
championed today most often by the right”).
261 Michener, supra note 260, at 550.
262 Robert C. Lieberman & John S. Lapinski, American Federalism, Race, and the
Administration of Welfare, 31 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 303, 303-04 (2001); accord Gerken, All
the Way Down, supra note 153, at 49 (“those interested in racial justice have long been
skeptical of federalism”); Medha D. Makhlouf, Laboratories of Exclusion: Medicaid,
Federalism & Immigrants, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1680, 1752 (2020).
263 See Ava Ayers, Discriminatory Cooperative Federalism, 65 VILL. L. REV. 1, 11-12
(2020) (explaining that “cooperative-federalism schemes” such as Medicaid “are
another important tool Congress can use to support state discrimination against
noncitizens.”); Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 161, at 1711 (arguing that deference to
state authority in implementing federal law has often served to entrench rather than
transcend interstate disparities).
264 Interlandi, supra note 7.
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demanded local control of hospital construction funds, which allowed
many hospitals in rural and Southern areas to be segregated.265
State control of federal funds likewise allows opportunistic states to
dis-invest in health care for their Black and Brown residents,
perpetuating disparities in health care access. Medicaid serves as a
prime example. Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as part of the Great
Society reforms targeting discrimination and poverty.266 Since then, a
series of legislative waivers and administrative policies have ceded
control of program design increasingly to the states.267 Southern states
and those politically aligned with them have frequently wielded this
“flexibility” to exclude and subordinate people of color from the
program’s reach, eroding the federal floor of protection.268 This “fendfor-yourself” federalism and policy devolution “has led to states
developing welfare sanctions that disproportionately harm low-income
Blacks . . . .”269
The Supreme Court’s decision in 2012 to make the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion subject to states’ discretion has meant that a similar grouping
of states have refused to expand Medicaid, allowing racial disparities in
coverage to persist in non-expansion states while narrowing disparities
in expansion states.270
In addition to eroding nationwide protections for subordinated
populations, the devolution to state sovereignty treads on the abilities
of local communities to protect their own populations through state
preemption of local government action.271 Preemption, as Harris and
Pamucku have argued, is “[a] potential danger to [the] innovations in

265

Id.
See generally Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism” Approach to Medicaid:
Empirical Evidence that Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States Harms Public
Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973, 978-80 (2002) (tracing the 1965 origins and evolution of
“Medicaid and the ‘New’ Legislative Federalism”).
267 See generally Edward H. Stiglitz, Forces of Federalism, Safety Nets, and Waivers,
18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 125, 129 (2017) (arguing that “waivers represent a form
of managed devolution, and that forces that operate at the level of state implementation
generally, even if not uniformly, move toward retrenchment”).
268 See id.
269 Grigsby et al., supra note 171, at 658.
270 Michener, supra note 260, at 549-51. All but four of the twelve remaining states
that have refused the Medicaid expansion were part of the Confederate States of America
during the Civil War. Interlandi, supra note 7 (“Several states, most of them in the
former Confederacy, refused to participate in Medicaid expansion.”).
271 See Briffault, supra note 154, at 1998-2000 (explaining that preemption denies
“legal space for local self-determination concerning problems that arise at the local
level”).
266
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collective self-determination” that further health justice.272 Local
governments are not insulated from racism, but to the extent that local
governments take discriminatory actions, federal and state preemption
helpfully invalidates them.273 On the other hand, when localities want
to adopt anti-racist or other protective policies, state governments may
preempt them from doing so, which exposes the subordinating
influence of state sovereignty.274 This is particularly true because local
governments often are “the very sites where racial minorities are
empowered to rule.”275
In a pandemic, local governments have the least political power and
fewest resources to effectuate public health measures.276 But, if allowed,
they also can be nimble and highly-responsive to local needs, especially
to the manifestations of health disparities among their Black and Brown
residents. For example, when COVID infections and deaths spiked in
the Atlanta region, Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms implemented policies
for face-covering and restricting business openings to stanch the
trend.277 Georgia Governor Brian Kemp sued her, asserting that statelevel policy of not requiring masks and not requiring public
accommodation closures preempted these local public health
measures.278 Other conservative states entertained similar arguments to
272

Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 4, at 827.
Derek Carr, Sabrina Adler, Benjamin D. Winig & Jennifer Karas Montez, Equity
First: Conceptualizing a Normative Framework to Assess the Role of Preemption in Public
Health, 98 MILLBANK Q. 131, 127 (2020); e.g., Briffault, supra note 154, at 2021-22.
274 Kim Haddow, Derek Carr, Benjamin D. Winig & Sabrina Adler, Preemption,
Public Health, and Equity in the Time of COVID-19, ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO
COVID-19, at 71, 73-74 (2020); see also HUNTER BLAIR, DAVID COOPER, JULIA WOLFE &
JAIMIE WORKER, ECON. POL’Y INST., PREEMPTING PROGRESS 1, 4-6, (2020),
https://files.epi.org/pdf/206974.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GQ8-B959] (“[State p]reemption [of
local ordinances] is more prevalent in the South and is embedded in a racist history,”
and also limited “cities’ ability to protect their residents from the pandemic.”).
275 Gerken, All the Way Down, supra note 153, at 59 (“If we eliminate opportunities
for local governance to protect racial minorities from discrimination, we also eliminate
the very sites where racial minorities are empowered to rule.”).
276 Cf. Gostin & Wiley, supra, note 168, at 394 (“Since the mid-twentieth century,
the federal government has assumed responsibility for financing disaster recovery
efforts that overwhelm local resources, thus spreading the economic burden of
disasters.”); Haddow et al., supra note 274, at 70 (“In many states . . . statewide orders
prevented local governments from imposing stricter requirements than the state [during
the COVID pandemic].”).
277 Ben Nadler, Jeff Amy & Kate Brumback, Georgia Governor to Drop Lawsuit over
Atlanta Mask Mandate, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 13, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/
virus-outbreak-georgia-lawsuits-local-governments-keisha-lance-bottoms-7c220bed26
f611dcf6ea57af94d516d9 [https://perma.cc/BM5L-LJYG].
278 Id.
273
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try to preempt protective measures taken by cities, many of which had
majority-minority populations.279
The manifestations of structural racism and subordination already
put low-income and racial minority populations at greater risk of
contracting and dying from COVID.280 They have also suffered from a
lack of equitable access to testing and vaccination.281 “[F]ederalism
exacerbates these inequities, as some states have a particularly deep
history of under-investing in social programs, especially in certain
communities.”282 The federal government’s tepid response and shirking
of responsibility surely contribute to the racial disparities in the virus’s
toll by implicitly delegating power to the states who wish to undermine
equity efforts, and failing to fund those states that wish to expand
them.283
D. Privatization
Racism is a key historical reason the U.S. has a predominantly private
health care system rather than a national, universal health system that
integrates health care and public health.284 From the inferior health care
provided to enslaved people dating back to the 17th century, through
the post-Civil War reconstruction period, the New Deal, the mid-20th
century Hill-Burton Act’s investments in hospital infrastructure, Great
Society reforms in the 1960s (adding Medicare and Medicaid), to the
ACA, reformers have entrenched the dominant role of privately
279 Haddow et al., supra note 274, at 70-71 (surveying preemption by state executive
order in those states, as well as West Virginia and Iowa); Brooks Rainwater, States Are
Abusing Preemption Powers in the Midst of a Pandemic, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2020, 3:00
AM PDT) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-01/how-states-co-optedlocal-power-during-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/VE7G-6QAU] (reporting on similar
efforts in Nebraska, Texas, Florida, Mississippi, Arizona, and North Carolina).
280 See Grigsby et al., supra note 171, at 659 (“[M]any have concluded U.S.
federalism is unfit to respond to a pandemic”).
281 See, e.g., Scott Dryden-Peterson, Gustavo E. Velásquez, Thomas J. Stopka, Sonya
Davey, Shahin Lockman & Bisola O. Ojikutu, Disparities in SARS-CoV-2 Testing in
Massachusetts During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 4 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 1, 3-4 (2021)
(finding that “despite programs to promote equity and enhance epidemic control in
socioeconomically vulnerable communities, testing resources across Massachusetts
have been disproportionately allocated to more affluent communities.” (citations
omitted)).
282 Huberfeld et al., supra note 71, at 1.
283 See, e.g., Grigsby et al., supra note 171, at 661 (“[T]he lack of coordination and
consistent messaging in a decentralized system contributed to unacceptable delays in
testing sites in . . . municipalities with a high proportion of Black residents.”).
284 See Interlandi, supra note 7 (“In the United States, racial health disparities have
proved as foundational as democracy itself.”).
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financed health care, which has permitted de jure and de facto
segregation and tiering of health care along racial, ethnic, geographic,
and socioeconomic lines, and separated health care and public health
into separate silos.285 The fragmentation of the U.S. health care system
tracks these demographic characteristics — with wealthier, mostly
white people covered by private insurance and poorer people, and more
non-whites, covered by public programs or not at all.286
David Barton Smith documented how racial subordination prevented
the establishment of universal social insurance in the U.S.287 The
ascendance of private, voluntary health insurance as a benefit tied to
employment largely benefitted whites, and opposition to a broader,
more inclusive system from trade unions, private hospitals, and the
white medical profession blocked the establishment of a national public
insurance system like those in other countries.288 The American Medical
Association and hospitals excluded Black people as members or patients
until the Civil Rights era, few Black people had jobs with employerhealth benefits, and even if they did, they couldn’t use the coverage in
white-only facilities.289 The divisions between the two-tiered publicly
and privately financed health care systems in the U.S. were racialized
from the beginning of the nation and continue through this day.290

285 W. MICHAEL BYRD & LINDA A. CLAYTON, AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA—RACE,
MEDICINE, AND HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 1900-2000, at 9-18 (2002); DAVID
BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED—RACE AND HEALING A NATION, ch. 5 (1999)
(describing how Southern states threatened to stop Medicare’s passage if it meant they
would be required to desegregate hospitals under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and
secured an exception for physicians).
286 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 285, at 17 (“[T]he majority of African Americans
remained demographically, economically, and socially segregated and isolated within our
nation’s depressed inner cities. These areas continue their history of being medically
underserved and being provided substandard healthcare by the underfinanced, inferior
public tier of the nation’s dual unequal health system.”); SMITH, supra note 285, at 29-30
(“Public programs were for Blacks; private ones for whites.”); Uninsured Rates for the
Nonelderly by Race/Ethnicity, Timeframe: 2019, KFF, https://www.kff.org/uninsured/stateindicator/nonelderly-uninsured-rate-by-raceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%
7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Sept. 10,
2021) [https://perma.cc/C7SL-2NRD] (finding 7.8% of whites, 11.4% of Blacks, 20%
Hispanics, 7.4% of Asian-Pacific Islanders, 21.7% of Native Americans, and 8.2% of multiracial persons being uninsured).
287 SMITH, supra note 285, at 28-29.
288 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 285, at 16; Interlandi, supra note 7 (contrasting the
opposition of the white-only AMA with the Black National Medical Association, which
advocated for national health insurance system).
289 Interlandi, supra note 7.
290 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 285, at 17.
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Racial subordination was key to the ascendance of the private tier of
the U.S. health care system, and the persistence of the private health
insurance model stands in stark opposition to health justice. In the
words of Deborah Stone, the market-based logic of the private health
insurance system is “profoundly antithetical to the idea of mutual
aid.”291 Private insurance market principles are based on actuarial
fairness, where each person pays for his own risk, and the insurance
profit model depends on fragmenting the risk pool into ever smaller,
more homogenous groups.292 Moreover, the actuarial methodology of
insurance historically incorporated the social biases and subordination
of people of color, who tend to be poorer and live and work in
communities designated as higher risk.293 The U.S.’s private insurance
system treats health care as a market good — allocated based on the
ability to pay — which means poorer communities, which are
disproportionately Black and Brown, always have worse health care
access and quality.294 By contrast, other developed countries treat health
care as a public good, to be distributed based on need and funded
collectively.295 It is this organizing market-principle of actuarial fairness
and its rejection of mutual aid principles, not the mere presence of
private insurance companies (which many countries with universal
social insurance programs have)296 that connect the U.S. private health
insurance system with its racially inequitable outcomes.297
The nail in the inequitable coffin is that the two-tiered U.S. health
care system pays providers less to care for patients with public
insurance than those with private insurance.298 Price discrimination,
291

Stone, supra note 8, at 290.
Id.
293 Id. at 296-97 (describing how underwriting methodology tracks social class,
stereotypes, and occupational categories).
294 See Thomas Rice, The Impact of Cost Containment Efforts on Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Healthcare: A Conceptualization, in UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 6,
699-70 (concluding that the U.S. approach to cost containment exacerbates racial
disparities, particularly by allocating services based on the ability to pay).
295 SMITH, supra note 285, at 28.
296 Roosa Tikkanen, Variations on a Theme: A Look at Universal Health Coverage
in Eight Countries, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Mar. 22, 2019),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/universal-health-coverage-eight-countries
[https://perma.cc/8FJT-4ZJA].
297 See Stone, supra note 8, at 291.
298 See UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 6, at 190 (“Low payment rates inhibit the
supply of . . . provider[] services to low-income groups, disproportionately affecting
ethnic minorities. Inadequate supply takes the form of too few providers participating
in plans serving the poor, and provider and unwillingness to spend adequate time with
patients.”).
292
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which is the practice of providers charging different prices depending
on the patient’s/payer’s ability to pay, is an economic principle that
maximizes profits for the provider.299 Health care is rife with price
discrimination. Health care price discrimination translates into racial
discrimination, because a patient’s coverage type maps onto a patient’s
racial, economic, and social status.300
In the U.S. health care system, lower provider payments by public
payers translate to reduced access, particularly in Medicaid, the public
program for the poor and the principal source of coverage for
minorities.301 Everyone knows that Medicaid is a poor payer, Medicare
slightly better, and private coverage the most lucrative.302 Price
discrimination means providers are always more willing and eager to
serve a privately insured patient (including for COVID testing and
vaccination) than a publicly insured one and validates negative attitudes
against minority, low-income communities.303 Low reimbursement
rates depress provider participation in Medicaid, and Medicaid
beneficiaries have far worse access to health care than privately insured
patients.304 This explains the paradox of how Medicare, Medicaid, and
299 Rice, supra note 294, at 712; Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to
Providers and the Flawed Theory of Cost Shifting: Is It Time for a More Rational All-Payer
System?, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 2125, 2128-29 (2011).
300 Rice, supra note 294, at 712 (describing how a system that permits price
discrimination will lead providers to preferentially serve privately-insured patients and
avoid serving less lucrative publicly-insured or uninsured patients).
301 Sara Rosenbaum, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare: Issues in the Design,
Structure, and Administration of Federal Healthcare Financing Programs Supported
Through Direct Public Funding, in UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 6, at 664, 679.
302 MATTHEW FIEDLER, USC-BROOKINGS SCHAEFFER INITIATIVE FOR HEALTH POL’Y,
CAPPING PRICES OR CREATING A PUBLIC OPTION: HOW WOULD THEY CHANGE WHAT WE PAY
FOR HEALTH CARE? 1, 14 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/
11/Price-Caps-and-Public-Options-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9FV-44H6]; Rosenbaum,
supra note 301, at 687 (“It is perhaps safe to say that the best-known problem plaguing
the Medicaid program is its notoriously low payment rates.”); Leila Fadel, ‘The Separate
and Unequal Health System’ Highlighted By COVID-19, NPR (Jan. 21, 2021, 4:27 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/01/21/959091838/the-separate-and-unequal-health-systemhighlighted-by-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/K8D3-HNJQ] (quoting the CEO of a safetynet hospital, “We’ve created a tiered financing system for health care with commercial
at the top and Medicaid and uninsured at the bottom . . . where many of our Black and
brown communities are. And that’s why they’re being harder hit by something like
COVID. We need to fix it.”).
303 See Rosenbaum, supra note 301 (quoting a 2001 GAO Report, in which a
consultant advised a physician practice to “ration your Medicaid, and if anyone calls
from Blue Cross/Blue Shield, you say, ‘When do you want to come in? We’ll come and
get you,’” and to give Medicaid patients the most inconvenient appointment times”).
304 UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 6, at 147-48 (describing how “Medicaid’s low
reimbursement rates for doctors and hospitals” make the program’s “poor,
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the ACA reduced racial disparities in health care while perpetuating
them.305 And this is why universal coverage is necessary but insufficient
to achieve equitable access to health care. So long as private payers pay
more than public ones and people’s source of coverage is correlated with
their social, economic, and racial status, simply giving everyone an
insurance card will not achieve equity.306
Empirically, privatized health care systems perpetuate and are
characterized by greater inequality.307 Privatized health care systems
underperform publicly financed systems in terms of health outcomes,
and they are correlated with higher levels of economic and health
inequality. According to one study, the level of health care system
privatization in a country significantly increased COVID incidence and
mortality, even controlling for other variables.308 A review study found
that greater health care privatization was associated with worse patient
outcomes and quality than public health care systems across a number

disproportionately minority beneficiaries [] subject to largely separate, often segregated
systems of hospital and neighborhood clinics” and “drastically restrict Medicaid
beneficiaries’ ability to access private physicians” and hospitals”) (internal citations
omitted)).
305 Rosenbaum, supra note 301, at 664; LaShyra T. Nolen, Adam L. Beckman &
Emma Sandoe, How Foundational Moments in Medicaid’s History Reinforced Rather Than
Eliminated Racial Health Disparities, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200828.661111/full/ [https://perma.
cc/HZ5K-6CXJ].
306 Note the distinction between paying providers equally to see all patients and
charging patients equally for their coverage. Equal provider payment is necessary to
promote equality of treatment and access. An equity-maximizing system would scale
individuals’ costs of coverage and care according to their ability to pay, with wealthier
individuals paying more for their coverage than poorer individuals but the coverage
would pay providers the same rate for all patients. See Rice, supra note 294, at 712-13
(advocating for an all-payer system to eliminate price discrimination); Stone, supra note
8, at 291 (describing how social insurance breaks the linkage between the amount one
pays for care and one’s ability to pay).
307 WORLD HEALTH ORG., CLOSING THE GAP IN A GENERATION: HEALTH EQUITY
THROUGH ACTION ON THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH 95 (2008)
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/43943/9789241563703_eng.pdf;jsessi
onid=59F070C281D0321A383E27BD94057FD6?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/3TYJS7M8] (“Runaway commodification of health and commercialization of health care are
linked to increasing medicalization of human and societal conditions, and the stark and
growing divide of over- and under-consumption of health-care services between the rich
and the poor worldwide.”).
308 JACOB ASSA & CECILIA CALDERON, PRIVATIZATION AND PANDEMIC: A CROSS-COUNTRY
ANALYSIS OF COVID-19 RATES AND HEALTH-CARE FINANCING STRUCTURES 14-15 (2020)
(estimating the magnitude of this effect of privatization to conclude that “a 10% increase
in private health expenditure results in a 4.85% increase in COVID-19 cases” and “a
6.91% increase in COVID-19 deaths”).
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of low- and middle-income countries.309 This is because health care
privatization has distributional effects. A privatized system generally
does a worse job of fairly distributing health care resources across the
population — by favoring the wealthy and disadvantaging the poor, and
charging fees that deter poorer patients from seeking or continuing care
— and these distributional inequities translate to greater disparities in
health outcomes.310 Privatized health care tends to be more inequitable.
Thus, even if everyone has coverage, a private health care system will
perpetuate inequality along racial and socioeconomic lines unless it is
heavily regulated to resemble a public system of coverage with
standardized provider payment rates and benefits.
Even in countries with universal public coverage systems, where
providers typically are not paid more to serve rich patients than poor
ones, there is an observed social gradient in health status.311 A universal
single-payer health care system does not fully eliminate the health
effects of income inequality, structural racism, and other social
determinants of health.312 But health inequalities and disparities cannot
be addressed without a universal system of coverage under which
providers are paid the same amounts to treat all persons.313 Moreover,
309 Sanjay Basu, Jason Andrews, Sandeep Kishore, Rajesh Panjabi & David Stuckler,
Comparative Performance of Private and Public Healthcare Systems in Low- and MiddleIncome Countries: A Systematic Review, 9 PLOS MED. e1001244, at 1, 5-8 (2012).
310 ASSA & CALDERON, supra note 308, at 6 (“Privatization also has distributional
effects, . . . [and the] positive relationship between private health-care provision and
health inequality is confirmed by the latest data for 147 countries on inequality in lifeexpectancy [] and the ratio of private to public health expenditures . . . .”); Basu et al.,
supra note 309, at 8 (“private sector health services tend to cater more greatly to groups
with higher income and fewer medical needs . . . resulting in disparities in coverage”)
(internal citations omitted)).
311 Michael Marmot, The Health Gap: The Challenge of an Unequal World, 46 INT’L J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1312, 1313 (2017) (calling the linking of social position with health –
higher rank, better health – the “social gradient in health”); M. G. Marmot, George
Davey Smith, Stephen Stansfeld, Chandra Patel, Fiona North, Jenny Head, Ian White,
Eric Brunner & Amanda Feeney, Health Inequalities Among British Civil Servants: The
Whitehall II Study, 337 LANCET 1387, 1391-92 (1991). See generally Roosa Tikkanen,
Robin Osborn, Elias Mossialos, Ana Djordjevic & George A. Wharton, International
Health Care System Profiles: England, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 5, 2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/international-health-policy-center/countries/
england [https://perma.cc/W3TZ-ZLBN] (describing England’s National Health Service,
which served the populations Marmot studied when he described the social gradient).
312 UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 6, at 34; Rosenbaum, supra note 301, at 665.
313 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 307 at 8 (“Universal coverage requires that
everyone . . . can access the same range of (good quality) services according to needs
and preferences, regardless of income level, social status, or residency, and that people
are empowered to use these services. It extends the same scope of benefits to the whole
population.”).
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single-payer health care systems may be more likely to integrate public
health goals into their operations.314
In the iron triangle era, the holy grail of health policy was universal
access to high-quality, affordable health insurance. However, the iron
triangle ethos equated access with coverage and was not particularly
concerned whether the coverage was equal or the benefits and burdens
of such health care were justly distributed. A health justice framework
would not be satisfied with universal coverage if it perpetuated a
fragmented health care system where wealthier, socially dominant
groups benefit from generous private coverage with broad access to
enthusiastic providers and poorer, socially subordinated groups are
covered by public programs with constrained access to reluctant
providers.
***
Individualism, fiscal fragmentation, federalism, and privatization
perpetuate inequity and subordination in our health care system on a
tragic scale. To reconstruct a system on the health justice model, future
reforms must confront the fixtures.
IV. LESSON 4: HEALTH REFORM RECONSTRUCTION REQUIRES
CONFRONTATIONAL INCREMENTALISM
The pandemic has instructed us that health reform needs nothing
short of a reconstruction in ethos, centered on health justice criteria.
We have learned that the entrenched fixtures of individualism, fiscal
fragmentation, federalism, and privatization sow dysfunction in our
health care system and tragically perpetuate inequitable burdens of
disease. The health justice ethos — with its commitments to antiracism, equitable distribution of burdens and benefits, and community
empowerment — demands confrontation with these fixtures. But their
logistical entrenchment may practically compel an incremental method.
We must dig deep for our concluding lesson about how health reform
might reconcile bolder goals with sharper pragmatism about the
fixtures’ obstruction of those goals: confrontational incrementalism
offers an agenda that makes health reform reconstruction possible.

314 See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 15, at 891 (“By eliminating (or dramatically reducing)
fragmentation in health care financing, single-payer health care could better align
incentives between the health care and public health systems. . . . Under a single-payer
system, there would be near-total overlap between the primary payer for health care
goods and services (taxpayers) and those who exercise control over the most crucial
social determinants of health (voters).”)
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A. Envisioning a Just U.S. Health System
Applying the bolder criteria of health justice, what would an antiracist, equitable, empowering, and solidarity-enhancing health system
look like? Such a transformed U.S. health system would eliminate,
displace, or transcend the four legally and logistically entrenched
fixtures that have led to the functional and existential failures laid bare
by the COVID pandemic. The lessons of the pandemic have
strengthened the case for a single-payer health care system in the U.S.
— a universal social insurance program that is grounded in solidarity,
distributes its benefits based on need, allocates its financing burdens by
the ability to pay, and empowers affected communities in decisionmaking processes.315
Such a single-payer system would displace the fixture of
individualism within health care by enrolling everyone into a shared
program from cradle to grave, providing every person in the country the
same right to a comprehensive array of health care services.316 It could
also embrace public health principles, strengthening the recognition of
health as a public good and prioritizing resources toward the
enhancement of the population’s health, including addressing systemic
racial and social inequities that are themselves a public health crisis.317
Adopting a universal, single-payer system in the U.S. would eradicate
the ethos of actuarial fairness, under which everyone pays for their own
risk, and move decisively toward social solidarity where health care and
public health are public goods, not commodities.318
A universal, single-payer system would also collapse the fixtures of
fiscal fragmentation and privatization by combining all participants in
315 See Bloche, supra note 29, at 300 (arguing that “in a democracy,” the “principle
function” of health law should be to manage conflicting “hopes and expectations for the
health care system” we have “as individuals and as public-regarding citizens”); Fuse
Brown et al., supra note 1, at 419-23 (describing how national single-payer proposals
confront the fixtures more directly than the ACA did); Hunter, supra note 43, at 1959
(arguing that practices arising out of health reform “have the potential to lead to new
discourses and understandings about the interrelationship between individualism and
collectivity, and about the public and private dimensions of the health system”); Stone,
supra note 8, at 291 (“Under a social insurance scheme, individuals are entitled to
receive whatever care they need, and the amounts they pay to finance the scheme are
totally unrelated to the amount or cost of care they actually use.”); Wiley, Privatized
Public Health Insurance, supra note 61 (discussing the role of democratic deliberation in
the design and administration of public insurance programs).
316 See Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 422; see, e.g., Medicare for All, H.R. 1384,
116th Cong. (2019–2020) (proposing a national single-payer health system that would
cover all U.S. residents automatically at birth or upon residency in the U.S.).
317 See YEARBY ET AL., supra note 227, at 7-8.
318 BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 285, at 585.
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a single, unified risk pool.319 With a single payer rather than fiscal
diffusion across multiple payers, the system could coordinate and
marshal resources in times of emergency. It could provide the “national
grid for the generation, transmission, or distribution” of supplies that
Atul Gawande has argued that the US lacks.320
A single-payer system could also confront fiscal fragmentation by
applying administratively set payment rates across the population,
eliminating unjust payment differentials so that providers would no
longer be paid more to care for wealthier patients than poorer ones.
Importantly, a universal system would eliminate the segmentation of
the population into tiers of unequal private and public coverage that
reify existing racial and socioeconomic disparities in health care access
and outcomes.321 Publicly financed health systems are more equitable
and produce better outcomes than privatized systems. Health care user
fees and lack of access to a private health plan would no longer be a
barrier for disadvantaged people to access needed care, whether in a
public health emergency or in more routine circumstances.
Likewise, a single nationwide single-payer program would confront
federalism. It could flatten many of the state-by-state disparities that
flow from federalism’s deference to state flexibility.322 A federal program
could advance health justice by redistributing the burdens and benefits
of public investments in health care at a national level — rather than
relying on state financing that varies widely.
Other countries offer a variety of visions for what a single-payer,
universal health care system looks like.323 Some have greater reliance on
private health insurance contractors to administer the benefits, others
retain more federalist flexibility.324 We do not have to invent our

319

See Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 419-21.
Gawande, supra note 173.
321 See SMITH, supra note 285, at 29-30.
322 See generally JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, FEDERALISM,
AND UNEQUAL POLITICS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2018) (documenting disparities
associated with Medicaid policies that vary from state to state).
323 See Tikkanen, supra note 296.
324 See, e.g., How Does Universal Health Coverage Work?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND,
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/international-health-policy-center/system-features/
how-does-universal-health-coverage-work
(last
visited
Aug.
27,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/MA4C-BXJH] (describing Germany’s health care system that shares
powers between the federal government and the states); Dylan Scott, Ezra Klein & Tara
Golshan, Everybody Covered: What the US Can Learn from Other Countries’ Health
Systems, VOX (Feb. 12, 2020, 10:28 AM EST), https://www.vox.com/2020/1/13/
21055327/everybody-covered [https://perma.cc/5AAV-X9ZG] (describing how the
Netherlands has private, universal coverage).
320
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universal, single-payer health care system from whole cloth — though
achieving a system that counters rather than propagates the legacy of
subordination in upstream determinants of health will be a particular
challenge for the United States. We benefit from being the last wealthy
country on earth without such a system.325 The difficulty lies not with
a lack of blueprints or models, but rather from the fact that no country
has ever gotten there from here. The prospect of overcoming the fixtures
in the U.S. to achieve this transformed, universal, single-payer health
care system seems daunting and possibly even naïve.
B. Health Reform Is Hard
Perhaps COVID will usher in a new era in which the U.S. finds the
will to begin the dramatic transformation it needs. Because access to
health care is one among many social determinants of health, realizing
health justice will also require action in other sectors. But a more just
health system, integrating public health and health equity goals into
legal frameworks for health care financing and delivery, is an important
pre-condition for health justice. The pandemic undeniably affects the
political and economic climate for health reform and therefore may
affect the feasibility of pursuing bolder reforms based on health justice.
The public health and economic crises of the pandemic may have
accelerated the public’s embrace of a greater government role in health
care, untethered from employment, and willingness to confront
structural inequalities of a fragmented, privatized, “you’re on your own”
non-system.326
Moreover, while we argue for a more principled ethos in which
solidarity supports health justice, interest-convergence theory327 also
suggests that the pandemic may have added to the utility of social
solidarity. That is, the pandemic may have made it more obvious to
dominant racial and social groups in the U.S. that empowering
subordinated populations aligns with their own interests. Interest325 See JACOBS & SKOCPOL, supra note 17, at 3 (“Universal health care was established
in one way or another in every other industrial or industrializing nation. But in the
United States, health care reformers (as advocates of universal coverage are labeled)
have run into bitter political opposition and, every time, fall short of achieving
guaranteed coverage or all citizens.”).
326 See Victor R. Fuchs & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform: Why? What?
When?, 24 HEALTH AFFS. 1399, 1412 (2005) (predicting that the will for comprehensive
health reform may require major upheaval such as a “national health crisis, such as a
flu pandemic”).
327 See Mary Crossley, Black Health Matters: Disparities, Community Health, and
Interest Convergence, 22 MICH. J. RACE & L. 53, 58 (2016).
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convergence does not make health justice more normatively desirable,
but it does suggest that it might be more feasible.
With all of that said, such transformational health reform may seem
hopeless or at least unimaginably hard.328 The pandemic has vitiated
any pretense that our current health care financing and delivery system
is effective or just — it is profoundly ineffective and unjust. And it has
shown that what is needed is not just the will for health justice, but a
way. Substantial fixtures are blocking the path toward health system
transformation.329 So long as the blinkered “iron triangle” approach
remains dominant in law and policy analysis, reform will not even aspire
to a just health system, guaranteeing we will not actualize it.330 And in
the political realm, the prospect of a dramatic change brought about
through federal legislation like “Medicare for All” has seemingly
receded, once again, into the future — as it has been doing for
decades.331
At the same time, even if a bolder vision of a just health system gains
steam in policy and political circles, the road to creating such a system
in the United States is difficult because of the structural impediments
we have described.332 As this Article has demonstrated, the distance

328 See JACOBS & SKOCPOL, supra note 17, at ch. 5 (asking whether the more modest
reforms of the ACA will survive special interest lobbying by the powerful industry
groups, whether federalism will undermine implementation, and whether it will
collapse under budgetary pressures).
329 See, e.g., Patrice A. Harris, Health Reform: How to Improve U.S. Health Care in 2020 and
Beyond, AM. MED. ASS’N. (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/about/leadership/
health-reform-how-improve-us-health-care-2020-and-beyond [https://perma.cc/T39WSX3K] (stating the AMA’s opposition to single-payer reforms, and its commitment to
universal “coverage” by “build[ing] on our current” multi-payer system, pursuant to the
values of “choice,” “competition,” and “pluralism”).
330 See supra Part I.A.
331 See Rachel Cohrs, Medicare for All Champion Bernie Sanders Drops Out of
Presidential Race, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 8, 2020, 1:10 PM),
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/politics-policy/medicare-all-champion-berniesanders-drops-out-presidential-race [https://perma.cc/5FB3-THSD]; Tucker Higgins,
Biden Suggests He Would Veto ‘Medicare for All’ over Its Price Tag, CNBC (Mar. 10, 2020,
4:17 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/10/biden-says-he-wouldd-vetomedicare-for-all-as-coronavirus-focuses-attention-on-health.html [https://perma.cc/F2FZHUV6].
332 See Anup Malani & Michael Schill, Introduction, in THE FUTURE OF HEALTHCARE
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (Anup Malani & Michael H. Schill eds., 2015)
(highlighting that health reforms are difficult because they “directly implicate many of
the most sensitive ideological cleavages in our society”); Gabriel Scheffler, Equality and
Sufficiency in Health Care Reform, 81 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with
authors) (comparing the normative principles underlying differing conceptions of a
“right to health care” in single-payer or more incremental reforms).
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between conception and execution is great, and the law is often a barrier
to reform, not a facilitator. When the country musters the impulse for
solidarity in health care as it did in the spring of 2020, that impulse
crashes against entrenched, isolating, dispersive fixtures —
individualism, fiscal fragmentation, federalism, and privatization — and
stalls. These quasi-legal structures ensure that the solidarity impulse
does not translate into solidarity in practice. We have focused on
COVID and racial disparities here, but history offers other examples,
including the ACA itself.333
C. Confrontational Incrementalism
To achieve anything approaching health justice, reform must
overcome the fixtures that constrain it. This will require transformation,
which may ultimately require a single-payer health system. Incremental
reforms that fall short of transformation must be evaluated not based on
their marginal progress on quality-cost-access metrics or some proxy
endpoint like “universal coverage,” but instead on the extent to which
they reinforce or undermine the fixtures. Incremental reforms that
reinforce the fixtures are counter-productive even if they entail modest
coverage gains. But, incremental reforms that undermine or transform
fixtures could be a step forward, perhaps regardless of their immediate
impacts on coverage.
To deal with both the necessity of transforming our health care
system and the apparent impossibility of doing so, we believe health law
and policy must develop a strategy for confrontational incrementalism —
a method for identifying incremental reforms that challenge, displace,
or transcend the regressive fixtures we have described and, so, plant the
seeds for future transformation.
Confrontational incrementalism begins by distinguishing
conceptually between incremental reforms that serve as stepping stones
(which represent progress toward fundamental change) and those that
serve as stumbling blocks (which distract from fundamental change).
Crucially, confrontational incrementalism also requires frank
assessment of the extent to which incremental reforms confront legally
and logistically entrenched structures that prevent transformation.
Incremental reforms that tend to dismantle those structures are
stepping stones and reforms that accommodate those structures are

333

See Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, 414-17.
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stumbling blocks. Examples from past health reforms inform this
approach.334
Our call for confrontational incrementalism traces an agenda for
health reform reconstruction. It does not conclude the project. This
methodological focus reveals the value of further research into the way
fixtures are created and, more importantly, how they may be dismantled
— not only in health reform but also in other legal fields where
reconstruction is necessary.
1.

Stepping Stones or Stumbling Blocks

The COVID pandemic has revealed just how far the United States is
from a just and equitable health care system. This leaves a fundamental
question for reform — should we accept incremental reforms or hold
out for transformation? If, for example, we accept that modest coverage
expansions like a “public option” in the Affordable Care Act
marketplaces would fall far short, what should we make of such
reforms? Are they to be avoided as a distraction from the transformation
that must take place, or embraced as a step in the right direction?
Incrementalism is not a question merely for health policy. In drug
policy, scholars and policymakers must decide whether to seek reform
through the criminal justice system, or hold out to decriminalize
substance use disorder.335 In policing, scholars and policymakers must
decide between fundamental reform (or abolition) or modest gains.336
And in environmental policy, scholars and policymakers must decide
whether to accept modest reforms if they fail to fully mitigate and
prepare for climate change.337
Unpacking incrementalism in environmental policy, Rachel Brewster
distinguishes among different incremental reforms based on whether
they are “stepping stones” or “stumbling blocks.”338 Stumbling blocks
turn out to be “a barrier that make advancement more difficult.”339
334 See, e.g., Fuchs & Emanuel, supra note 326, at 1408 (comparing incremental
versus comprehensive reform).
335 John Kip Cornwell, Opioid Courts and Judicial Management of the Opioid Crisis, 49
SETON HALL L. REV. 997, 1005 (2019) (discussing controversy surrounding whether to
employ drug courts or abandon them as “fundamentally incompatible with the disease
model of addiction”).
336 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV.
1, 11-12 (2019) (describing abolition movement in criminal justice reform).
337 Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National
Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 246 (2010).
338 Id.
339 Id.
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Stepping stones “eas[e] the way to climbing higher.”340 In assessing the
difference, Brewster stresses the importance of considering not only the
static effects of a reform (“what the immediate and direct effects of the
policy are”) but also its dynamic effects (“how the measure will affect
the system,” including “longer-term and indirect effect[s]” and
alterations to “incentives for private and public actors”).341
This is an essential framework and an important, partial defense of
incrementalism. Yes, we should not accept any goal short of
transformation to a just and equitable health system. But that alone does
not render reforms short of that goal undesirable. To realize health
justice, the confrontational incrementalist approach to health reform
must be anti-subordinationist.342 Assessing whether any particular
incremental reform is a stepping stone or a stumbling blocks is key to
this effort.
In some sense, whether an incremental reform is a stepping stone or
a stumbling block is a political judgment for elected officials and
movement leaders. Will implementing a modest reform use up political
energy that could eventually be channeled into transformation? Or will
it demonstrate the success that will both maintain a movement’s
momentum and make the next step forward a smaller one? That said,
the relevance of such political judgments may be overstated, as shifting
political dynamics make any prediction about how choices today will
impact the will of the voters (or the politicians they elect) in some future
year inaccurate indeed.
Differentiating stepping stones and stumbling blocks is also a legal
question. Because the fixtures we have identified impede social
solidarity and propagate subordination in health care, the question of
whether to pursue reforms that fall short of the needed transformation
depends on how those reforms interact with the legal entrenchment of
individualism, fiscal fragmentation, federalism, and privatization.
2.

Applying Confrontational Incrementalism to Pre-pandemic
Reforms

Measuring incremental reforms’ degree of confrontation with the
fixtures will be hard work. As a starting place, we can find historical
examples of health reforms that, on an impressionistic basis, appear
positive or negative from the standpoint of confrontational
incrementalism.
340
341
342

Id.
Id. at 250-51.
See Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 4, at 762.
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Medicare’s enactment in 1965 may be an example of a stepping stone.
The law partially confronted privatization (established as a public
program), individualism (automatic enrollment), fiscal fragmentation
(federally-financed without segmentation), and federalism (federally
administered).343 Not surprisingly, the law is today understood as a
template for universal, single-payer, federally-run health care.344 Given
Medicare’s success in confronting the fixtures, it is no wonder that
“Medicare for All” has become the shorthand for such a system.345 It’s
worth remembering, however, that Medicare’s confrontations, while
substantial, were partial. Medicare preserved a role for private
contractors in benefits administration (in addition to preserving private
health care delivery systems).346 It also preserved fiscal fragmentation
to some degree by segregating eligible enrollees from other risk pools.
By this same analysis, Medicare Part D, which added pharmaceutical
coverage to the program, was more of a stumbling block. The program,
spearheaded by the George W. Bush Administration, changed a largely
government-run program into a fully-privatized program by relying on
private insurers to administer virtually every aspect of it.347 This private
insurance model meant individual premiums, significant cost-sharing,
and risk selection — importing an ethic of individualism and actuarial
fairness into Medicare. Moreover, by explicitly keeping the Medicare
program out of drug pricing, it failed to leverage administrative rate
setting to keep drug prices (and costs to enrollees) in check.348 Thus,
Medicare Part D invites Medicare enrollees to see themselves as
individual consumers rather than participants in a public program. In
this sense, Medicare Part D was a stumbling block because it primarily
accommodated rather than confronted the fixtures that constrain
reform.
Under this analysis, the ACA was a mixed bag. The law’s coverage
gains themselves actually came through designs that, because they tried
343 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Governing Medicare, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 44-45
(1999) (describing the Medicare program).
344 Id.
345 See Nicole Huberfeld, Is Medicare for All the Answer? Assessing the Health Reform
Gestalt as the ACA Turns 10, 20 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69, 70-72 (2020).
346 Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101
GEO. L.J. 519, 527-28 (2013) (describing reliance on private claims administration in
Medicare program).
347 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101(a) (2012); see Fox Ins. Co. v. Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., 715 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing Medicare Part D
enrollment process).
348 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww-111(i) (2012) (Medicare “may not interfere with the
negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies[.]”).
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to accommodate the fixtures, reinforced them, featuring further fiscal
fragmentation, individualism, and state administration. The law did,
however, directly attack the individualism fixture in two ways: the
individual mandate (requiring everyone to purchase insurance) and
community rating coupled with the ban on preexisting condition
exclusions (requiring everyone to share in the costs of one another’s
illness).349
Though the individual mandate did not endure,350 the ACA’s ban on
preexisting condition exclusions won the confrontation with
individualism, shifting the public’s view on preexisting conditions.351
That reform — and not the law’s coverage gains — is perhaps the
clearest example of an incremental stepping stone, precisely because it
confronted a fixture of American law.
Confrontational incrementalism can be applied to assess proposed
reforms. It does not necessarily provide definitive answers, but it does
reframe the debate around the extent to which trade-offs among the four
fixtures progress toward health justice or further entrench the status
quo.352 Consider public option reforms. A federal public option plan
could extend eligibility to everyone, create a large and unified risk pool
of previously fragmented ones, offer broad benefits and provider
participation, improve affordability through aggressive rate setting, and
offer additional financial supports for low-income and high-cost
patients.353 Such a public option reform would confront all four fixtures
to some extent and likely be a stepping-stone toward health justice. If
politics require accommodations to certain fixtures — to federalism by
allowing states to pursue a public option first, or to privatization by

349 See Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 414-17; Hunter, supra note 43, at 1959
(arguing that practices arising out of the individual mandate and health insurance
exchanges “have the potential to lead to new discourses and understandings about the
interrelationship between individualism and collectivity, and about the public and
private dimensions of the health system”).
350 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017)
(reducing the individual mandate penalty to zero).
351 See Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 76, at 560 (“Virtually no Republican is
now willing to state a desire to return to the pre-ACA landscape of discrimination based
on health status.”).
352 Fuse Brown et al., supra note 1, at 423.
353 See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Joe Biden’s Health Care Plan, Explained, VOX (July 16,
2019, 11:30 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2019/7/16/20694598/joe-biden-healthcare-plan-public-option [https://perma.cc/SNY6-F9A8] (describing candidate Biden’s
public option plan as containing all these features and noting that if implemented, it
would be “the most dramatic piece of new social legislation since the Great Society.”).
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using commercial carriers to administer public option plans354 — these
accommodations should be offset by confrontations to other fixtures.
For example, the policy could grant states the ability to combine their
Medicaid population with their public option plan, equalizing payment
rates and unifying the inequitable two-tiered public-private health care
system that pays more to providers for seeing privately insured patients
than publicly insured. Overall such a plan could be a stepping-stone
toward a just and equitable health system, even if it did not confront all
the fixtures simultaneously.
For contrast, consider a public option that is only offered on the
marketplaces (and is thus unavailable to Medicaid beneficiaries and
undocumented immigrants), leaves untouched most employer-based
coverage, is administered and financed by private health insurers, and
applies modest provider rate controls with correspondingly modest
effects on the market. A public option thus designed would
accommodate the fixtures and would not move us any closer to the goal
of a just health care system, even if it provided more choices and modest
cost savings to some enrollees.355 Such an accommodating public option
could constitute a stumbling block if it consumes all the political capital
and energy for reform, but merely reinforces the fixtures and all their
attendant problems.
3.

Applying Confrontational Incrementalism During the Pandemic

Realizing health justice — especially during a pandemic — requires
legal protections and supports that extend well beyond access to
medical countermeasures, including measures to secure safe and
healthy housing, worker protections, basic income support, food
security, and more. Here, our focus is on medical countermeasures.
Although testing and vaccination campaigns have been plagued by
inadequacies and inequities, there are examples of interventions that
incrementally confront the fixtures we have described.
Some of the most successful approaches from a health justice
perspective have been place-based interventions that inherently
confront the fixture of individualism. By prioritizing access to scarce
resources for testing and vaccination based on census tracts, worksites,
and other institutional settings, place-based strategies recognize the

354 Wiley, Privatized Public Health Insurance, supra note 61, at 2161 (discussing
potential political expedience of private provision of public coverage).
355 Jaime S. King, Katherine L. Gudiksen & Erin C. Fuse Brown, Are State Public
Option Health Plans Worth It?, 59 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2022).
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importance of individuals’ connections with the communities where
they live and work.
The Pharmacy Partnership for Long-Term Care Program is an
example of a place-based approach.356 It confronts federalism by
creating a nationwide distribution mechanism, but its hands-off
approach to privatization and its failure to confront fiscal fragmentation
left it poorly coordinated and underfunded.357 Depending exclusively
on third-party reimbursement based on the insurance status of each
individual resident or worker who receives a vaccination was a major
stumbling block. Relying on profit-motivated pharmacy chains to
mobilize vaccination teams without public oversight contributed to
failures of coordination, transparency, and accountability. Ironically,
state governors were blamed for “doses sitting on shelves” at a point
when most of those doses appeared to be sitting on shelves owned by
CVS and Walgreens. While the pharmacy chains held up vaccine
administration to obtain hard-copy consent forms for billing purposes,
state government officials were being criticized for the deficits between
doses shipped and doses administered.
A better example (though one that benefits from state flexibility
under a federalism framework, rather than confronting it) was West
Virginia’s program for vaccinating nursing home residents and staff.
West Virginia was the only state to entirely opt-out of the federal
program for vaccinating long-term care residents and workers.358 The
state’s governor and health department opted to launch their own
program. Well-funded state and local health departments played matchmaker between individual long-term care facilities and local pharmacies
and provided ongoing guidance and oversight to ensure smooth
administration.359 The state was the first in the nation to offer full
vaccination to all residents of nursing homes and assisted living
facilities.360
Rhode Island has pioneered a place-based approach to prioritization
for COVID vaccines and to ensuring just distribution of the benefits of

356

See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., supra note 147.
See supra Part II.B.2.
358 Noguchi, supra note 150.
359 Id.
360 Press Release, W. Va. Off. of the Governor, COVID-19 Update: Gov. Justice: West
Virginia Becomes First State in Nation to Complete Vaccinations at All Nursing Homes,
Assisted Living Facilities (Jan. 29, 2021), https://governor.wv.gov/News/pressreleases/2021/Pages/COVID-19-UPDATE-Gov.-Justice-West-Virginia-becomes-first-statein-nation-to-complete-vaccinations-at-all-nursing-homes.aspx [https://perma.cc/U8GCYTEC].
357

740

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:657

public investments in health. The governor and health department
designated entire “hard-hit” communities for the first phase of vaccine
distribution based exclusively on geography.361 Place-based
prioritization — based on pandemic-related indicators like test
positivity and hospitalization rate, as well as pre-pandemic tools like
CDC’s social vulnerability index362 — directly confronts the structural
racism and economic subordination that have driven COVID disparities
by actively prioritizing communities where higher-risk workplaces and
crowded multi-generation homes contribute to high exposure.363 After
prioritizing entire communities, the state health department partnered
with local housing authorities, employers, and civil society groups to
send mobile teams and pop-up vaccination sites directly to the places
where people live and work and vaccinate anyone on-site who’s willing,
without asking for documentation of individual eligibility factors or
insurance information.364
These partnerships focused on empowering local communities. They
confronted individualism by focusing on neighborhood-level factors
and the interconnectedness between individuals and the communities
where they live, work, shop, and attend school. They confronted
privatization (incrementally, but also intentionally) by ensuring strong
public coordination and oversight. They failed to confront federalism,
but in this case, state-level experimentation and on-the-ground
implementation may have had some advantages.
Another incremental approach is to confront fiscal fragmentation by
equalizing reimbursement rates for Medicare, Medicaid, and private
insurance. In March 2021, amid criticism that white and wealthier

361

Pan, supra note 106.
The social vulnerability index is a tool for identifying communities likely to be
hit particularly hard by disasters. It uses fifteen variables to rate census tracts based on
socioeconomic indicators, household composition, racial and ethnic composition,
English language skills, housing type, and access to transportation. CDC/ATSDR SVI
Frequently Asked Questions, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY,
https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/placeandhealth/svi/faq_svi.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/VZY9-B9HG].
363 Govind Persad, Allocating Medicine Fairly in an Unfair Pandemic, 2021 U. ILL. L.
REV 1085, 1131 (2021); see William F. Parker, Govind Persad & Monica E. Peek, Four
Recommendations to Efficiently and Equitably Accelerate the COVID-19 Vaccine Rollout,
HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20210204.166874/full/ [https://perma.cc/75NN-HSUH].
364 E-mail Communication from Julian Drix, Co-Lead, Health Equity Inst., R.I.
Health Dep’t, to authors (Feb. 5, 2021, 8:14 AM) (on file with authors).
362

2021]

Health Reform Reconstruction

741

residents were receiving the lion’s share of vaccine doses in his state,365
Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker announced that the state’s
Medicaid program would increase reimbursement for COVID
vaccination to twice the level of Medicare rates and mandated that
private insurers pay at least the same rate.366 Shortly after that, CMS
announced a substantial increase in the reimbursement rate Medicare
would pay to providers for administering vaccines.367 Equalizing rates
reflects a more passive approach than place-based prioritization efforts,
and it fails to confront individualism, federalism, or privatization. But
rate equalization’s confrontation of fiscal fragmentation marks a
significant, stepping-stone improvement.
***
Successful examples of confrontational incrementalism within the
pandemic point to important lessons of their own. It may well be that
accommodating one fixture as part of a trade-off that allows for greater
confrontation with other fixtures provides an important path forward.
Vaccination programs in West Virginia and other states took advantage
of federalism and public-private partnerships to confront individualism
and fiscal fragmentation. Similarly, Washington’s public option reform
accommodates federalism and privatization while confronting
individualism and fiscal fragmentation. These trade-offs among the four
fixtures merit further attention in follow-up projects. Here, our point is
simply that examining trade-offs among individualism, fiscal
fragmentation, federalism, and privatization offers a new framework for
evaluating health reforms aimed at anti-subordination, just distribution
of the benefits and burdens of public investments in health care and
public health, and community empowerment. Trade-offs among health
care access, quality, and cost are insufficient to explain or inform the
next steps in health reform reconstruction.

365 Philip Marcelo, 2 Hard-Hit Cities, 2 Diverging Fates in Vaccine Rollout, WBUR
NEWS (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2021/02/24/central-fallschelsea-coronavirus-vaccine-access [https://perma.cc/TML6-JFRA].
366 Priyanka Dayal McCluskey, In Surprise Move, Baker Administration Sets High
Insurance Payments for Vaccinations, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 8, 2021, 6:51 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/03/08/metro/surprise-move-baker-administrationsets-high-insurance-payments-vaccinations/ [https://perma.cc/E3FD-KTHQ].
367 Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Biden-Harris Administration
Increases Medicare Payment for Life-Saving COVID-19 Vaccine (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/biden-harris-administration-increasesmedicare-payment-life-saving-covid-19-vaccine [https://perma.cc/UD6K-8WTF].
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CONCLUSION
The COVID pandemic is what John Kingdon has described as a
“focusing event.”368 Reflecting on the failures of the U.S. pandemic
response may create an opening to start building a better health system
oriented toward public health and equity. The lessons of the pandemic
have made the case for reconstructing health reform to confront the four
fixtures in ways that realize health justice. Reformers should seize the
moment — the public health, racial, and economic crises of the
pandemic have accelerated the public’s embrace of a greater government
role in health care and bolstered our willingness to confront the
structural inequities of a fragmented, privatized, “you’re on your own”
system. But it is critical for reformers to ensure that they do no further
harm by entrenching the fixtures we have identified here. Regardless of
whether reformers seek to realize health justice in one leaping
transformation or tack toward it incrementally, we provide a
methodology — confrontational incrementalism — to chart the course.
The post-pandemic period will be a critical inflection point. The
COVID pandemic offers lessons about the what, the how, and the why
of future reforms to the U.S. health system. Similar lessons will also
guide reforms in other spheres implicated in pandemic devastation. The
deep entrenchment and path-dependent reification of individualism,
fiscal fragmentation, federalism, and privatization make it nearly
impossible to displace these fixtures wholesale. But abandoning the
haphazard accommodation of the fixtures, which fatally constrained
pre-2020 health reform, is a critical step in the right direction.
Given the enormity of the U.S. health system’s failures during the
pandemic, we put forth an ambitious proposal. It is time to exit the iron
triangle era in which health reforms are assessed solely in terms of
health care access, quality, and costs. We must work toward a bolder
goal of realizing health justice by centering anti-subordination,
equitable distribution of burdens and benefits (for which access,
quality, and cost are useful, but not exhaustive, metrics), and
community empowerment. This will require confronting the structural
fixtures that have hobbled the country’s pandemic response and
reinforced racial and social subordination in our health care system.
Armed with a new conceptual framework (health justice), the diagnosis
(the four fixtures) and the treatment (confrontational incrementalism),
health reform reconstruction is possible.
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